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2While the freedom to move capital is necessary for foreign investors, the power of the state to 
regulate capital transfers is necessary to prevent volatile capital from causing financial crises as 
well as to mitigate such crises when they occur.  Thus, in regulating international capital 
movement, a balance should be made between the right to transfer funds and the state’s right to 
protect the stability of its economy.  It is in relation to achieving this balance that this thesis 
argues that bilateral investment treaties’ (BITs) regulation of capital transfers is deficient, both 
substantively and procedurally.  
On substance, this thesis identifies three substantive defects that affect obligations under BITs:  
absoluteness, immediacy, and breadth.  First, many BITs adopt an absolute approach in 
liberalizing capital that does not permit any restrictions or exceptions, nor does it distinguish 
between different kinds of capital, or between the right to import capital and the right to 
repatriate capital.  Second, the obligation to permit transfers is immediate and does not allow for 
a gradual liberalization of capital.  Third, many BITs’ terms and obligations are broad and 
therefore vague, such as the broad definition of investment, or the obligation to grant fair and 
equitable treatment, which is also broad and interpreted in a manner that restricts the regulatory 
powers of the host state.
Such results could have been partly mitigated if there were a dispute settlement mechanism with 
the power to create precedent and with it a clearer and more coherent body of rules. But BITs’ 
investor-state arbitration is also deficient since it consists of ad hoc tribunals, which are not 
bound by precedent; and their decisions are not generally subject to substantive review. This
leads to an inconsistent and incoherent body of law that protects neither the state’s regulatory 
powers nor the legitimate expectation of investors. 
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8In the last three decades, financial crises have been cyclic in developing countries. Developed 
countries have also suffered from crises, perhaps most notably during the most recent global 
financial crisis.1  Just as other financial crises that started in developing countries, there are two 
major characteristics of this most recent crisis: first, the minimal, or complete lack of, regulation 
of the market, or sector of the market, where the crisis started; and second, the liberalization of 
capital flows that led to the expansion of the crisis effect.2  It is this latter characteristic that 
concerns this study. 
The treatment of international movement of investment and capital is a controversial subject that 
is part of the debate over the relationship between the state, on the one hand, and private 
investment and business, on the other.  This has always been controversial in the economic and 
political disciplines.  It is correspondingly so in the legal discipline.  It becomes even more 
complicated when the investment is foreign both politically—because of the different political 
interests involved, and legally—because international law in addition to national laws govern the 
state’s regulation of the investment.  
The regulation of international capital movement is not exclusively subject to national regimes.  
It is also subject to international law.  It is thus important to analyze the international legal 
framework governing the movement of capital and the regulatory powers of the state.  
One major characteristic of the existing international legal framework that applies to capital 
movement is that there are no comprehensive mandatory rules.  No global multilateral treaty 
regulates international capital movement.  No established principles exist in customary 
international law.  The one multilateral treaty, the Articles of the International Monetary Fund, 
regulates movement of funds relating to current transactions and, by and large, leaves the 
                                                  
1 In 2008, a credit crisis erupted in the United states and rapidly spread out to the whole global economy. IMF, 
, at 131-132 (IMF, 2008);
UNCTAD, (UN, 2009).
2 UNCTAD, n 1, at 4-18; chapter II.
Chapter One: Introduction
World Economic Outlook 2008: Financial Stress, Downturns, and Recoveries see also
The Global Economic Crisis: Systemic Failures and Multilateral Remedies
See supra . see also
9regulation of capital movement to each country.3  It also does not have a mandatory dispute 
settlement mechanism nor does it permit individuals to seek remedies for its violation.  Other 
multilateral treaties and instruments that deal with the capital movements are mostly not 
universal and are either regional like those of the European Communities, and/or lacking any 
enforcement mechanism as in the case of the OECD Codes of Capital movement.  
Capital movements are also regulated under Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).  In the last 
several decades, BITs have formed a complex web of treaties that apply to many international 
transactions.  They play a paramount role in international investment law because of their dispute 
settlement mechanism.  Although they are bilateral in nature, their effect is widespread because 
of their large number, the similar substantive obligations they impose, and the most favoured 
nation clauses they often incorporate. By the end of 2009, 2,750 BITs had been concluded 
worldwide.4  General features of this myriad of treaties include similar standards for the 
protection of investment, including the prohibition of expropriation of investment without 
compensation, and the regulation of issues of liquidation of investment and transfers of related 
capital.  
In addition, most BITs include a dispute settlement mechanism that allows investors to seek 
remedies for any violation of their rights under BITs, or in relation to any dispute with the host 
state, through arbitration.  The investor-state arbitration mechanism provided for in BITs does 
not require the investor’s home state to raise the claim on behalf of investors.  Arbitration can be 
initiated under BITs without further consent from the host state, on the basis that the host state 
has given its consent to arbitration in the treaty, and often without the requirement that local 
remedies have first been exhausted.  
By consequence of the rights they grant, enforceable through binding investor-state arbitration, 
BITs have come to occupy the dominant position in regulating investment under international 
law.  They have reduced investors’ need to resort to their home state’s diplomatic protection, as 
the International Court of Justice has noted.5  Accordingly, while there may be other treaties and 
                                                  
3 The IMF Articles only require the host state to impose capital controls in certain circumstances upon the IMF’s 
request.
4 UNCTAD, , at 81 (2010).
5 ( ), Judgement 
on Preliminary Objections, para. 88 (May 24, 2007) (“The Court is bound to note that, in contemporary international 
See World Investment Report 2010
Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo
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instruments that regulate the movement of investment and capital in the international sphere, 
BITs are among the most important instruments that regulate the treatment of international 
investment and related capital.  An analysis of the effect of any legal obligation or policy 
position adopted by BITs is, thus, important.  
BITs generally impose obligations on the host state in relation to the treatment of investment and 
related capital.  In that respect, investment is referred to broadly to include all kinds of assets and
rights that have financial value.  Correspondingly, the related capital subject to BITs is very 
broad in nature.6  
This study examines the regulation of international capital movement under asymmetric BITs 
between developed and developing countries.  It considers whether in regulating the transfer of 
funds these BITs have maintained a balance between the state’s right to preserve its economy by 
regulating capital movement and the foreign investor’s need to transfer capital related to its 
investment.  It concludes that countries, especially developing countries, must be able to regulate 
international capital movements to prevent financial crises before they occur or to deal with their 
consequences after their onset.  Notably, BITs were originally entered into in an asymmetric 
manner between developed and developing countries.  Yet during the last decade many 
symmetric BITs between developing countries were made.7 These later BITs are not examined in 
this study.
During the last two decades, liberalization of capital movement was advocated by international 
financial institutions and many economic writings as the way to avoid distortions, and to 
promote efficiency in investment and economic growth.  It is now apparent that there was little 
                                                                                                                                                                   
law, the protection of the rights of companies and the rights of their shareholders, and the settlement of the 
associated disputes, are essentially governed by bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection of foreign 
investments, such as the treaties for the promotion and protection of foreign investments, and the Washington 
Convention of 18 March 1965 on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between states and Nationals of Other 
states, which created an International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and also by contracts 
between states and foreign investors. In that context, the role of diplomatic protection somewhat faded, as in practice 
recourse is only made to it in rare cases where treaty regimes do not exist or have proved inoperative.”), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/103/13856.pdf.
6 Chapter III.
7 Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer, , at 21 (OUP, 2008) (“ Within 
the past decade, the second key development is the fact that more and more developing states have negotiated BITs 
among themselves, altogether more than 600.”); UNCTAD, 
, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2007/3, at 36 (UN, 2008) (“[B]y end 2007, more than 690 
BITs had been concluded among developing countries, constituting about 27 percent of all BITs.”).
available at
See
See Principles of International Investment Law
International Investment Rule-Making: Stocktaking, 
Challenges and the Way Forward
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or no empirical evidence for this proposition.  Nonetheless, BITs have led to the widespread 
liberalization of capital flows.  
The main purpose of BITs is to protect and promote foreign investment.  One aspect of their 
underlying rationale is that foreign direct investment can lead to the economic growth of the host 
state.  In endeavouring to promote the free flow of capital needed for investment, asymmetric 
BITs generally provide for absolute, immediate, and broad obligations that cover all kinds of 
investment and capital.  In doing so, they do not always distinguish between different kinds of 
capital, investment, investors or different circumstances of different countries.
What’s more, asymmetric BITs do not explicitly provide for the host state’s regulatory power to 
preserve its economy from volatile capital or to prevent and mitigate financial crises and balance 
of payment difficulties.  This is notwithstanding that these exceptions explicitly exist in the main 
multilateral international treaties and instruments that deal with international movement of 
capital, such as the IMF Articles of Agreement.  
The need for BITs emerged last century for political, economic and legal reasons. In this context, 
it is relevant to present a brief history of the relation between foreign investment and the host 
state which required this international law regulation. This will be followed with a brief 
description of the main trends as regards the treatment of capital movement under asymmetric 
BITs, the methodology of this study, and an outline of the thesis.
During the colonial era, the colonies were governed (either or ) by European and 
other colonial powers. When the merchants of colonial powers’ were doing business in other 
countries during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they had no need for international law 
protection under the theory that their nationals were not subject to the national laws and 
institutions of the host state.  At that time under what were called “Capitulation Agreements” 
entered into with African and Asian countries, European and other developed countries investors 
and traders were not subject to local laws or judiciaries.8  In addition, developed countries used, 
                                                  
8 Gus Van Harten , at 14-15 (OUP, 2007); Kenneth J. 
Vandevelde, , 12 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L.& Pol’y 157 (2005); 
I. Necessity of BITs
de jure de facto
See , Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law
A Brief History of International Investment Agreements
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or threatened to use, force to protect their nationals’ rights in other countries that they did not 
govern, to conclude international agreements and to adjudicate their nationals’ claims by mixed 
arbitral panels.9
Last century, with the prohibition of the use of force in international economic affairs and the 
independence of African, Asian and Latin American countries, this changed.  The main point of 
contention under international law was the control of the host state over its territory and property 
that existed in it.  Particular bones of contention were whether the national treatment of foreign 
merchants was sufficient (i.e. that it was acceptable that foreign merchants were treated in the 
same way as domestic merchants) or whether there was a minimum standard that a foreign 
investor was entitled to under international law; as well as the principles governing the ability of 
a state to expropriate.10  
Latin American countries sided with the Calvo Doctrine, under which a foreign investor was 
only entitled to treatment accorded to nationals.  These countries also required foreign investors 
to give up all diplomatic protection from their home countries, and agree, in advance, that their 
sole remedy would be in the local courts of the host country.11
At that time, customary international law maintained that there was a minimum standard that 
treatment of foreigners should not fall below, and that expropriation of foreign property must be 
for a public purpose and against the payment of prompt adequate compensation (the Hull 
Rule).12  
                                                                                                                                                                   
Surya P Subedi, , 7-8 (Hart Publishing Ltd, 2008); 
Jose E. Alvarez, 60 Ala. L. 
Rev. 944, at 959 (2009).  For example in Egypt until 1937, Europeans were not subject to local courts, but their 
disputes were decided by their home counties’ Consular or a mixed court.  Stephen D. Sutton, 
, 21 Arbitration International 
113, at 118-119 (2005).
9 Harten n 8, at 15-16; Vandevelde, n 8, at 160 (referring to U.S. practice in Latin America).
10 Ian Brownlie , at 524-528 (7th ed., OUP, 2008).
11 Georg Schwarzenberger & E. D. Brown, , at 144 (6th ed., Professional Books Ltd, 
1976) ; Vandevelde, n 7, at 159. 
12 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, , 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 
373, at 380 (1998); L. Oppenheim, , at 641 (ed. H. Lauterpacht, 8th ed., 
Longmans, 1955) ([I]t is clear that the state is bound to respect certain fundamental rights of aliens resident within 
its territory . . . .”); Schwarzenberger & Brown, n 11, 84(noting that a minimum standard exists under 
international law to protect life, freedom and property of foreign nationals).
International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle
Contemporary Foreign Investment Law: An “Empire of Law” or the “Law of Empire”? 
See Emilio Augustin 
Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain and the ICSID Secretary-General’s Screening Power
See , supra . supra . 
See , Principles of Public International Law
A Manual of International Law
supra . 
See Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment Regime
see also International Law: A Treatise
supra . 
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The first challenge to that customary international law on foreign investment (that is to say, the 
Hull Rule) was made by Mexico before World War II.  The challenge emerged during the 
dispute between Mexico and the US over the expropriation of US nationals’ property. The 
Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, relying on the Calvo Doctrine, contended that giving 
foreign investment better treatment than national investment would be a breach of the principle 
of equality. The Mexican Minister in a note dated August 3, 1938, declared explicitly that 
Mexico did not recognize the Hull Rule.13   
Thereafter, newly independent developing countries continued their challenge to the then 
existing customary international law, primarily in the United Nations General Assembly through 
what became known as the New International Economic Order Resolutions.  The UN General 
Assembly, in the 1960s and 1970s, issued many resolutions asserting the right of sovereign 
nations over their resources and their individual regulatory power over them.14  These 
resolutions, although not binding, reflected the positions of the newly independent countries.  
They departed from what was a well-settled customary international law relating to the treatment 
of foreign investors.15
By these efforts, developing countries brought into question the certainty over the Hull Rule as 
part of customary international law.  In addition, there was an increase in the number of 
nationalizations and expropriation as newly independent countries sought to take back what, they 
alleged, the colonial powers had given away.16  
Given the increased doubts over the extent of customary international law protection of foreign 
investment, the spread of expropriation, the rather weak or uncertain protection of private 
property, and generally, the weak rule of law in many newly independent states, it became 
necessary to devise a means to protect foreign investment.17  The state of the relevant customary 
international law was thus uncertain.   There was no rule that protects a contract between an 
                                                  
13 Andrew T. Guzman, 
, 38 Va J. Int’l L. 639, 646 (1998); Vandevelde, n 12, at 380.
14 Peter Muchlinski, , The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, at 4 (eds. Peter 
Muchlinski , OUP, 2008).
15 Peter Muchlinski, , at 618 (Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1995); Rudolf Dolzer 
& Margrete Stevens, , at 11 (Kluwer Law International ,1995).
16 Guzman, n 13, at 641, 647.
17 Stephan W. Schill, , 4-5 (Cambridge University Press, 
2009). 
Why LDCs sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the popularity of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties supra . 
Policy Issues in
et al.
Multinational Enterprises and the Law
Bilateral Investment Treaties
supra . 
The Multilateralization of International Investment Law
14
investor and a host state under international law.  The existing rules for the protection of foreign 
investment were ambiguous and they lacked consistent interpretation.18  Moreover, even if the 
existing international law rules protected foreign investment, there was no autonomous system 
for their enforcement.19
Meanwhile, a multitude of problems overwhelmed efforts directed at obtaining a multilateral 
agreement to protect and promote foreign investment. Private and public initiatives to conclude 
multilateral treaties to provide substantive protection to investment failed. The Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) undertook work in the area of protecting 
and promoting foreign investment.  That organization prepared a Draft Convention in 1967 on 
the Protection of Foreign Property, which was approved by all members through a decision.20
However, the draft never came into force and was not even opened for signature.  It did, 
however, serve as a model which most European BITs closely followed.21  This explains the 
similarities in substance between the European BITs. 22 It is relevant to note, although as a 
something of an aside from this chronological account of events, that the OECD countries also 
initiated negotiations to enter into a multilateral investment agreement (MAI). The MAI 
negotiations failed in 1998 after strong opposition from different groups.23
The 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other states, which established the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID),24 was certainly a step towards some procedural regulation of investment.  But it 
provided no substantive rules for the regulation of international investment.25
These developments coincided with the increase of international capital movement and foreign 
investment in developing countries that took place in the 1970s. Between the early 1970s and 
                                                  
18 Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, 
, 46 Harv. Int'l L.J. 67, at 68 (2005); Guzman, n 12, at 655.
19 Guzman, n 13, at 655.
20 , OECD 
Publication No. 23081(1967), reproduced in 7ILM 117(1968).
21 Dolzer & Stevens, n. 15, at 2-3.
22 .
23 Peter Malanczuk, 
3 JIEL 417, at 418 (2000).
24 , entered into force on October 14 , 1966.
25 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, , 42 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 123, 125 
(2003).
Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Their Grand Bargain supra . 
supra . 
Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property and Resolution of the Council of the OECD
supra
Id
state-state and Investor-state Dispute Settlement in the OECD Draft Multilateral Investment 
Agreement,
International Convention for the settlement of Investment Disputes 1965
Investment Agreements and International Law
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early 1990s, the increase of international capital movement was almost tenfold to developed 
countries and more than twentyfold to developing countries.26  This puts into context the desire 
of developed capital exporting countries to restore the international law protection for foreign 
investment and ensure the freedom of capital movement.  
Against this background, BITs began to become increasingly prominent in the international legal 
environment.27  They can be understood as a policy reaction to the desire of developed capital 
exporting countries to provide substantive protection to their nationals’ foreign investments.28  
The first BIT, made between Germany and Pakistan, entered into force on November 25, 1959.29  
Also, in this light, the 1980s and 1990s calls by developed countries and international financial 
organizations for the liberalization of international capital movements are not surprising.30  The 
growth of capital movements, coupled with the prohibition of the use of force to protect national 
investment in other states, required an independent international law system that provides for 
substantive and procedural protection against the inherent risks of investing in developing 
countries.31  Starting in the mid 1980s, the prevailing neo-liberal ideology, advocated by the 
international financial institutions, entailed excluding government control and leaving the market 
as the leading and dominant power in the process of reform and encouragement of foreign 
investment.32
Many developing countries, in the context of the scarcity of funds and capital flight that ensued 
in the 1980s, became convinced that capital brought by foreign investment was essential for their 
economic development.33  Loans from international development organizations required that the 
                                                  
26 Richard N. Cooper, , Brookings Papers on Economic Activity vol No.1, at 
97 (1999).
27 Muchlinski, n 15, 618. Indeed, one of the main reasons behind the initiation of the U.S. BITs program was 
to reiterate the existence of the Hull rule in state practice under customary international law and defeat the 
developing countries allegations and the UN General Assembly resolutions to the contrary. Kenneth J. 
Vandevelde, , 14 MIJIL 621, 625 (1993).
28 Sol Picciotto, 42 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 132, 
136 (2003); Vandevelde, n 12, at 382.
29 Dolzer & Stevens, n. 15, at 1.
30 Picciotto, n 27, 132.
31 Vandevelde, n 12, at 382; Dolzer & Stevens, n. 15, at 11.
32 Tamara Lothian & Katharina Pistor, 
, 42 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 101, at 114 (2003); Victor Mosoti, 
, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 95, at 113 (2005).
33Vandevelde, n 12, at 389. 
Should Capital Controls Be Banished
supra . 
See
U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave
Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation of International Business,
supra . 
supra
See supra . 
supra . supra
Local Institutions, Foreign Investment and Alternative Strategies of 
Development: Some views from Practice Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and the Possibility of a Multilateral Framework on Investment at the WTO: Are Poor 
Economies Caught in Between?
supra . 
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recipient countries submit to strict conditionalities, which were themselves more drastic and 
painful to implement than any controls related to foreign direct investment.34  In addition, the 
example of “the East Asian miracle”, which depended mainly on foreign investments, was an 
important factor in convincing developing countries of the importance of foreign investment.35   
The collapse of the Soviet Union also led most developing countries to discard planned economy 
and socialist strategies, and turn instead to free market system.36
It was argued that to attract foreign investment developing countries should accept BITs.  On the 
back of this argument, the number of BITs has surged to reach more than 2,750 such treaties 
worldwide.  This in itself demonstrates the sea change in the way foreign investments and capital 
are perceived by developing countries.  The desire to attract foreign capital, and the willingness 
to enter into BITs and issue laws to promote and protect foreign investment, is a radical change 
that has very significantly liberalised capital movements.37  This change coincided with the 
liberalization of trade.  Investment and trade are viewed as complimentary elements in the 
globalisation process of the world economy.38
It should also be noted that the proliferation of BITs has not brought to a halt all multilateral 
efforts to regulate foreign investment and international capital movements. The Marrakesh 
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), of which an integral 
part is the multilateral trade agreement found in Annex 1,39 includes some regulation of 
investment. The Trade Related Investment Measures Agreement (TRIMs), itself annexed to the 
WTO Agreement, restricts the imposition of some performance requirements by host states. The 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) seeks to reduce the barriers on the trade of 
services. In doing so, it regulates some aspects of investment. The GATS also imposes some 
                                                  
34 . at 388-389. These conditions entailed adopting “strict macroeconomic structural adjustment policies that 
required painful reductions of budget deficits and currency devaluations.” .
35 . at 389.
36 . at 390; Robert Gilpin, , at 7 
(Princeton University Press, 2000).
37 Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, , in Legal 
Aspects of Foreign Direct Investment, at 88 (Daniel D. Bradlow & Alfred Escher eds., 1999)
38 .
39 The Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, World Trade Organisation, The Legal 
Texts, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral trade negotiations, art. II (2) (Cambridge University Press, 
1999) [hereinafter ].
Id
Id
Id
Id The Challenge of Global Capitalism, The World Economy in the 21st Century
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restrictions on the imposition of capital controls against a Member’s specific commitment.40 One 
of the subjects of the Doha Round under the WTO was an investment agreement.41 The 
appropriateness and scope of the agreement remains at issue,42 and it is clear that the 
international regulation of investment and capital flows under the WTO umbrella is not yet 
settled. 
There are two separate targets pursued by asymmetric BITs, above and beyond the protection of 
foreign investment.  The first is the promotion of foreign investment.  Developing countries 
especially seek to attract foreign capital, technology and know how to advance their economic 
growth and development.  The second is the liberalization of investment flows, which is desired 
principally by developed countries so as to allow their investors to select the investments they 
consider the most advantageous and/or profitable. 43  
It is apparent from this that asymmetric BITs have as their objective somewhat more than a 
reinstatement of the Hull Rule in international law. Customary international law allows countries 
to regulate the entry of investment and capital as they see fit. It imposes no restriction on the 
state’s powers to deny foreign investment the right to enter.44  BITs, however, impose 
obligations with regard to capital movement related to investment which exceed anything that 
existed in customary international law.  Many asymmetric BITs, including the German and US 
BITs, liberalize both inflows and outflows of capital related to investment.  Most BITs do not 
interfere with the right of host countries to control the admission of investment.45  They allow the 
host state to admit investment according to its laws and regulation, although many BITS do not 
require registration of the investment or other prior approvals from the host state.  Some BITs 
(such as the UK BITs) grant the host state discretion to regulate the admission capital (i.e. 
inflows), but provide for the free repatriation of capital arising from investment (i.e. outflows). 
                                                  
40 , Annex 1B.
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43 Salacuse & Sullivan, n 18, at 78-79.
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As will be discussed in detail below, the liberalization of capital lows is achieved through 
absolute, broad and immediate treaty obligations.
As indicated in the paragraph above, in its BITs, the US refused to distinguish between the right 
of investors to make investments in the territory of the host state and the protection of investment 
more generally.  The US objective was to eliminate restrictions to establishing investments in the 
territory of treaty parties.46  This was achieved by incorporating the principle of national 
treatment with regard to the right to enter the host state, together with a broad definition of 
investment embodied in most asymmetric BITs that includes foreign direct investment, portfolio 
investment and other kinds of investment and transactions.47  Only a few business sectors were 
excluded from national treatment in these BITs.48  
Writings dedicated to the transfer of capital under BITs are few.49  Hagan in an UNCTAD paper 
on transfers describes different transfer provisions under BITs in comparison with other 
multilateral agreements.  He proposes the sequencing of liberalization, while maintaining 
temporary exceptions for balance of payment difficulties.50  Waibel describes the relationship 
between BIT transfer provisions and exchange restrictions, and criticizes the liberalization in the 
absence of a balance of payment exception.51  Kolo and Wälde analyze the relationship between 
BIT obligations and exchange restrictions.  They argue that while these restrictions may be 
legitimate in exceptional circumstances, they must be necessary, proportionate, non-
discriminatory, and such that they will not cause severe hardship for the foreign investor.52  In 
addition, they argue that even if these conditions are met, exchange restrictions may be in 
violation of other BIT obligations such as fair and equitable treatment and the prohibition of 
                                                  
46 Jose E. Alvarez, 
, 30 Va. J. Int 1, 33 (1990).
47 Mosoti, n 32, at 116.
48 Picciotto, n 28, 137-138.
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indirect expropriation.  Also, most writings focus on restrictions on repatriation of capital, as 
opposed to admission of capital.
Gallagher’s recent G-24 discussion paper analyzes the conflict between the US BITs’ transfer 
provisions and the use of capital controls.53  It recommends excluding short-term debt investment 
and portfolio investment from the application of BITs; allowing capital controls and balance of 
payments exceptions; and excluding investor-state arbitration in disputes relating to financial 
crises, instead having a system of state-to-state claims.54
This study takes an interdisciplinary approach, combining an analysis of economics and law.  It 
surveys the economic debate relating to the liberalization of capital movement and analyzes the 
economic case for such liberalization, as well as the utility of capital controls.  It proceeds to 
examine the role of asymmetric BITs between developed and developing countries in regulating 
international investment flows.  
Asymmetric BITs have proliferated and exist in great number.  Their provisions regulating 
transfers are often different.  These factors limit the degree to which it is appropriate to 
generalize in terms of their study and analysis.  For this reason, this study examines mainly three 
important groups of Model BITs and BITs: those of Germany, the UK and the US as 
representatives of asymmetric BITs.  These countries were chosen for the following reasons: 
(i) Germany was the first country to conclude a BIT and is party to more 
BITs than most countries;55
(ii) both the German and UK Model BITs are representative of two types of 
BITs that grant discretion to states in admitting investment; 
                                                  
53 Kevin Gallagher, , G-
24 Discussion Paper Series No. 58 (2010).
54 at 17-18. 
55 UNCTAD, (June 1, 2010), 
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(iii) the US Model BIT represents a different kind of BITs that imposes certain 
obligations on states in admitting foreign investment; and
(iv) each of these groups of treaties represents a different approach to the 
regulation of capital transfers. 
Each of the above countries has developed more than one Model BIT over time. This study 
focuses on the Model BITs used in the 1990s because: (1) this period was the time when the 
surge of entering into BITs started and (2) this period coincided with the prevalence of the 
liberalization of capital movement trend.  The most recent US Model BIT of 2004 is also 
discussed because it represents a revised Model BIT devised by a developed country after it has 
had its own experience of investor-state arbitration.56
While the analysis in this study starts with these models, BITs that follow the models and those 
that have different rules are also analyzed in order to identify and analyze the main trends in
regulation of capital movements under asymmetric BITs.
As charted above, this study does not examine symmetric BITs (the so called south-south BITs), 
treaties or initiatives between developing countries, as well as other multilateral treaties, 
including regional arrangements and treaties. 57  Also, the subjects of human rights and 
                                                  
56 In the case of the United states, under an investment chapter of a free trade agreement, namely the North 
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corruption and their relation with liberalization of international capital movements, growth, and 
development under BITs are not examined in this study, which are discussed elsewhere.58
Asymmetric BITs state their support for the views that foreign investment brings economic 
growth, and that liberalization of investment is beneficial, in both non-binding statements in their 
preambles and in the form of legally binding obligations. Yet the relationship between foreign 
investment, economic growth and development is not simple.  Foreign investment does not lead 
to economic growth and development by itself; this is not its main purpose; its main purpose is to 
make a profit.  The component of liberalizing international capital movement in a market led 
development does not succeed without satisfying other conditions in the host state economy and 
its regulatory system.  A balanced approach that recognizes the importance of the role of private 
investment, as well as the regulatory role of the state, in achieving development is warranted.  
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This study does not purport to propose an alternative to the free market system. Rather it 
provides a critique to a certain school of thought within the free market system in its treatment of 
the movement of international capital and the legal results of this direction in asymmetric BITs.
This study concludes that asymmetric BITs do not represent a balanced approach.  It analyzes 
these BITs treatment of capital flows substantively and procedurally in conjunction with the 
analysis of the economic case for liberalizing capital movement and the use of capital controls.
Chapter two discusses the economics of the liberalization of capital movements and the use of 
capital controls.  It discusses the main political and economic theories relating to the 
liberalization of international capital movements.  The most prevalent school of thought during 
the 1980s and 1990s supported the liberalization of international capital movement and the 
abolition of capital controls under what was termed the “Washington Consensus.”  This trend 
proposed lifting restrictions on capital movement on the ground that this would lead to efficiency 
and better allocation of investment, that is, allocation to its economically optimal utilization free 
from government interference.  This is the rationale for the position adopted by many BITs with 
the aim of liberalizing capital movements.  This rationale is analyzed, as are other theories which 
are critical of such liberalization.  The analysis concludes that the supposed benefits of capital 
liberalization are double-edged.  While liberalization of capital movements may produce 
economic growth, it does not ensure the sustainability of that growth.  A certain advancement 
and maturity in the market of the liberalizing state is a precondition for such sustainability.  The 
theoretical underpinning of liberalization, in particular its lack of empirical studies, is also called 
into question.  The conclusion reached is that absolute and immediate capital liberalization is not 
suitable for all countries, especially developing countries.  Rather regulation of capital movement 
and particularly capital inflows is necessary. 
It also analyzes one mechanism used to regulate capital movements: capital controls.  It 
evaluates their rationale and the case for their abolition.  It also assesses their effectiveness and 
distinguishes between different kinds of capital controls.  Almost all countries used capital 
controls at some point in history to protect their economy.  While many developed countries 
have abolished capital controls, they still use them in financial crises.  It is evident in recent 
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history that some countries have used capital controls to prevent the consequences of global 
financial crises from reaching their economies.
The thesis goes on to consider asymmetric BITs substantive treatment of capital transfers 
focusing on three aspects: breadth, absoluteness and immediacy.  The breadth and immediacy of 
relevant BIT provisions is discussed in Chapters three.  Chapter three discusses the breadth of the 
concept of investment, which is a key factor in determining the types of transactions protected by 
asymmetric BIT obligations. It also analyzes the breadth of the admission of investment 
provision.  Investment is defined broadly in BITs to cover almost every asset and transaction that 
has economic value.  This broad definition includes foreign direct investment, indirect 
investment and other transactions that are not considered investment in economic terms.  The 
broad meaning given to investment leads to ambiguity and incoherence in practice.  Two 
competing interpretations exist.  The first maintains that every asset and transaction included in 
the treaty definition qualifies as investment.  This has been adopted in most arbitral awards.  The 
second interprets the treaty definition as limited to assets that have the characteristics of 
investment.  This has been adopted in a minority of arbitral awards.  The breadth of the 
investment definition is problematic because it extends the scope of BITs’ protection, and its 
guarantee of capital transferability, in a manner that unnecessarily covers assets and property that 
are not rightly characterized as investment.  
In addition, one way to restrict capital movement is by restricting the underlying investment.  
Most asymmetric BITs’ admission provisions are broadly drafted and allow the admission of 
investment according to the host state’s laws and regulations. These broad provisions have led to 
interpretations that find that foreign investors’ violation of the registration requirement in the 
host state laws and regulation does not constitute violation of the BIT admission provision.  The 
breadth of these admission provisions and their interpretation can result in the host state losing 
its discretion to require registration of investment and accordingly, its discretionary power to 
admit investment.  Further, the admission of investment under US BITs is subject to national and 
most favoured nation treatment.  This further restricts the state’s discretionary powers to control 
admission of capital through restricting the underlying investment. 
24
Chapter four analyzes the absoluteness, breadth and immediacy of the liberalization of capital in 
asymmetric BITs’ capital transfer provisions.  Absoluteness is demonstrated in the transfer 
provisions which liberalize the transfer of capital in absolute terms without permitting 
derogations or any restrictions by the host state.  The transfer provisions are typically broad.  
They do not distinguish between different kinds of investment and capital in guaranteeing the 
transferability of related capital, which includes short-term capital.  In addition, many 
asymmetric BITs guarantee both the transferability of capital inflows and outflows.  This 
accordingly prevents the host state from regulating the admission of volatile capital.  Unlike 
many multilateral agreements and international instruments that allow gradual liberalization, 
asymmetric BITs do not permit gradual liberalization to enable the host state’s market to develop 
and to manage different kinds of capital.
Chapter five analyzes the breadth and absoluteness of two obligations and standards of treatment 
that affect the power of the host state to regulate capital: fair and equitable treatment, which is 
broadly defined and interpreted and most favoured nation treatment.  Even when an assymetric 
BIT does not cover the transfer of capital inflows or certain kinds of capital, national treatment 
and most favoured nation treatment provisions may broaden that BIT’s scope to cover capital 
inflows.  Also, even where exceptions or regulatory powers are included, the operation of other 
BITs’ obligations like most favoured nation, national treatment, fair and equitable treatment and 
the prohibition of indirect expropriation may lead to diminishing the regulatory powers and 
exceptions reserved to the host state.  This has led to incoherence and ambiguity that may unduly 
hinder the powers of the host state to regulate capital.  This breadth results in ambiguity and 
incoherence in the application of BITs.  This chapter also analyzes investor-state arbitration, the 
dispute resolution mechanism provided for under most BITs. Investor-state arbitration is broad in 
its scope since it covers disputes resulting from general regulatory measures on capital 
movements.  It is a deficient and defective system, due to its nature, lack of consistency, 
lack of authority to consider public interest and balancing factors, lack of accountability, and 
inability to correct wrong interpretations.  These features do not permit the establishment of 
coherent, balanced and consistent rules to mitigate the substantive deficiencies in the treaty 
provisions themselves.  
ad hoc
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The concluding chapter notes that the regulation of capital movement under BITs is deficient, 
both substantively and procedurally--substantively, because of the way BITs’ obligations are 
drafted, and procedurally because of the selection of ad hoc arbitration as the method of dispute 
settlement.  Conclusions are drawn based on the analysis of the previous chapters.  They 
highlight the principal themes of the substantive and procedural deficiencies.  Some general 
reforms are proposed.
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In the late 1970’s, Sir Joseph Gold commented on the debate over the use of capital controls, 
stating: “Most opinions about capital controls are expressions of the slogan that they are 
necessary evils in some circumstances, with some experts stressing the word ‘necessary’ and 
others the word ‘evil’.” 1
The same comment can still be said today with regard to the debate involving the liberalization 
of capital movements and the use of capital controls. The issue of international capital movement 
liberalization is of great importance.  It has invoked much controversy surrounding its economic 
benefits, costs, and its relationship to development. As Barry Eichengreen notes, “[i]t is hard to 
think of another issue over which there is more dispute or where the stakes for policy are 
higher.”2  It is surprising that liberalization was embraced without much reservation during the 
1990s by many economists and international financial institutions.  It is still being advocated, 
although with more caution–at least publicly—by the same groups today.  
In order to establish the credibility of the arguments for and against international capital 
movement liberalization, it is important to discern the differences in ideologies and interests that 
lie behind many of the different approaches advocated, with regard to liberalization of capital 
movements and the use of capital controls.  Most viewpoints concerning liberalization of capital 
movements are based on achieving growth and/or development.  The same is true regarding 
international agreements that typically include development, economic growth or prosperity as a 
purpose in their preambles.3
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Meanwhile, there has been a substantial increase in capital flows starting in the latter part of the 
20th century.4 Substantial amounts of capital flows starting from mid 1980s led to varied results 
for developing countries. While some witnessed economic growth others witnessed episodes of 
financial crises and a decline in growth rates. 5
This chapter analyses the debate surrounding liberalization of international capital movement 
and presents the case for and against the use of capital controls. In doing so, it discusses the 
different theories and ideologies behind different approaches, touching on the political economy 
of the players involved therein. The chapter begins with identifying the main approaches towards 
liberalization of capital movement and investment, along with the primary tools used to further 
each approach.  The case for capital liberalization will be discussed, along with its ideological 
underpinnings and underlying economic arguments.  The chapter then discusses capital controls
and the reasons and criticisms for their use. 
This chapter evaluates the evidence on capital movement liberalization and the use of capital 
controls. The key question is this: will the benefits of capital movement liberalization and the 
elimination of capital controls exceed the costs for developing countries? The answer depends on 
whether a one-model or a “one size fit all” approach is the right way to regulate international 
capital movements, and whether development is the viable strategy for such an approach.
After World War II (WW II) the idea of development was confined to economic growth, buoyed 
by the belief that growth would raise the quality of life for all people.6  Developing counties 
thereafter realized that growth is a necessary prerequisite for development, but not sufficient by 
itself to achieve equitable distribution of wealth. 7  
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By the middle of the twentieth century, three approaches toward foreign investment existed. 
First, developed states embraced the approach of “liberal investment policy” or “an economic 
nationalist policy,” maintaining that international law includes a requirement of an international 
minimum standard that must be accorded to foreign nationals. 8
The second approach was advocated by newly independent developing countries, which came 
together to defend their national interests in a heretofore unprecedented display of power.9 The 
trend of independence of states in the 1960s coincided with the newly independent states 
assuming the ability to regulate economic activities in their jurisdiction. 10 Most of these states 
were capital-importing developing states.11 They declared their right to control foreign 
investment within their territories as a part of their economic independence.12  Many sided with 
the Calvo doctrine- an “economic nationalist policy” that places the interest of foreign investors 
on the same level as local national entities.13
The third approach involved socialist states, which rejected the existence of any international 
legal protection for foreign investment and nationalized private property to control the 
economy 14
These approaches have shaped the current debate with regard to international regulation of 
capital movement and treatment of foreign investment, thus the identifying their origins is highly 
significant in understanding the discourse of this topic. The three trends invoked distinct ways in 
which the interests and ideologies of their proponents are enforced. While developing countries 
participated in the General Assembly of the UN to declare their positions and defending their 
interests, developed countries opted to use international agreements, programs and codes drafted 
and promoted by international financial organizations, to enforce their own set of interests. The 
third trend of socialist states lost momentum, however, with the fall of the Soviet Union.
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As for international financial institutions, most notably the Bretton Woods institutions, they 
adopted the neo-liberal stances, asserting that government intervention should be very limited 
because it causes distortions in the market. 15  To enforce this, the Interim Committee of the IMF 
in 1997 suggested amending the Articles of the IMF to obligate member countries to accept the 
IMF power over capital transactions in order to liberalize capital account.16 The suggested 
amendment would have added the convertibility of capital transactions to the objectives of the 
IMF, such as current transactions.17  This suggestion failed as it coincided with the East Asian 
economic crisis, which forced many countries to reconsider the liberalization of capital account’s 
shortcomings.  
It is submitted that the current debate regarding the liberalization of international capital 
movements and the use of capital controls is shaped by different interests and ideologies that 
colours this debate under the guise of achieving development and efficient use of resources 
reaching a total growth. 
Economic nationalism puts the political national interest of the host State above other 
considerations.  The host State is allowed to interfere in the capital flows in order to preserve its 
national interests and advance domestic welfare.18  
The main objective of this trend of thoughts is to promote political agenda of the state.19 For this 
reason, followers differ drastically on the content of the policies they feel should be pursued, 
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depending on where their States are standing at a particular moment. The differences are most 
drastic between developed and developing States.20
Economic nationalists from developing countries use interventionist measures to attract foreign 
direct investment that will enhance the national policy and to restrict capital not conforming 
thereto.21 Since foreign investment may not achieve the promised development, they leave room 
for the State’s regulation and interference.   Additionally, because foreign investment may only 
benefit its owners without producing any benefit to the host State’s economy, in terms of 
technology transfer, foreign currency reserve, or employment, the host State reserves the right to 
regulate such investment to insure its contribution to its welfare.22   This sect also supports 
restriction of outward investments to prevent capital outflows.23
On the other hand, economic nationalists from developed States are concerned with protecting 
their investments abroad, for which they support promotional and protective measures. 24 At one 
point in time, protective measures involved the use of armed force.  Now, economic sanctions 
and diplomatic pressure are utilized as along with promotional measures, which include 
providing insurance schemes for investment, information and finance, and financial aid to States 
that protect foreign investment.25  For instance, Germany and France provide political risk 
insurance only to investments in States with which they have BITs.26
In short, “[e]conomic nationalists are willing to regulate economic activity to the extent 
necessary to further national political policy.”27
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Economic liberalism subscribes to the idea of freedom of private persons organizing their affairs 
and economic relations without interference of the government which leads to the failure of 
achieving optimal use of resources.28  It is acclaimed to be the most successful economic model 
in creating wealth, benefiting the middle classes people, maximizing production and advancing 
technology.29  The latter two outcomes are related in that maximizing productivity is done by 
advancing technology.30  In doing so, the system disregards less advanced means of production 
in what is known as “process of creative destruction”: it destroys the less advanced in order for 
the more advanced to develop. 31  The system accommodates those who are able to adjust and 
adapt with the new advancement and accompanied changes in accordance with the “creative 
destruction” process. 32
According to this trend, having an international capitalist system and leaving the market forces to 
function unhindered by government intervention lead to the most efficient use of resources and 
best results for everyone. 33 Rationality assumes that each individual is making a decision that 
achieves his or her best interest to achieve the highest utility.34 Thus, rationality results in the 
efficient use of resources as a result of the cumulative rational decisions of all individuals.   This 
trend assumes that all individuals behave rationally to efficiently use their capital and 
accordingly achieve the maximum gain, resulting in an optimal allocation of resources. 35
This theory argues that the government role in the market should be very limited and confined to 
maintaining the rule of law, protecting contractual and private property rights, presiding over 
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fiscal policy, controlling inflation and rectifying market failures.36  An independent legal system 
is required to limit government reach in the market, protect private rights from government 
meddling, “and to enforce bargained-for exchanges in the market.” 37
Consistent with this notion, the “Washington Consensus” played a vital role in applying this 
theory on the international economy.  The Washington Consensus is a term coined by John 
Williamson that describes the agreement between Washington political institutions, the 
prominent international financial institutions (IMF and the World Bank) and Washington think 
tanks on the prescription for an efficient economy, which a developing state should follow.38
The Consensus coincided with the end of communism and the old communist bloc aspiration as 
a prescription for a capital system.39  The resulting set of policies is mainly an application of the 
neo-liberal theory. The IMF and the World Bank had a significant role in enforcing this neo-
liberal paradigm by urging developing countries to take measures that included opening their 
markets to foreign capital.40
The Washington Consensus mainly focuses on liberalizing trade, stabilizing macroeconomics 
and obtaining the correct prices.41 As observed by Aslund:
Standard measures were the minimization of the budget deficit, a broadening of the tax base and cutting of 
top tax rates, reorientation of public expenditures, a strict monetary policy, the liberalization of prices and 
foreign trade, deregulation, demonopolization, financial liberalization, the liberalization of foreign direct 
investment, unification of the exchange rate, the privatization of state enterprise, and the reinforcement of 
property rights. Democracy had proven beneficial to such reforms, and a social safety net for the poor was 
desirable.42
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The liberalization of capital markets is one of the most controversial parts of the Washington 
Consensus.43 Economic liberalism refers to this trend that advocates liberalization of capital 
movements based on the neo-liberal political economy stances.  This is often referred to as the 
“economic theory”.44
But the economic nationalism school of thought has an effect on this theory, as well as 
manifested within the position taken by the US.  The US promotes the free movement of capital 
and the integration of financial markets in order to obtain the necessary funds from savings of 
other countries.45 It is on the top of the capital importing countries list.46 The US rate of savings 
is very low in comparison to most developed countries.  For the US to keep the current rate of 
consumption and investment, the US has to use savings from other countries.  It facilitates the 
borrowing process to produce a globalized world with integrated financial markets. 47
To substitute foreign savings with national savings will lead to decreased consumption, which 
would in turn lead to a recession. 48  In addition, Wall Street benefited from interconnected 
financial markets, without restrictions on capital movements, especially in emerging economies 
where the market was expanding faster than that of the US. 49
Another reason for US support for the free capital movement is the effect of such movements on 
the political economy of other countries. Other countries will be pushed to follow the US model 
of corporate structure and labour rules. 50 This is crucial as many systems, especially in Asia, 
which are based on long term relationships and tolerance on getting returns, weaken the 
competitive ability of American corporations. 51
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The convergence of interests between Wall Street and US corporations to lift capital controls and 
allow the free movement of capital compelled the US Treasury to push international 
organisations like the IMF and the WTO to include the liberalization of capital movements on 
their agendas.52  This manifested in the calls to amend the IMF Articles to include the power of 
the IMF to force members to liberalize capital movements. 53  
Notably, BITs and many legal writings adopt the neo-liberal theory as representative of 
economics.54  In addition, international financial organizations and national institutions 
encouraged this trend.55 Although the Washington Consensus, as originally envisaged, advocates 
liberalizing foreign direct investment, the neo-liberal line, followed by the international financial 
institutions and many BITs, included liberalizing portfolio investment and short-term capital.  
Also, there were differences in some policies that were prescribed by the international financial 
institutions and in the way they were applied in different countries.56
According to this neo-liberal consensus, in matters of foreign investment, the role of law should 
be confined to protect private rights and specifically foreign investors and should establish a 
legal environment accommodating to liberal market economy.57 Economic development and 
growth can be achieved by integrating into the global economy, which results in greater 
prosperity. 58  Free transfer of capital and the elimination of barriers to capital movements are 
essential steps for economic development and growth for the whole global economy and 
maximizing productivity. 59  
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This trend considers government interference in regulating economic relations “both normatively 
undesirable (under neo-liberal theories of development) and legally unacceptable (as evidenced
by international arbitration awards).”60  It diminishes governments’ power to regulate relations 
and limits legislatures’ ability to choose any other course.61  This “alone guarantees the basis for 
economic development, stability, and growth.” 62  
Any disadvantage attributed to foreign investment is dismissed by liberal advocates as a result of 
government’s interference and regulation and not from any deficiency in the process of 
liberalization of capital movements. The ready answer is for governments to increase of 
deregulation. 63  Crises suffered by countries that liberalize capital movements are explained by 
claiming that these countries are being punished for wrong policies. These crises are justified by 
policy mistakes like unwarranted restrictive monetary and fiscal policies (Italy, UK and Spain 
1992). 64 Mexico’s severe inflation and current account deficit are used to justify the attack on its 
currency and its crisis. 65  According to this trend, if countries take the “correct” policies, they 
can avoid speculative attacks that bring currency crises. 66  
Heterodox economics include different theories that are critical to economic liberalism and are 
mainly influenced by Marxism and the neoKeynesian economics.67 The public interest theory 
assumes that government regulation serves the purpose of achieving public interest by curing 
market imperfections.68 This is common point in all sects in this trend, which is the emphasis on 
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the role of the government as a key player in the economy and in income distribution in response 
to market inefficiency.69  This trend stresses the inefficiency of the market alone and the need for 
the government interference in different forms, which may include regulation, to remedy such 
imperfections.70  
This school of thought finds that liberalization of international capital movement are 
problematic. The main contribution to this trend, in this context, is in revealing the weaknesses in 
the neo-liberal consensus on capital movements.  This trend criticizes the neo-liberal’s 
economists for presenting their theory as a scientific fact and doubts its foundations.71 It finds the 
“liberal consensus . . . a historically contingent one. Liberalism is no less vulnerable than 
competing ideologies to the adverse consequences of its failures.” 72  
Capital flows are negatively viewed as increasing the dependency of developing countries on 
developed ones and keeping them in an underdeveloped state. 73 This trend disagrees with the 
assumptions made by the neo-liberal economics on the efficiency and rationality of the market. It 
is more concerned with equitable distribution and public interest rather than efficiency and 
growth . 74
Many of the prescriptions proposed by the neo-liberal theory are based on inaccurate 
assumptions. 75  The main problem with liberalism is the assumption of the existence of efficient 
markets and rational investors.  But efficient and competitive markets do not generally exist in 
developing countries, which are “characterized by extensive market failures.”76  
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In addition, the rationality assumption is not totally accurate because decision making is more 
complex and involves other factors including availability of information, and, social and 
psychological factors, among others.77
This trend also emphasizes the uncertainty of economics and the risks arising from advanced 
financial tools.78 The liberalism trend assumes that the economic system ergodic: probabilities do 
not change by time as the structures do not change.79  However, the economic system is rather 
nonergodic: probabilities differ from one point in time to another as structures change. 80  
Moreover, the liberal theory does not deal with the issues of equitable distribution of wealth and 
economic justice.81  Rather, it is concerned with total growth and maximization of productivity.82
The advantages of liberalizing international capital movement are founded on both 
macroeconomic and microeconomic theory. The main argument for liberalizing capital 
movement offers the notion that liberalization will lead to the efficient allocation of international 
savings “and a better diversification of risk, hence greater economic growth and welfare.”83
Many theoretical models assert that international financial integration leads to growth and 
development in developing countries. 84
Liberalizing capital movement achieves the most efficient use of resources which leads to greater 
growth for the entire global economy and provides essential capital developing countries need 
for development.  Capital mobility affects the whole global economy and should not be
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considered a national or domestic issue due to its global effect.85  Accordingly, a global and 
comprehensive approach that results in global growth and development should be adopted.  
Liberalization leads to the best allocation of capital and helps to diversify risk, which leads to 
more economic growth and development. 86 This refers to the assumption that by liberalizing 
capital flows, capital will go to where it can achieve the maximum profit or lower risk. 87 This 
parallels the comparative advantage theory of free trade, where the benefit of free trade is 
maximized in all countries. 88 In addition,“[c]apital inflows can improve a country’s balance of 
payments, smooth temporary shocks to income and consumption, reduce borrowing costs, and 
spur economic growth.” 89
From a macro-economic perspective, capital inflows can help countries, especially developing 
countries, to increase investment and growth. 90 Increasing economic growth is the most 
successful and fastest way to fight poverty.91 Capital inflows are especially important for 
countries where the domestic savings fall short of their development needs.92 This is important 
given the decrease in the amount of Western sovereign aid to developing countries. 93
Additionally, foreign capital helps in increasing employment and transfer of technology. 94  
Capital controls and restrictions on capital transfers deter foreign investment, thus, impeding 
growth potential and further stagnating developing countries.95   
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It is argued that free transfer of capital supplements free trade in many respects. It avoids trade 
barriers through foreign direct investment. 96  From a micro-economic perspective, liberalization 
of capital movements increases the efficiency of production as it helps investors to obtain capital 
needed for investment for a lower price.97   Through free movement of capital, investors are also 
able to diversify the risk of investment. 98
Freedom of capital movement allows for regulation of government policies, specifically 
monetary policies. 99  Investors will punish bad policies by refraining from investment or 
withdrawing investment from a country. In contrast, governments pursuing favourable policies 
will be rewarded with an increase in capital inflows and investment, which boosts the 
government economic program.100  A problem that arises here, however, is that the investors are 
assumed to be the arbiters for what constitutes a good or bad policy. Private investors may not be 
qualified to decide whether a policy is good or bad. They tend to move as a herd, thus potentially 
leading to group think cases. It is the anticipation of profit that drives them and not the 
fundamentals of economic practice. In addition, good policies in the eyes of private investors 
translates  to policies that increase profits for them. In practice, this means that the public interest 
may become less of a priority. It also encourages race to the bottom in prices between countries 
requiring foreign capital.101
It is further asserted that the economic system of any country may occasionally face financial 
shocks that affect the balance of payment equilibrium. 102 In these cases, capital inflows will be 
needed to restore the balance of payment equilibrium. 103 It will be easier to attract private 
inflows to restore the balance of payment equilibrium when capital transfers are liberalized. 104  
This is, however, limited to cases of countries with stable political systems and advanced 
financial markets. 105
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Furthermore, it is asserted that advances in technology and communication makes reversal of the 
trend of capital mobility liberalization inconceivable.106  This is due to the advancement of 
communications and different jurisdictions involved, that attempts to restrict capital movement 
are condemned to be ineffective and unable to achieve their targets on the long run. 107  The issue 
thus becomes how to get the most benefit out of capital mobility and minimize the risks. 108
Finally, the principle of freedom of choice and democracy provides the last rationale for 
liberalizing capital movement.  One of the basic principles of democratic societies is freedom. 109  
Freedom is an absolute value that should be focused on as means of development.110  Different 
kinds of freedom uphold and maintain each other.111 This includes the right of free choice to 
invest anywhere in any legitimate activity.112  In this context, liberalization provides such 
freedom and equality for all who chose to partake.113
There are many risks that arise from liberalization of international capital movements.  Foreign 
investment and free moving capital flows usually raises some concerns for any nation from both 
micro and macro-economic point of views.  It is riskier to developing States.
First, liberalization is associated with financial crises. Any country whether developed or 
developing may suffer from financial and currency crises.114  The possibility of arbitrary 
movement of capital that disrupts the economy even if the economic fundamentals exist and did 
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not change may lead to inefficient allocation of resources. 115  Many external reasons can 
provoke speculative attacks. 
An important cause of any financial crisis is the way investors in the international capital market 
behave.116  Investors may lose their confidence in investing in a specific country or countries and 
start to rush out for a variety of reasons. 117 The motives may be political or economic, internal or 
external, significant or insignificant.118 It does not matter the nature of the reasons that changed 
the perception of investors or the veracity thereof, so long as investors find it better to transfer 
their mobile investment away from the specific country or countries, it is up to the complete 
discretion of the investor.119  This behaviour is often an exaggerated reaction, which exacerbates 
the economy’s position and the circumstance that was feared becomes reality simply because of 
the excessive reaction and not because of the underlying reason.120
What makes this even more problematic is the herd behaviour feature of capital markets. Herd 
behaviour is one of the capital markets imperfections that creates crisis.  Investors, lenders and 
fund managers who deal with short term investment typically focus more on the behaviour of 
their counterparts than to economic elements. 121  The behaviour of other investors will affect the 
price of their assets or investment, a fundamental characteristic of supply and demand. 122 In 
addition, the reputation of any fund can be damaged if it alone loses while others do not. In case 
these securities sustain loss, it is important for any fund manager to find their other counterparts 
in the same situation to be defended as it is a mistake made by all, and not simply a single 
investor’s oversight. 123   
Another reason for crises is the so-called “self-fulfilling attacks”.124  This refers to speculators 
attacks on the system to cause a change in the macroeconomic policy, which they anticipate and 
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exploit.125  They cause the crisis even though the economic elements are functioning well.126  
This can be illustrated by how a currency crisis begins. Investors and lenders, worried from 
depreciation in the currency, stop their activities and start transferring their capital out.  By this, 
they share significantly in creating the currency crisis.127  The contrary effect of the surge in 
inflows will follow.  Exchange rates and assets’ prices decrease. 128  To preserve the currency, 
governments have to increase interest rates, which results in further weakening of the banking 
system. 129
A different but related problem is the spill over or contagion problem. This refers to the effect of 
a crisis in one country that extends to other countries, which are in the same region, share similar 
economic circumstances, or are viewed as similarly situated without being warranted by their 
economic circumstances.130  These associated countries may very well have an efficient and 
functioning economy.  However, they become the victim of the change, as viewed by investors 
regarding investment in such economies.131
Another kind of drawbacks represents a combination of contagion and self fulfilling attaches.  It 
happens when a devaluation of a country’s currency lead to deterioration in its trading partners’ 
positions due to decreased competitiveness, which may force the trading partners to devalue their 
currencies in order to preserve their competitiveness.132 Speculators may attack its trading 
partners in anticipation of devaluation of their currencies or in anticipation of external changes, 
which may cause currency crises. 133 The collapse of one country’s currency may lead to 
another’s collapse. 134 The anticipation that a country will defend its currency may lead to more 
speculative attacks. 135
One more drawback for developing countries is that they are more prone to crises when they 
liberalize capital movement. Crises in developed countries do not usually turn into financial 
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market crises nor does financial disorder result in currency crises or payment difficulties in 
developed countries. 136  There are many reasons for this difference between developing and 
developed countries in the effect of crises, which make developing countries more vulnerable to 
financial crises. 
The market trusts developed countries’ economic systems and usually expects their system to 
bounce back. 137 To be sure, small devaluations in developing countries like Mexico, Thailand, 
Indonesia and Brazil in the 1990s resulted in loss of market confidence. 138  On the other hand, 
developed countries like Canada and Australia left their currencies to devaluate without capital 
controls and the market expected that their currencies will recuperate naturally. 139  
Additionally, the financial market of a developing country is, by and large, small, thus any 
middle-sized capital inflows or outflows may substantially affect prices. 140  The net external 
indebtedness of developing countries, which is mostly dominated in foreign exchange, usually 
exceeds that of developed countries. 141  It is even worse if the external debt is held by the private 
sector as opposed to governments. 142
Second, investment may not guarantee growth either in the short term or the long one.  The 
complete effect of the liberalization of capital movements on development and growth is not 
clear.143  Moreover, there is some evidence that liberalization of international capital movements 
may lead to consumption volatility.144
Third, other related but separate factors must be accounted for; like liberalization of current 
account, trade liberalization and macroeconomic imbalances, which may cause, if not 
harmonized with liberalization of capital account, distortion and certain financial crises.145
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Fourth, the liquidity-oriented attitude of investors that is reflected in the increase in short-term 
capital is troublesome.146  There are many reasons for this.  One being a lack of information to 
evaluate investment by stakeholders. Even qualified professionals who are able to evaluate 
investment worthiness do not depend on this evaluation to take their decision.147
Indeed, the herd behaviour of investors does not support an informed decision. The anticipated 
expectation of other investors’ behaviour that is the controlling element in a market that is 
concerned with liquidity and short-term investment and not with the worthiness of the 
investment in the long run. 148  For those qualified professionals and speculators, the most 
important element is to anticipate the behaviour of other investors and how the prices will move 
in order to make a short-term profit out of such expectations. 149  It is worth noting that large 
amounts of capital come from individuals. Given that individuals’ behaviour is more volatile 
especially in cases of investing in developing countries, this leads to the conclusion that lifting 
all controls over short-term capital may lead to more instability.150
If the economy cannot utilize capital inflows efficiently, the market will suspect the ability of the 
economy to repay its external debt and sustain capital inflows.151  Liberalization of capital 
movements may, without safeguards, tempt financial institutions to incur more foreign exchange 
debt risk. 152
Furthermore, unrestrained capital movements may lead to increase in exchange rate, with its 
negative impact on exports, current account deficit, and inflation.153  The effect of large capital 
inflows or outflows on the economy of a country can be damaging to the host State’s 
economy.154 Free movements may jeopardize the ability of the government to manage its 
macroeconomic policy. 155   For one, they oblige countries to take certain measures that may not 
be accommodating to development and growth in order to satisfy foreign investors’ expectation 
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of “market credibility”. 156  Consequently, market credibility has grown to be a main objective 
behind domestic policy in the 1990s.  The expectation of increasing interest rates in case of rise 
in the investing risk in the country is an example for when the governments may be expected to 
do to satisfy investors’ expectation, although it may be counterproductive for growth and 
discourages further investment. 157
Finally, empirical evidence does not indicate a strong or significant correlation between 
international financial integration and growth in developing countries.158  As the Evaluation 
Office of the IMF observes, “[w]hile the idea that free capital mobility enhances economic 
welfare is an appealing concept to many economists, there has been surprisingly little empirical 
evidence to date to either support or refute such a view conclusively.”159  
The above summarizes main theories behind the debate over the liberalization and regulation of 
international capital movements.  Liberalization of capital flows carries many benefits to the 
global economy, while also offering downfalls as well.  The benefits are not guaranteed and 
further studies are required to establish optimal circumstances for capital movement 
liberalization.
Liberalization of capital movement trend tends to give the same value to all kinds of investment, 
which do not contribute equally to economic development. 160 Yet some empirical evidence 
reveals that there is a “hierarchy of volatility” between capital flows. 161
Generalization about the advantages of capital liberalization -- without distinguishing between 
different kinds of capital flows and different kind of investors and the effect of these differences 
on development-- is incorrect. Immediate liberalization of all types of capital flows involves 
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many risks and may not increase economic growth for the reasons explained in the previous 
section.162   
In this regard, one should distinguish between speculative short-term capital flows and long term 
capital, which is essential to realize the costs and benefits of liberalizing capital flows because 
their effect is not the same.  Short-term capital is hardly sustainable as it depends on interest rate 
differentials, which do not normally last.163 It is important to realize that a large component of 
international capital flows today consists of short-term capital and especially to developing 
countries. 164  But short-term capital flows are associated with instability and financial crises.165
Long term capital and foreign direct investment are associated with stability and efficiency in 
terms of technology transfer and management know-how, productivity and growth. 166  Countries 
whose direct foreign investment component is larger are less susceptible to currency crises. 167  
Furthermore, a country is at risk when it is dependent on covering an extremely large current 
account deficit with substantial capital flows. 168 This is significant because researches revealed 
that many professional experts in investing institutions view countries with substantial amount of 
“hot” (short-term) capital as high risk. 169 They prefer investing in countries with more “cold” 
capital flows. 170 Accordingly, the type of capital and its degree of volatility are of paramount 
importance in two respects. First, from a macroeconomic perspective, it is important to manage 
the risk of capital movements and to avoid currency crises. 171  Secondly, it affects the decision-
making process of foreign investors, which “influence both the level and the degree of 
permanence of inflows”. 172  
Another distinction is made between institutional investors.  Some studies found that certain 
institutions tend to create more instability than others in terms of volatility in investment 
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decisions. 173  For example it is asserted that mutual funds create more volatility than pension 
funds and insurance companies. One of the reasons put forth is that mutual funds have to respond 
short-term demand on capital redemption and accordingly are searching for short-term profit 
while the pension funds and insurance companies do not face the same conditions. 174  
Accordingly, developing countries should seek to encourage institutional investors who tend to 
be more long-term oriented and discourage the short-term seeking ones due to their detrimental 
effect on real economy. 175  However, given the regulatory short term periodic checks on the 
long-term oriented institutional investors’ performance, the distinction may lose its significance 
because these checks induce herding while seeking not to appear as performing inferior to other 
investors in the market. 176
In the same vein, another distinction based on whether the investor is national or foreigner 
indicates the distinction’s effect on the stability of the domestic economy of a country. National 
investors are more affected by the local circumstances in the country whether they be political, 
economic or otherwise, which they are able to directly evaluate. 177 Accordingly, it is these 
expectations that guide the actions of national investors, rather than external circumstances. 178  
Conversely, foreign investors tend to follow other countries and changes in other markets that 
can produce higher returns. 179  For this reason, capital provided by domestic investors tends to 
be more stable provided that the economic and political fundamentals of the country are 
satisfactory. 180  
To conclude, enforcing economic theories under the sanction of international law that are not 
empirically substantiated should be cautioned. Many objections have been raised against using 
theoretical models, economic assumptions of rationality, laissez faire approach and dedication to 
the efficiency promoted by the neo-liberal theory among others.181  
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The problem with the Washington Consensus, as applied by international financial institution in 
its pursuit to further the neo-liberal ideology, is the total dependence on market mechanism to the 
total exclusion of governments’ role. It ignores issues of fair distribution of wealth and the 
specific circumstances and needs peculiar to each developing country. 182
It is important to recognize that economic theories are not “hard science,” and that they can be 
used to further certain ideologies and specific interests.183 In the context of liberalizing capital 
movements, there is no decisive empirical proof on the neo-liberal consensus regarding the 
liberalization of capital movements. 184  The facts maintain that there is no solid scientific basis 
behind the claim of capital account liberalization and its promise of growth, efficiency and 
development.  
The effect of liberalization differs from developing to developed countries. Notwithstanding the 
existence of economic fundamentals, a developing country is more prone to financial crisis and 
herd behaviour of investors. Benefits generated from the total liberalization of capital flows can 
prove to be minimal compared to the costs incurred by developing countries. 185  The so-called 
price often overweighs the promised benefits for developing countries.186  
Absolute and immediate capital liberalization is not suitable for all countries, especially 
developing countries.  Rather regulation of capital movement and particularly capital inflows is 
necessary. A distinction between different kinds of capital is important. States should be able to 
regulate capital and restrict certain types of capital and may distinguish between types of 
investors, which can be done through registration or licensing like in India.  The distinction 
between short-term and long-term capital can prove, however, to be too general.  Not all short-
term capital is undesirable. The different characteristics of various types of short-term capital 
result in different consequences. For example trade credits, an essential component of 
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international trade, is a short term capital.187 It should also be noted that with the quick advance 
of financial tools that combines many features of both kinds of flows and difficulty of getting 
accurate results from empirical researches in this field, this distinction and the results thereof 
should be taken with caution.188 Nevertheless, in terms of economic policy strategy, States 
should seek long-term capital flows and try to discourage short-term capital flows.189
Financial markets that contain asymmetric information cannot be an effective tool for creating 
welfare in case of liberalizing capital flows. 190  Especially in case of developing countries that 
are not sophisticated enough to process all the related information, there is no guarantee that 
capital inflows will be used efficiently. 191 Development means not only economic growth but 
also equitable distribution of wealth, reduction of poverty and unemployment, transfer of 
technology and sustainable development, among others. Economic policies that do not target 
these ends are not made for development. 
The supposed benefits of liberalization are double-edged. While liberalization may produce 
economic growth, it does not ensure the sustainability of that growth. The argument that 
liberalization of capital movement would lead to efficiency and better allocation of investment, 
that is, allocation to its economically optimal utilization free from government interference is not 
supported with empirical evidence and fails in several aspects.  A certain advancement and 
maturity in the market of the liberalizing State is a precondition for such sustainability.  Also, 
theoretical underpinning of liberalization lack of empirical studies. Some kinds of foreign 
investment, mainly foreign direct investment, is long-term oriented and may transfer capital, 
technology to the host State, contributing to its economic growth and development. Yet other 
kinds of investment and capital are volatile and do not contribute to growth or development of 
the host state.  
In summary, there seems to be no economic theory that presents a policy that can achieve a 
balance between public and private interests in liberalizing capital movements and achieving 
efficient allocation of resources while reaching an equitable distribution of income, alleviating 
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poverty for developing countries, and avoiding crises. 192 The trend of the heterodox policies is 
very general without clear content and has not been successful in many instances. 193 Central 
planning led to recurring shortage and acute inefficient allocation of economic resources.194
However, this trend does help in exposing the drawbacks of the liberalization of international 
capital movement under economic liberalism. 
There still exists a balancing approach of allowing capital movement, but regulating it through 
government intervention to insure that speculative and non-productive capital does not increase 
the risks of crises. Developed States’ practice of this theory demonstrates that they imposed 
capital controls and did not liberalize international capital movements suddenly without 
sequencing. This confirms the conclusion that “[w]ithout intervention, globalization may instead 
lead to increased socioeconomic inequality and economic volatility.” 195
As noted by the Independent Evaluation office of the IMF:
Whatever the potential benefits of capital account liberalization may be, policy makers must weigh them 
against its associated risks and costs, including the diminished ability to pursue monetary autonomy and 
exchange rate stability simultaneously, the possibility that excessive capital inflows may make 
macroeconomic management more difficult, and the greater vulnerability to contagion from financial crises 
that erupt elsewhere. Recent experience also shows that, with a weak regulatory framework, large capital 
inflows can exceed the absorptive capacity of the banking system, leading to inappropriate lending 
decisions and subsequent financial system fragility. The critical issue thus seems to be how best to manage 
the process of liberalization so as to make sure that the benefits outweigh the risks. Recognition of the 
centrality of process has led to a policy-oriented literature on the sequencing and speed of liberalization. 196
One means to regulate capital movement is to impose capital controls.  The imposition of capital 
controls is controversial and there is an array of capital controls, all with distinct effects, 
functions and forms. 
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Capital controls can be defined as government measures that directly or indirectly affect the 
amount of capital movements and their allocation.197 The word “control” can have many 
interpretations.  The terms “control” and “restriction” are by no means the same.198 Control is a 
broader term than restriction. Control does not only mean hindering or restricting the movement 
of capital but also encompasses the notion of restrictions and other measures, which may 
influence the capital movement in a positive rather than negative way.199  
Other definitions focus on the restrictive nature of controls. Some define capital controls as 
measures that aim to suppress capital inflows or outflows or that which affect their form.200 In 
the same vein, capital controls are defined as “regulatory measures to control or limit the flow of 
capital across … borders”.201
Others apply the term capital controls to measures that restrict capital quantitatively as opposed 
to measures that affect the price of the capital movement.202 They consider capital controls to be 
a part of capital restrictions, which include both quantitative restrictions (capital controls) and 
other price based restrictions.203
From herein, capital controls will be used to refer to measures that regulate capital movements to 
achieve certain policy purpose whether encouraging, discouraging, restricting capital inflows or 
capital outflows or certain types of capital.204 However, the main focus will be on capital 
controls that discourage or restrict capital movements.
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Capital controls can be divided into two categories. The first is tax or market-based capital 
controls or indirect capital controls, which usually depends on imposing taxes whether directly or 
indirectly. 205  The second is administrative controls or direct capital controls that impose 
quantitative limit or require authorization for capital movement.206
The distinction between both direct and indirect capital controls can be made by observing 
whether the measure restricts the freedom of the private parties to do the transaction or whether it 
merely influences the decision making process by affecting the cost or profit of the 
transaction.207 The former are direct controls and the latter are indirect controls.
Indirect capital controls are used to influence the cost of capital movement transactions, or both 
the cost and volume of the transactions.208  These kinds of controls generally use taxation, 
whether explicit or implicit, to influence capital movements by encouraging or discouraging 
them by making a transaction either more or less expensive to conduct.209
Indirect capital controls affect the cost of international transfers through many avenues including 
imposing taxes on foreign transactions and repatriation of dividends and profits; restricting 
interest payment on foreign obligations; requiring minimum reserve for foreign obligations; and 
establishing a dual or multiple exchange rate systems.210  
Tax levied on capital inflows is a direct characteristic for this category. This category could 
include direct tax and indirect tax on specific transactions.211  The government may also apply 
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different tax rates on foreign transactions or impose different exchange rates according to the 
type of transaction in order to encourage or discourage specific transactions.212
Many indirect controls are hardly distinguishable from prudential measures. An example of such 
indirect controls is the restrictions imposed on private persons from taking foreign loans except 
after having a minimum credit rating.213  Other examples of  indirect controls are “provisions for 
commercial bank’s net balance in foreign currency, limitations on unpaid foreign currency 
option contracts ‘that discriminates between long and short currency positions or between 
residents and non-residents . . . .’”214 These can be considered prudential measures as well.
Another market-based capital control is a particular form indirect taxation. In this case, the 
central bank or an equivalent authority imposes “a non-remunerated reserve requirement on 
banks and companies on obligations denominated in foreign currency.”215  
An example of an unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) is the URR used by Colombia and 
Chile to combat short-term capital inflows. 216   The Chilean URR was imposed in June 1991 
until September 1998. 217  The URR directs foreign lenders to Chilean private persons to deposit 
an amount equal to a certain percentage of their loan in a non-interest generating account at the 
Chilean Central Bank for a certain time period.218  At first, the time period for the deposit was 
between ninety days to one year depending on the maturity of the investment.219  This was 
amended in 1992 to one year without regard to the maturity of investment.220  The URR scope 
changed over time to cover more investment, except for what was conceived as “nonspeculative 
foreign direct investment”.221
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Direct or administrative controls refer to a governmental direct interference in its regulatory 
capacity with the clear intent of directing capital flows. 222  These are straightforward controls. 
They are done through banning or restricting capital movements or underlying capital 
transactions. These controls encompass restrictions on certain transactions or a requirement of 
prior approval on certain transactions.223  
Administrative controls are usually intended to directly shape the volume of capital flows. They 
oblige banks to control such flows.224 “The usual methods of ….direct controls are prohibitions, 
quantitative limits (quotas), rule-based or discretionary approval, and minimum-stay 
requirements for direct and portfolio investment.”225  
These may be a complete ban of certain transfers, a requirement of authorization by the 
appropriate authorities for each transaction, or prescribing certain amount of foreign liability 
and/or credit that can be undertaken by banks and other private persons whether as borrowers or 
lenders.226
Administrative controls can take many forms, including (i) restricting capital access totally or 
from certain sectors; (ii) screening to decide to permit or reject it and may put some conditions to 
permit the access of the foreign investment (e.g. performance requirements)227; (iii) limiting 
foreign ownership; (iv) imposing maximum percentage of shareholding in corporations; (v) 
restricting the amount of obligations owed to foreigners.228; and (vi) requiring registration.229
An example of prior approval requirement to control capital and minimize speculation is the 
Taiwanese Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors.230  It restricts the ability of foreigners to 
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deal in the Taiwanese stock exchange except those authorised by the Taiwanese security market 
regulatory agency.231
Exchange controls are frequently used to ensure enforcement of capital controls.232 It is difficult 
to define exchange controls. A suggested definition offers that exchange controls are tools of 
monetary policy that restrict the ability to pay or transfer funds to non-residents. 233 Classic 
exchange controls entail designating a national institution to exclusively regulate all foreign 
exchange allocation and operations. 234 Originally, they were used to restrict capital outflows. 235
Exchange controls are employed to preserve the country’s balance of payment by restricting the 
demand on foreign exchange, to protect and stabilize the country’s monetary resources, and to 
allocate foreign exchange to achieve maximum benefit. 236
A method of enforcing exchange controls is to register all capital inflows upon its entry.237 This 
way, repatriation of returns and original capital is permitted on the basis of the value recorded in 
this registration. 238  Exchange controls may involve limiting the ability to convert the national 
currency into foreign currencies.239  
According to the IMF Articles, member countries may not enforce exchange contracts that are 
concluded in breach of exchange control regulations of another member country, which are 
related to the latter’s currency.240  However, discriminatory and undue exchange controls are 
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denied effect in some national courts.  English courts, for example, will not take into account 
foreign exchange controls that are imposed “in a discriminatory or oppressive manner”. 241  
A multiple exchange rate system mainly offers certain transactions a better exchange rate than it 
offers to others.242  Dual and multiple exchange rate systems seek to increase the cost of 
transactions on speculative transactions especially to avoid short-term inflows with high interest 
rates which the government perceives as overburdening residents. 243  Dual and multiple 
exchange rate systems satisfy the demand of non-speculators for credit under normal exchange 
rates, while giving a higher exchange rate to such speculators.244  This requires imposing and 
monitoring foreign exchange transactions of residents and dealings of national currency by non-
residents to distinguish between capital and current transactions.245  This is done through 
directing financial institutions not to lend to such speculators while allowing lending and foreign 
exchange transactions to foreign direct investment and trade activities.246
There are many reasons posited for using capital controls. In addition to the abovementioned 
concerns regarding liberalizations of international capital movements, there are additional 
reasons to impose capital controls. Foreign investment and capital flows may cause macro 
economic and balance of payments problems.247  There are many risks that arise from lifting all 
capital controls in an inefficient capital market. In a developing country where the banking 
system is not developed enough, the country may not be able to effectively utilise the inflows to 
its most efficient use.248  If the economy cannot utilize capital inflows efficiently, the market will 
expect the ability of the economy to repay its external debt and sustain capital inflows.249
The inexistence of efficient regulatory system and financial markets that can deal with such 
flows, especially in developing countries, is an obstacle for the efficient use of international 
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capital. 250  This problem can be illustrated in the Chilean experience in the late 1970s. Chile 
allowed the free capital inflows and was able to attract a large amount of capital.  The banking 
system, with low supervision from the government, accumulated bad loans which was one of the 
reasons for the big recession that followed the 1980’s debt crisis.251 This is in addition to the 
prudential reasons.252  
Argentina is another example. In the 1990s, Argentina followed the model set by the 
international financial institutions in terms of privatisation and liberalization of financial 
markets.  Large amounts of capital inflows went to Argentina. 253 The country was considered a 
model in applying the neo-liberal prescription of the Washington Consensus.  However, services 
provided by foreign investors who took the public services’ privatised companies, fell short of 
providing basic needs. 254  Financial crisis erupted. Foreign investment failed to provide and 
sustain the growth and development needs of Argentina.255  Part of the reason had to do with the 
inefficiency or absence of governmental institutions capable of dealing with foreign investment 
and able to secure that foreign investment would contribute to the growth and development of 
the host country. 256 Thus, the theoretical advantages that liberalizing capital movements will 
lead to advancing the domestic financial sector and accordingly decreasing the volatility seems 
to be realized only in developed countries which have institutions and market capable of 
benefiting from and sustaining capital movement.257
In addition, capital controls on inflows are used to minimize the need to use sterilization (and 
other monetary tools like fiscal policy) and to avoid making adjustments. 258 Governments 
usually utilize two economic policy tools for countering the negative effect of capital inflows.259
The first is sterilization, which “principally refers to the use of open market operations by the 
central bank” for the purpose of decreasing the undesirable effect of capital inflows.260 It is an 
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operation where the national central bank sells securities dominated in the local currency to 
reduce the capital inflows effect on the country’s money supply. 261  The sterilization aims at 
reducing money supply. A government may also issue bonds to absorb the excess of money.262
However, this can prove to be an expensive operation for the government due to the difference 
between the cost of the bonds and the revenue from foreign assets.263 Moreover, sterilization may 
lead to higher interest rate and result in more capital inflows benefitting from the higher interest 
rate, which exacerbates the problem.264  
The second method is fiscal policy.  Fiscal policy entails hard, political decisions for 
governments, which undermine its usefulness.265  In short, these economic tools may not be 
sufficient to halt the negative effect of large capital inflows.266
Capital controls are used to halt short-term capital inflows and increase the maturity thereof. A 
substantial amount of short-term capital inflows into a developing country can carry many risks. 
These flows are volatile and reversible, which may cause currency depreciation and collapse of 
the economy.267 This stems from the “maturity transformation” characteristic of capital 
markets.268
“Maturity transformation” refers to the fact that lenders want to have more liquid investment to 
be able to liquidate rapidly in case of risks or for more profitable opportunities, while borrowers 
want to have longer term liabilities.269  Financial institutions like banks come as intermediaries to 
accommodate the conflict of interests between borrowers and lenders.270 They usually do so by 
diversifying and using the “law of large numbers”. 271 They rely on the assumption that not all 
customers will desire to withdraw all their money at the same time. 272 They accordingly keep 
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only the amount they expect that will be claimed liquid and lend the rest for terms longer than 
what their lenders want. 273  
This “maturity transformation” characteristic is not realized only in the banking system but also 
in an efficient capital market where securities holders can liquidate their securities in the 
secondary market while issuers use the raised funds to invest for a longer term. 274 However, one 
of the often occurring characteristics of a liberalized financial system in developing countries is 
the sudden increase of claims to liquidity that exceed the financial system to provide which 
causes financial crisis.275 Surge of capital outflows usually follows. This destabilizes the 
macroeconomic tools, causing fluctuations in exchange rates and the assets’ prices.276 This is 
accompanied by unemployment and poverty; 277 “new borrowing becomes more difficult, old 
loans become impossible to roll over, and aggregate demand slumps, wasting productive 
resources and lowering real income”278 ; resulting in all kinds of social, economic and political 
problems that may threaten a country’s stability.  This is one of the consequences of the 
microeconomic advantages to foreign investors of liquidity and free capital movement which 
negatively affect the macroeconomics of the host country.
Capital controls are also traditionally used to manage balance of payment and 
macroeconomics.279  A country with a balance of payment problems usually uses capital controls 
to restrict capital outflows.280 From a macroeconomic perspective, capital controls are used to 
guard against destabilizing short-term capital flows and related instability in exchange rates, 
“asymmetric information problems”, and the investors’ herd behaviour.281
Balance of payment justification for using capital controls is sometimes explained in terms of 
reducing the cost of domestic debt servicing to finance domestic projects when national savings 
fall short from while also keeping domestic interest rate low.282    In the same vein, capital 
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controls are used to reduce the effect of the difference between domestic and international 
interest rates while decreasing the pressure on exchange rates.283 This mode is criticized, since 
employing capital controls for lowering interest rates would, arguably, hurt existing investors in 
national assets and would decrease national saving. 284 It is submitted, however, that the change 
in domestic interest rates will not have substantial effects on capital flows in case of effective 
capital controls in place.285  Nevertheless, this wedge may encourage avoidance thereof, and the 
effectiveness of capital controls will depend on the difference between the costs of and the profit 
from avoiding them. 286
Another rationale forwarded is the desire to keep a level of “monetary and exchange rate policy 
autonomy” towards achieving national targets and lessening attacks on domestic currency 
exchange rate. 287  Capital controls may be used to preserve the exchange rate system. Any 
exchange rate system needs to regulate the national banking system’s short-term foreign 
exchange liabilities. 288 The foreign exchange market is a huge market and its turnover by far 
exceeds trade in goods and services.  The trading in the foreign exchange market in one day 
exceeds the total global central banks reserve.289 Regulation may include imposing exchange 
controls on short-term capital inflows. 290  The movement of short-term capital can drain 
international reserves, causing considerable instability in interest rates, which could potentially 
destroy the fixed exchange rate regime. 291 A country that wants to keep a fixed exchange rate 
regime may use capital controls for that purpose. 292  Capital controls “lengthen the period of 
time for which a currency peg can be maintained given the stance of monetary and fiscal 
policies…” 293  
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Recent experiences suggest that if there is capital mobility, it is not feasible to have fixed but 
adjustable rates.294 It is argued that free capital movement also does not fit with floating 
exchange rates in most countries, other than in developed countries like the US and the EU, that 
do not have the same advanced capital markets nor as diversified an economy.295 Speculative 
attacks on any currency, even developed countries’ currencies, can destroy the macroeconomic 
policy of any country.296  
In addition to developing countries’ currency crises like Mexico in 1994, the 1990s saw currency 
crises in developed countries, such as in Italy and the UK in 1992, France in 1993, and Spain in 
1995. 297  Such speculative attacks led Sweden to change its policies in 1992 after failing to 
defend its currency begs. 298  The United States was not immune from the effect of exchange rate 
changes either. Between 1994-1995, the US had to change some of its strategic targets as the 
dollar was deteriorating against the Yen. 299  Capital controls can be used as a temporary tool to 
avoid such consequences.300
Capital controls can be used to preserve the stability of the financial system by restricting 
national entities from assuming substantial foreign exchange liability, or by changing the nature 
of liabilities of financial institutions from short-term to long term ones. 301 Banks and other 
domestic financial actors may have an incentive to borrow for a short-term foreign exchange to 
benefit from differences in interest rates in cases of begged or fixed exchange rates. 302 The fixed 
or begged exchange rate provides a kind of implied guarantee.303 In addition, some research has 
found that pegging the exchange rate in order to halt inflation distorts capital market. 304 It is 
argued that a pegged exchange rate, coupled with domestic inflation, leads to increase in capital 
inflows since foreign investors stand to gain more than national investors. An established 
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exchange controls can solve this problem. 305  This is more acute in developing countries where 
interest rates are usually higher than those in developed countries. This gives banks and other 
lenders in these countries more incentive to borrow foreign exchange from developed countries 
to benefit from the difference. 306
In addition, when the government uses interest rates and exchange rates concurrently in pursuing 
contradictory internal and external balance targets, capital controls can be used to resolve this 
conflict of targets. 307 Controls on outflows, in general, aims at preventing currency depreciation 
without resorting to tough measures like pursuing restrictive monetary policy.308 In contrast, 
capital controls on capital inflows are used to prevent a currency appreciation as a result of surge 
in capital inflows, while keeping national “monetary conditions” under control.309
Using capital controls for prudential reasons is justified on the grounds that international 
transactions inherently involve different kinds of risk than that of national transactions.310 To 
allow the trade and listing of foreign securities, different sets of conditions are required other 
than just those required from national securities. 311 This is due to the possible existence of 
different regulatory and accounting systems, and difficulties relating to enforcement in other 
jurisdictions. 312
Many problems are associated with the use of capital controls, which relate to their effectiveness 
and efficiency. First, it is asserted that capital controls cause distortions, create corruption, and 
are almost always (after a certain time) evaded or avoided. 313  
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Second, capital controls are always condemned by their critics to fail, whether in the policy 
target they want to achieve or in their general effectiveness. Some evidence shows that capital 
controls are not effective in assisting the balance of payment position against capital outflows. 314
To keep capital controls effective and sustainable, the government must be able to extensively 
interfere in the trade and financial systems, which entails negative consequences. 315  The 
government also must stay disciplined in order to restrain unwarranted surges in capital inflows 
during boom times. 316
Third, the classical theory on capital controls on inflows maintains that capital controls lead to an 
increase in interests, thus influencing the country welfare and productivity.317  This is because 
imposing capital controls raises the cost of capital, and hence, the interests increase to 
compensate for this cost and output fall.  However, data on countries applying capital controls 
reveals different results: in some countries, interest rates increased, while in others, they 
decreased. 318 Research on the effect of liberalizing capital movements and capital controls has 
led to contradictory results with many methodological problems.319 Capital controls may 
destabilize the economy and cause financial crises since they may increase capital outflows and 
discourage foreign investors from investing in the country in the future.320 Furthermore, it is 
asserted that capital controls are not effective in countering capital outflows.321  And by lifting 
capital controls, a country sends a positive sign to foreign investors, which is responded to by 
more capital inflows. 322
Yet these inflows may not be sustainable from the start. 323 China is an example to the contrary.  
China attracts investment more than any other country, except for the US, although it imposed 
                                                  
314 Johnston & Tamirisa, n 247, at13.
315 Rogoff, n 166.
316 .
317 Tang Hsu, n 205, at 456.
318 .
319 Stiglitz , n 162, at 221; Ariyoshi, , n. 207.
320 Glick & Hutchison, n 313, at 3.
321 Johnston, n 117.
322 .
323 .
supra . 
supra . 
Id
supra . 
Id
supra . Country Experience supra 
supra . 
supra . 
Id
Id
64
certain performance requirements on some types of foreign investment and had many restrictions 
on capital movement.324
Furthermore, it is intrinsically problematic to ascertain the effect of capital controls from 
statistical and econometric studies.325  There is no means to identify the effect of capital controls 
with certainty or to precisely distinguish it from the effect of other factors that influence the 
economy.326  There are many reasons for this, including the extreme difficulty of quantifying the 
effect of capital controls and separating the effect thereof from other different political and 
external factors that affect capital movements, and the unavailability of accurate records on 
capital accounts. 327
From the economic liberalism school, a trend emerged that recognizes that the immediate and 
radical capital liberalization movement is not the best method, neither economically nor 
politically. This trend recognizes the risk inherent in some kinds of capital movements. 328 It 
cautions from immediate and total liberalization and finds that gradual liberalization -- in other 
words, “sequencing” -- is more suitable for developing countries. 329  
The IMF started to show some support for “sequencing” in capital account liberalization after the 
Asian Crisis.330  Many conditions are prerequisite for such liberalization. These include adequate 
institutions and existence of macroeconomic fundamentals.331 However, it is submitted that there 
is no proof of a model “for the optimal pace and sequencing of integration.” 332  Yet regulation of 
certain sectors is crucial.
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There could be three players who may default on credits, namely sovereigns, banks and other 
private persons.333 The banking system is crucial for any domestic economy, and its foreign 
exchange denominated debt is a matter of concern for any government. 334 Its collapse results in 
the inability to finance national economy. In case of a threat to the banking system, the 
government has to bail it out. Accordingly, the government has to regulate this system so that it 
does not undertake excessive risk, which threatens the whole economy. 335 The regulation of 
government may take the form of capital controls. However, this trend distinguishes between 
cost based capital controls and other controls that are in the nature of total prohibitions. 
According to this trend, increasing the cost of capital mobility for certain transactions is a middle 
way to combine private and public interest. 336  After research on Chile’s URR revealed its effect 
in increasing the maturity of capital flows, the IMF staff seemed to agree on the use of indirect 
capital controls temporarily. 337 However, they stayed unequivocally opposed to the use of 
administrative capital controls, especially on capital outflows. 338
This trend recognizes the special problem faced by developing countries’ economies.  As 
discussed earlier, the nature of financial crises and the consequences thereof are not the same for 
developed and developing countries. 339 It acknowledges that the liberalization of economy, and 
specifically, financial liberalization, have notably taken place before crises. 340 Almost all 
currency crises are triggered by a surge in capital inflows, followed by a reverse surge in capital 
outflows. 341
Yet foreign direct investment should be liberalized since it does not pose the same risks and 
generate more benefits than costs.342  Evidence shows that portfolio and bank loans flows are 
volatile and increase the risk of financial crises, in contrast to foreign direct investment. 343 A 
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segment in this trend distinguishes between credit portfolio investment and equity portfolio 
investment.  The international equity portfolio flows affect the prices of equities and may cause 
instability in managing economic policy (Hong Kong is an example). 344 However, this 
instability, according to this trend, does not cause drastic economic crisis. 345 A reversal of 
foreign investment in equities may also create problems for countries with fixed exchange rates.
346 However, it is asserted that this is due to the intrinsic nature of a fixed exchange rate system 
and not foreign investment. 347 It is the international credit portfolio investment that causes such 
crisis. 348  
To conclude, even in the liberal trend, it is recognized that capital controls are necessary.  This 
trend promotes the use of one kind of capital controls that allows the movement of capital 
although makes it more expensive and thus reduces the short-term gain incentive for volatile 
capital. 
One of the tools to regulate capital movements is capital controls.  They have been used by 
developed countries successfully before they liberalized capital movements. They still keep the 
option to use them in crises. Capital controls on inflows are especially important to prevent 
volatile capital. Other macroeconomic tools may not be available to the country. Recent 
empirical economic research and the most recent financial crisis have both shown that countries 
which used capital controls on inflows were able to avoid the consequences of the financial 
crises.349
Moreover, although some studies confirm that investment and liberalization of capital flows 
movement lead to growth, others find that they do not inevitably result in economic growth.  For 
example, some studies in Africa conclude that investment does not lead to growth, neither in the 
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short term nor in the long term.350 Other conditions must exist before liberalizing the capital 
movement to reach the goals of growth and development such as advanced regulatory and 
mature market must exist. Efficiency and growth have no inherent value. It depends on the 
purpose it serves for the society and the society conditions. 351  
The assertion that economic liberalization and the integration of the economies into a global 
economy is an inevitable process that cannot be reversed is not true. 352 If this liberalization lacks 
the required political foundation and equitable legal and economic system that ensure its 
sustainability, it may not advance and could be reversed. 353  
The liberalism trend’s justification of economic crisis as a result of the bad policies of host States 
is not true in all cases. Many States that did not have monetary and fiscal imbalances have 
suffered from speculative attacks that caused currency turmoil. 354 As explained above, many 
speculative attacks are “self-fulfilling” that attack a sustainable exchange rate system. 355  
The system has to be fair and equitable in order to be sustainable. 356 To be fair and equitable, it 
must, while rewarding the innovative and productive, accommodate the needs and conditions of 
the most vulnerable. It must be sustainable and not under the risk of changing moods of 
speculative capital. Crises usually follow capital liberalization in developing countries. There is 
no way, either, to accurately anticipate financial and currency crises. It seems, from the 
economic literature, that there is no one correct policy to be followed, since speculative attacks 
can cause currency turmoil even if there are no macroeconomic imbalances and the economic 
fundamentals are good. 357
In short, the “one-size-fits-all” mode is not working. 358  In 2002, the then IMF economic 
counsellor and director of the IMF’s Research Department submits that the IMF, in many 
instances, did not properly warn developing countries about the dangers of opening their markets 
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to short-term capital without suitable financial systems or adequate macroeconomic 
fundamentals already in place.359  He admits that developing countries are losing more from the 
liberalization of capital movements. 360  He ends up, however, standing conclusively against 
using capital controls, although he cautions that more research is still required. 361
This stance seems hard to defend objectively. As mentioned above, there is no conclusive 
empirical proof on the beneficial effect liberalization of capital movements. There are many 
other distortions and inefficiencies that may hinder the benefits that may arise from international 
capital liberalization and lifting capital controls, while keeping only their risks to be shouldered 
by vulnerable economies. An example of other distortions is when protected industries exist in 
an economy. Capital liberalization may lead to the flow of capital to these industries to benefit 
from the protection, although there may not be a comparative advantage in this industry. 362  
The economic analysis of uncertainty helps to explain financial crises in this context. 363 The 
analysis shows how new forms of capital inflows are not reasonably reliable for a country that 
seeks a sustainable capital flows for achieving growth and development. 364  It also serves as an 
indicator for developing economies of the high risk they undertake in the process of 
liberalization and deregulation. 365 The uncertainty is high regarding new financial tools not 
previously experimented.  Uncertainty is even higher in unregulated markets or insufficiently 
regulated markets. 366
This explains episodes of financial crises that have coincided with deregulation and financial 
tools advancement. 367 When there is a high rate of uncertainty, investors lose confidence easily 
and the smallest remote incidence may lead to reactions that are not proportionate. 368 A little 
devaluation and decline in the circumstances of a state in Mexico resulted in high surge of capital 
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outflows. 369 This necessitates retaining an “adequate regulation and supervision to avoid 
excessively risky behaviour by financial intermediaries”. 370  However, developing countries, in 
general, do not have the adequate institutions to deal with large capital flows, and are more 
vulnerable to financial and currency crises.371
It is useful at this point to discuss the application of capital controls during a crisis and its effect.  
East Asia’s economic growth and crisis teach many lessons. Some viewed the success to support 
pursuing a liberal policy. The crisis showed the amount of controversy and uncertainty that 
surrounds the liberalization of capital movements, and the conflict between much academic 
economic literature on the subject and what was presented by international financial institutions 
as the economic advice. The East Asian crisis is informative regarding the risks of lifting all 
capital controls. It also showed the different political interests from the international community.
The crisis started in Thailand and soon progressed to Indonesia.372  It soon reached Korea, Brazil, 
and Russia, all of which have liberalized capital movements.373 A substantial amount of capital 
inflows entered these economies, changing their “macroeconomic variables.” 374  The account 
deficit was not in a public sector deficit, but rather a private sector deficit. These countries had 
strong functioning economies with high prospects of return for investments.375
One of the causes of the crisis was the excessive and partly inefficient investment rather than 
excessive consumption.  This substantially increased exchange rates and assets’ prices. 376  
Accordingly, the purchasing power of domestic currencies increased as the imports began to cost 
less, which meant an increase in real income. With the increase in the value of assets, the wealth 
increased as well.377  Banks lent more with the consequential increase in consumption and 
private investment. 378  The increase in both consumption and investment quickly reduced the 
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balance of payment current account.379  This usually is not viewed as problematic so long as 
investors are still satisfied with investing and expecting high returns with little risk. This sustains 
until such expectation ceases to be true. The crisis may be primarily caused by loss of confidence 
as opposed to macro-economic inefficiency. 380
When the Asian crisis took place, along with what followed in Russia and Latin American 
countries, the varied interests between different nations appeared in the way they individually 
explained the crisis reasons as well as the prescribed solutions they suggested. 381  
The so called “crony capitalism” term was introduced to explain the failure of the liberal system 
during the East Asian crisis.  The term refers to the alleged corruption in the banking system that 
allowed the misallocation of resources. 382  The US advocated for the view that the crisis 
happened because of the bad policies of the suffering countries. The US advocated a “new global 
financial architecture”. 383 This architecture includes enhancing transparency and accountability 
in the financial system, using international standards, and freedom of capital movement. 384
The IMF leaned toward this theory. Accordingly, the IMF conditioned its bailouts to Indonesia, 
South Korea, and Thailand on further liberalizing capital movements. 385  It also insisted that the 
Asian countries must reduce the domestic demand by raising interest rates and decreasing 
government’s expenditure. 386  
On the other hand, Asia and the European Union considered that the cause of the financial crisis 
was the reforms advocated by the IMF to liberalize capital movements.  In the 1990’s, upon 
advice from the IMF, the Asian governments, liberalized capital movements that increased 
speculative capital in stock market and property market. 387  The capital inflows consisted of 
loans to local firms, which were not adequately regulated due to the hasty move towards 
financial deregulation. This led to incurring a huge debt to foreigners in the absence of 
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government supervision. 388  The European Union, accordingly, found that the solution to prevent 
the reoccurrence of such crises is involving governments in the regulation of the financial market 
and international capital movements. 389  There should be different rules for different groups of 
countries according to their monetary position and other factors.  Each group of countries has 
different protection rules from capital movements. Governments should be able to regulate 
capital movements and impose capital controls. 390
Many Asian countries agreed with the European Union’s stance.391  For instance, in September 
1998, Malaysia imposed foreign exchange restrictions to halt the attacks on its currency and the 
shortage of foreign reserve it was suffering as a result thereof. 392   Malaysia also wanted to keep 
the increase domestic demand and decrease interest rates while keeping the national currency 
from collapsing. 393  
In the same vein, Hong Kong restricted some speculative dealings in its currency and stocks to 
halt speculative attacks thereon. 394  Taiwan followed suit by introducing restrictions on capital 
inflows and outflows. 395  And Japan expressed its wish that the Group of Seven reconsider its 
policy that encourages the liberalization of capital movements. 396   
Asian countries, having just witnessed the financial crisis, regarded free capital movements a 
threat to their economic stability. Capital controls were needed, especially with the inexperience 
of these countries with capital markets and the lack of adequate regulation of the banking system 
and financial market.  Establishing such systems takes many years, during which capital controls 
are required to keep the system from collapsing. 397
Meanwhile, these countries were taking expansionary monetary and fiscal policies to recover 
from the crisis.  Capital controls were needed to avoid a surge of outflows of capital as a result of 
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investors anticipating lower interest rates or inflation. 398 Moreover, Asian countries, in general, 
have huge domestic savings and do not need foreign capital.399
The instability seems to be an intrinsic characteristic of free international capital movement 
system. 400  India and China escaped the Asian crisis because of the capital controls they had in 
place.401 And Malaysia had a shorter downturn because it imposed capital controls.402 Since there 
is no effective means utilised on the international level to ensure the stability of the financial 
system and prevent crises, developing countries should retain their regulatory autonomy to 
prescribe policies regarding international capital movements.403 One of the means available is 
capital controls.
In a study by the IMF on five countries404 that applied controls on capital inflows, it was found 
that controls were effective in establishing the wedge between domestic and international interest 
rates; nevertheless, three of the five countries (Brazil, Chile, and Colombia) were not able to 
keep their exchange rates without change under continuous rising pressure from the market. 405
Real exchange rates increased in all five countries, but more substantially in the three 
aforementioned countries with the increase in the external current account deficit.406 The same 
study also found that controls on inflows decreased the amount of inflows in Malaysia and 
Thailand, and were able to decrease the short term capital inflows in all five countries.407 Two 
countries (Brazil and Chile) had to continue sterilization operations, thus incurring the 
administrative costs.408
As mentioned above Malaysia is an example of a successful use of capital controls during crises. 
It is important to look to the Malaysian experience in using capital controls before and during the 
Asian crisis. Malaysia imposed capital controls on short-term inflows in 1994 to maintain 
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monetary control during a time where inflation was increasing.409  Malaysia also begged its 
currency to the US dollar. 410 During the Asian crisis, Malaysia “adopted a combination of 
administrative (prohibition of non-resident purchases of money market securities and non-trade-
related swap transactions with nonresidents) and regulatory measures (asymmetric limits on 
banks’ external liability positions for nontrade purposes and reserve requirements on ringgit 
funds of foreign banks).” 411  
Malaysia amended its capital account regulation, not as a result of routine reviews, but instead 
used capital controls as a policy tool to halt the negative consequences of short-term flows on its 
economy.412 Many economists thought the rate of the peg was devaluated. 413  A study of the 
Malaysian capital controls shows that, in contrast to the liberal theory of capital controls, the 
imposition of capital controls in Malaysia was followed by increase in output and decrease in 
interest rates.414 This is because the difference between the theory and real data is that the theory 
does not account for the lessening of external debt and moral hazard. The reduction of external 
debt may counter the costs of capital controls and lead to a decrease in interest rates and increase 
of output. 415 The assumption rests on the basis of whether and to what extent the economy 
borrowing is rated upon its external debt level. If the debt level affects the borrowing rate of the 
economy, capital controls will result in a decrease of interest rate and an increase of output. This 
is because the reduction of external debt will outweigh the required increase in rate of return 
because of capital controls. Conversely, if the economy’s borrowing rate is more independent of 
the external debt level, then the required rate of return will increase accompanied with decrease 
in output. 416  This study concludes that capital controls do not inherently negatively affect the 
economy. 417
The East Asian crisis confirm the necessity of capital controls.  States that used capital controls 
in inflows before the crises like India and China avoided the financial crisis negative 
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consequences. Countries like Malaysia that imposed capital controls on outflows after the crisis 
were able to recover in a shorter time. Similarly, recent research confirms that “the empirical 
evidence suggests that the use of capital controls was associated with avoiding some of the worst 
growth outcome associated with financial fragility.”418
While liberalizing international capital movement can potentially drive global development and 
growth, regulation is essential to quell the imperfections of the market and equalize the 
differences in economic power and advancement of structures in different States. Without 
regulation, the benefits of liberalization will be transferred unevenly to the already developed 
and rich, while the risks transfer to the poor and underdeveloped.419
This is countered that liberal reform includes social assistance and plans for unemployment 
insurance. Some studies found that growth led to more equitable distribution. 420 Nonetheless, the 
social assistance plans are not always successful in developing countries with their limited 
resources. Meanwhile, international financial aid falls short from developing countries needs. 421  
Neo-liberals tend to ignore the externalities effect on developing countries.  This economic 
principle does not allow for a true prediction for its prescription as it relies on certain theoretical 
assumptions that may not come true and on uncontrollable factors that cannot be guaranteed. 422  
Neo-liberal theorists offer their diagnosis and prescription of a free market without government’s 
interference in the regulation of international capital of movement as if it is an objective and 
neutral science, with no external factors. Yet no empirical research proves that the liberalization 
of international capital movements lead to economic growth.
Fair or equitable distribution, for the most part, does not concern neo-liberal economists who 
focus primarily on efficiency. 423 They ignore the possibility that their prescriptions of 
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liberalizing international capital movements may lead to increasing the wealth of certain 
communities in the world without benefiting the already deprived communities.424
Also, the growth of the global economy alone does not ensure fair or equal distribution of the 
results of this growth.425 Many developing countries liberalize capital movements not because of 
an ideological conviction, but rather as a means for attracting capital needed for development 
and/or in compliance with structural adjustments imposed by international financial
institutions.426
Yet many countries that do not follow the neo-liberal prescription on liberalizing international 
capital movement attract foreign investment.427 And they have been very successful in gradually 
maintaining economic growth while minimizing the risk of financial crises.  India is but one 
example. Thus, the neoliberal argument of lifting all barriers on international capital movement 
will attract foreign capital is incorrect.  In addition, the law protection component of the 
Washington Consensus has a minimal weight in the foreign investors’ decision to invest in 
certain countries, even though it may affect thereafter the mode of entrance. 428  
What attracts foreign investment and capital is profit opportunities.429 Factors like availability of 
raw materials, the size of the host country market and geographical proximity of the country with 
the target market are the main criteria that control the decision to invest in a certain country. 430
Liberalizing capital movement to achieve efficient allocation of resources and generating more 
benefit than costs is an argument that does not recognize who will get the most benefit and who 
has to live with the costs and risk. Most benefits go to the financial community of investors 
through the ability to take the best opportunities to profit while simultaneously being able to 
withdraw money quickly if troubles appear. The combination of allowing short-term capital and 
banning the use of restrictions on capital outflows only benefits foreign investors while leaving 
the risk to fall solely on the host state. 
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Finally, it is submitted that lifting barriers on international capital movement is not likely to 
attract sustainable foreign capital and may not accordingly achieve the required growth and 
development.431  The liberal legal agreement model represented by BITs that liberalize capital 
movements fails to address the problems of market failure and equitable distribution.432 This 
model cannot maintain the liberal economic system sustainability.  
To carry its promise, differences between economies must be taken into account and distinct 
kinds of capital and investor must be treated accordingly.  For one, regulation of short term 
capital is required to avoid crises. Considering what types of investors might be also important
for admitting capital.  Integration of different economies must only be allowed gradually until 
compatibility is achieved. This ensures that the realization of the required efficiencies while 
minimizing the risks of financial crises.  Western Europe after World War II have used gradual 
transformation to liberalize capital movement.433  In doing so, there existed interventionist 
governments with competent institutions and high public finance (the Marshal Plan). This is a 
characteristic that is lacking in many developing States. 434  
It is important to note that the current account convertibility mandated by the IMF Articles 
(Article VIII) was applied by European countries in 1961.435 As for controls on capital transfers, 
they stayed far longer.  Imposing capital controls was wide spread in most developed countries 
after the WWII.436 They were in effect in many countries including those in Western Europe. 
The controls in the United Kingdom that were imposed at the beginning of World War II were 
only lifted in 1979. 437  And they are still considered a legal option in certain situations in 
European Community.
Furthermore, OECD States did not agree to restrict their ability to regulate the right of 
establishment and capital inflows until 1984 under the 
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, which deals with admission and establishment of investment.438 Even if capital 
controls were distorted, removing them might not lead to development since there are other 
distortions.
Following certain economic ideology without decisive empirical proof based on highly 
controversial foundations should not be forced via international political mechanisms or 
international legal obligations. The latter can be more disastrous given the legal obligation 
required and the mandatory enforcement dispute settlement used to enforce the economic theory 
under legal sanction.
BITs and other regional agreements that include capital liberalization do not provide means to 
enforce the promised gains of liberalizations: development, technology transfer, capital 
movement, performance requirement, and the ability to change types of investment.  They only 
provide obligations on the host State to provide certain rights and minimum treatment to foreign 
investors, and allow capital related to investment to move freely in and out of the host State.  
And investment is broadly defined to include foreign direct investment as well as short term and 
speculative investment.  On the other hand, they do not prohibit the home country from 
restricting the ability of investors to invest or transfer technology.439
To conclude, immediate and complete liberalization of capital movements is not a viable option 
for many countries, especially developed countries.  The use of capital controls on the inflows of 
capital is necessary to avoid volatile short-term capital. Also, the use of capital controls on 
outflows in case of financial crisis is a legitimate policy tool that should be available to states.
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The concept of investment is a prominent factor in determining the types of transactions 
protected by BITs obligations. The content of the term investment determines the scope of the 
coverage of the BIT. It also determines the scope of protected capital relating to such investment 
that BITs mandate it transferability. 
The definition of investment is important to identify the capital that is protected and entitled to 
transfer under BITs. While most BITs define investment, they do not define capital. It is thus 
important to identify what constitutes investment to identify what funds benefit from BITs 
transfer of funds provisions. The breadth of the concept of investment affects directly the scope 
of the obligation to transfer capital under BITs. If the investment is defined and interpreted 
broadly, the covered capital would be similarly broad.
Most BITs generally define investment and the definition is broad. Some BITs define investment 
as every asset, while others define investment as every investment. Both of these types include 
non-exhaustive lists of what is included in the definition of investment. These lists are also broad 
and cover a wide range of assets and transactions. These broad definitions of investment have 
created ambiguity of the subject of protection and led to different interpretations. Two competing 
interpretations exist. The first maintains that every asset and transaction included in the treaty 
definition qualifies as investment. This has been adopted in most arbitral awards. The second 
interprets the treaty definition as limited to assets that have the characteristics of investment, 
which is followed by minority of arbitral awards. As a result of this, some recent BITs, such as 
the US BITs, have specified that the assets must have certain characteristics to be considered 
investment.
BITs definition also affects the kind of transactions that is subject to BITs admission rules. 
Under international law, a sovereign country, as an attribute of sovereignty, has the right to 
control and regulate the transfer of foreign investment into its territory. Such right is not 
Chapter Three: Breadth of Investment and its Admission 
Clauses under BITs
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restricted, unless otherwise provided in an international treaty.1 This right is treated in BITs. Yet, 
it is also broadly drafted in many BITs.  
Under BITs, there are two types of treatment of the host State’s sovereign power to regulate the 
entrance of foreign investment. Both are broad. Most BITs permit the admission of investment 
subject to the host State’s domestic laws. While this regulation of investment’s admission is 
conceptually clear, its breadth and application do not reflect its conceptual clarity.  Case law is 
inconsistent. Admission of investment provisions have sometimes been interpreted in a manner 
that narrows the extent of host State discretionary powers considerably in certain instances, while 
maintaining it in other cases. 
Some case law, as discussed further below, holds that even when the host State requires certain 
approvals or registration in order for a foreign investment to enter its territory, foreign investors 
that do not comply with such requirements may still be considered to have a valid investment 
that is protected under BITs and entitled to all the BITs rights, which may include the right to 
receive capital transfers. This is because the admission clauses in these BITs do not specifically 
refer to registration or prior approvals requirements under the host state laws.
Furthermore, some BITs purport to limit the ability of States to regulate the admission of 
investment. A minority of BITs grant national treatment (NT) and most favoured nation 
treatment (MFN) at the admission phase.  These BITs typically include a list of exceptions that 
provides that admission of investments in certain sectors or activities is not subject to national 
treatment and MFN obligations.
One way to restrict capital movement is by restricting the underlying investment.  Thus, it may 
be even more difficult to regulate capital inflows indirectly by regulating the underlying 
investment in domestic law. This is because even under BITs that leave the power of admission 
to host state laws, such regulation may not be enforceable.  
This chapter analyzes the concept of investment, related capital, and investment different 
interpretations under BITs. It also analyzes BITs’ admission of investment provisions. The 
analysis seeks to answer the following questions. Is the investment definition in BITs necessary 
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to protect and promote investment or is it broader than what is necessary? The answer to this 
question affects the investment entitled to admission and capital transfers. If the definition is 
broad, this broadens the ambit of the capital entitled to transfers.  The second question is: what is 
the effect of the broad drafting of admission clauses in BITs on the ability of states to regulate 
the admission of capital? The admission of foreign investment is important since an important 
way to regulate capital is by regulating the underlying investment and because admission of 
foreign investment gives rights to investors to repatriate capital arising from that investment. If 
the breadth of the admission clauses restricts the ability of the host state unduly or unexpectedly, 
it negatively affects its ability to use one of its monetary policy tools to regulate investment. The 
analysis will mainly be based on three countries model BITs, namely: Germany, the UK and the 
US.
The ordinary meaning of investment refers to the expansion of capital or resources to acquire or 
establish certain asset in order to gain profit over a certain amount of time.2  Brownlie refers to 
“the nature of an investment as a form of expenditure or transfer of funds for the precise purpose 
of obtaining a return.”3  Investment thus entails an action, which is payment of money or 
allocation of certain assets; and the asset that will generate the profit over time.  The term 
investment typically is identified with either these two: the action or “process” of purchasing or 
establishing the profit-generating asset; or the profit generating asset itself.4
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On the other hand, there is a lack of a common legal definition of investment.5 Different treaties 
contain different definitions and formulations for the term investment.  Some treaties, like the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention, do not even 
define investment.  
The ICSID Convention only provides that “[t]he Jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any 
legal dispute arising directly from investment.”6  This led to different interpretations for this term 
in legal writings and arbitral awards.7  Two main trends under ICSID exist; subjective 
interpretation and objective interpretation of the term investment.8  
One is a subjective trend.  It relies on the parties’ definition of investment and their consent to 
the jurisdiction of the ICSID to evidence the existence of an investment.9  If the parties agree that 
certain transactions constitute investment, then there is an investment under ICSID.  
The second trend, the objective trend, defines investment under ICSID Convention with 
reference to the common characteristics of investment.10  Investment by and large has the 
following characteristics: (i) commitment of funds or resources; (ii)“a certain duration;” (iii) 
expectation of profit; and (iii) “assumption of risk.”11  
To start, any investment requires funding or other contribution; like technical knowledge or 
know how.  Also, an investment requires certain “extended duration,” which distinguishes it 
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from a normal sale of good transaction for example.12  The expectation to make profit from the 
assets is an integral part of any investment, even if no profit was realized. 13  Finally, an 
investment entails certain assumption of risk that the assets will not generate the expected profit 
over the extended period.14  This distinguishes it from a contractual risk that the other party will 
not satisfy its obligation under a purchase agreement for example.15
Under ICSID Convention, many tribunals and commentators found that the above are the 
characteristics of investment, and some added the requirement that investment contributes to the 
host State development relying on the preamble of the ICSID Convention that refers to 
development of the host State.16  For example, in , the ICSID tribunal noted that 
investment is “described as involving a certain duration, a certain regularity of profit and return, 
assumption of risk, a substantial commitment and a significance of the host State’s 
development.”17 Similarly in ( ) the tribunal found for an investment 
to qualify as such under ICSID Convention, the following should exist: “contributions, a certain 
duration of performance of the contract and a participation in the risks of the transaction.  In 
reading the Convention's preamble, one may add the contribution to the economic development 
of the host State of the investment as an additional condition.”19  
As for BITs, investment is the subject of its protection, and BITs generally include a definition of 
investment.  This definition limits the subject matter of the BIT, the capital regulated thereby and 
the dispute settlement mechanism contained in such BIT.20 Yet the definition is typically very 
broad.
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Generally, BITs refer to the profit-generating asset in their definition of investment and not to 
process of investment.  Two main trends exist in defining investment under BITs.  These two 
trends exist in the Model BITs and BITs that follow them, which refer either to “every kind of 
assets” or to “every kind of investment” in defining investment.21  The former is very broad, 
while the latter is defining investment as investment, which is ambiguous. Both trends typically 
follow the definition by a non-exhaustive list of what is considered covered in the term 
investment.  The Model BITs, as most modern BITs, follow one of these trends.   
The German Model BIT definition of investment includes any type of asset. 22  A non-exhaustive 
list is provided, which includes a broad spectrum of assets such as property rights, securities,
money and performance claims, intellectual property and concessions. It states:
[T]he term ‘investments’ comprises every kind of asset, in particular: 
(a) movable and immovable property as well as any other rights in rem, such as mortgages, liens and 
pledges;
(b) shares of companies and other kinds of interest in companies;
(c) claims to money which has been used to create an economic value or claims to any performance 
having an economic value;
(d) intellectual property rights, in particular copyrights, patents, utility-model patents, industrial 
designs, trade-marks, trade-names, trade and business secrets, technical processes, know-how, and 
good will;
(e) business concessions under public law, including concessions to search for, extract and exploit 
natural resources;
any alteration of the form in which assets are invested shall not affect their classification as 
investment.23
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Some German BITs restrict this definition. For example, the China-German BIT limits the 
investment definition by adding the qualifier “invested” to assets.24  It states: “‘investment’ 
means every kind of asset directly or indirectly by investors of one Contracting Party in 
the territory of the other Contracting Party . . . .”25  The term “invested” entails employing these 
assets to produce income to profit from such asset.  It is not enough to own the asset; it must be 
used to produce income.  The BIT’s Protocol explicitly requires that the investment purpose be 
for “lasting economic relations;” “in connection with an enterprise;” and the ability to “exercise 
effective influence its management.”26  It states: “For the avoidance of doubt, the Contracting 
Parties agree that investments as defined in Article 1 are those made for the purpose of 
establishing lasting economic relations in connection with an enterprise, especially those which 
allow to exercise effective influence in its management.”27    
Another variance from the German model BIT’s definition exists in the German-India BIT, 
which states: “‘Investment’ means every kind of asset 
of the Contracting Party where the investment is made . . . .”28  This definition thus qualifies 
the investment to an asset that is “invested,” and is made in accordance with the host State law.  
Investment that is made in violation of host State law will not be covered.29  
Similar to the German Model BIT, but differently worded, the Model UK BIT states that 
“‘investment’ means every kind of asset”, and follows that with a non-exhaustive list of what is 
included in the definition.30  The non-exhaustive list refers to all property rights on movables and 
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immovable property, securities, contract rights, intellectual property rights, and any change in the 
form which these assets are invested.  It states:
“investment’ means every kind of asset and in particular, though not exclusively, includes:
(i) movable and immovable property and any other property rights such as mortgages, liens or 
pledges;
(ii) shares in and stock and debentures of a company and any other form of participation in a 
company;
(iii) claims to money or to any performance under contract having a financial value;
(iv) intellectual property rights, goodwill, technical processes and know-how;
(v) business concessions conferred by law or under contract, including concessions to search for, 
cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources.
A change in the form in which assets are invested does not affect their character as investments 
and the term “investment’ includes all investments, whether made before or after the date of entry 
into force of this Agreement.31
The term “every kind of asset” is qualified in some UK BITs.  The UK-Argentina BIT for 
example qualifies the assets to those defined as such under the host State law.  It provides that 
“‘investment’ means every kind of asset 
and admitted in accordance with 
this Agreement and in particular . . . .”32  In , the tribunal found that this provision constitutes 
a to the host State law, which “requires th[e] tribunal to apply the laws of Argentina to the 
interpretation of this part of the definition of ‘investment’ in the Argentina-UK BIT.”33
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Not all UK BITs define investment as “every kind of asset” though.  The UK-Tunisia BIT 
defines investment as follows: “‘investment’ means every kind of investment admitted into the 
territory of one Contracting Party in accordance with its laws and regulations . . . .”34  This 
definition is similar to the definition of investment under US BITs, which is discussed below.  
This definition also qualifies the protected investment to that admitted in accordance to the host 
State law. 
As for the US Model BITs, investment definition has developed with time in different US model 
BITs and US BITs that followed them.  Until 2004, the investment definition under the US 
model BITs and BITs was circular; defining investment as “every kind of investment.”35  This 
was followed by a non-exhaustive list of what the investment or its form could include.  While 
this approach is similar to the German and UK Model BITs, the investment definition refers to 
“every kind of investment,” instead of “every kind of asset.”  The 1992 US Model BIT for 
example states:
“investment” means every kind of investment in the territory of one Party owned or controlled directly or 
indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party, such as equity, debt, and service and investment 
contracts; and includes:
(i) tangible and intangible property, including rights, such as mortgages, liens and pledges;
(ii) a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or interests in the assets thereof;
(iii) a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic value, and associated with an 
investment;
(iv) intellectual property which includes, inter alia, rights relating to: literary and artistic works, including 
sound recordings, inventions in all fields of human endeavour, industrial designs, semiconductor mask 
works,
trade secrets, know-how, and confidential business information, and trade marks, service marks, and trade 
names; and
(v) any right conferred by law or contract, and any licenses and permits pursuant to law.36
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On the other hand, unlike the other Model BITs, the US Model BIT of 2004 explicitly states that 
an asset must have the characteristics of an investment to qualify as investment.  It identifies 
certain characteristics as examples, like extending capital, expectation of profit and risk taking.  
The US Model BIT of 2004 defines investment as “every asset that an investor owns or controls, 
directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics 
as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the 
assumption of risk.”37  It provides for a similar list of “forms that an investment may take” as the 
US Model BIT of 1994.38  Vandevelde notes that “the 2004 model continues the US practice of 
limiting investment to those assets that have the character of an investment, but it differs from 
earlier models in seeking to identify some of the characteristics of an investment.”39
Aside from the US Model BIT of 2004, the definitions contained in the Model BITs are very 
broad and their ambit appears limitless.  As shown above, the definition of investment in the 
Model BITs does not limit the asset-based definition of investment.  This broad definition of 
investment in modern BITs is a source of tension and challenges in several investment disputes. 
It includes “movable and immovable property” including ownership of real estate and other 
rights thereon like mortgage.40  It refers to assets and legal rights that have monetary value, 
which do not qualify as investment in an economic sense, neither direct nor indirect 
investment.41 It follows that almost any kind of property under these treaties could be considered 
an investment.  There is, thus, a tension between the concepts of investment and property under 
BITs and may broaden the scope of what is protected by BITs in a way that was not anticipated 
by state parties. It also affects the balance in favour of broadening BITs to regulate civil and 
commercial transactions that are not investment, which unduly encroaches on the host state’s 
regulatory powers.
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Two trends in jurisprudence exist for what qualifies as investment under BITs.  One accepts that 
each asset that has an economic value qualifies as investment, and especially those stated in the 
non-exhaustive list of assets.  This trend is referred to as the literal interpretation.  The other 
trend requires that assets must have the characteristics of investment to qualify as investment.  
This is referred to as the contextual interpretation.  In addition to these two interpretations, the 
issue of whether investment made in violation of the host State laws could be considered 
investment under BITs is also discussed.
The first trend adopts a broad interpretation of investment based on a literal interpretation to the 
broad language in the investment definition in BITs.  It adopts a textual reading that interprets 
the definition of investment to mean any asset that has a financial value and any asset stated in 
the non exhaustive list in the BIT. This interpretation does not limit the notion of investment to 
assets that have the characteristics of investment.   
A textual interpretation of the UK Model BIT that states, “Investment means every kind of 
asset,” leads to the conclusion that any asset qualifies as investment.42  Indeed, many UK and 
other BITs provisions defining investment were generally interpreted to mean that each asset in 
the non-exhaustive list qualifies as an investment under BITs so long as it has economic 
value by many tribunals and commentators.43  Even for US BITs that use “every kind of 
investment” instead of “every kind of asset” to define investment, many commentators and 
tribunals do not acknowledge any difference in interpretation.
Schlemmer, for example, describes the US-Honduras BIT definition of investment as “a typical 
‘asset-based’ definition [that] is used in a significant number of BITs.”45  The US-Honduras BIT 
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defines investment as “every kind of investment,” and follows this with a non-exhaustive list of 
what such investment consists or takes the form of.46 Dolzer and Schreuer maintain that an asset 
would be considered an investment if it is included in a BIT’s non-exhaustive list of assets in the 
definition of investment.47
Many arbitral tribunals have also adopted this interpretation.  In , the tribunal accepted that 
investment is not limited to certain characteristics under BITs, and found that promissory notes 
that were endorsed to foreigners constituted an investment for the purpose of the BIT.  The claim 
arose from promissory notes issued by Venezuela to local corporations, which were denominated 
in US dollars.48  The claimant was an endorsee of these promissory notes. The tribunal quoted 
the Netherland-Venezuela BIT’s definition of investment, which is similar to the German Model 
BIT definition that states that investment “shall comprise every kind of asset and more 
particularly though not exclusively . . . titles to money, to other asset or to any performance 
having an economic value . . . .”49  It noted that the term “title to money” was not qualified in the 
BIT to either foreign direct investment or portfolio investment.50  It reasoned that the “broad 
definition of investment” is the norm in BITs and other agreements, and limiting the term is the 
exception.51  
tribunal further stressed that “only very exceptionally do bilateral investment treaties 
explicitly relate the definition of the assets or transaction included in this concept to questions 
such as the existence of a lasting economic relation, or specifically associate titles to money and 
similar transaction strictly to a concept of investment.”52  It concluded that a loan qualified as 
investment under the BIT, and a promissory note is an evidence of the existence of the loan. 53
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thus stands for the proposition that under BITs asset-based definition of investment an 
asset is considered an investment without regard to the characteristics of investment, the ordinary 
or economic meaning of the term. It thus did not examine whether the promissory note or the 
underlying transaction, the loan, have the characteristics of investment to qualify as such under 
the BIT.  The tribunal found, and Venezuela admitted, that the underlying transaction for which 
the promissory notes were issued would have qualified as an investment under the BIT if it was 
undertaken by the foreign investor.  However, the foreign investor was an endorsee who bought 
the debt and was not a party to the underlying transaction. The tribunal did not find any reason to 
treat the endorsement differently considering that since the promissory notes were denominated 
in US dollars“, their eventual international circulation and availability to foreign investors was 
contemplated from the outset.”54
In another ICSID case, the tribunal found that any item in the non-exhaustive list qualifies as 
investment under a BIT’s asset-based investment definition.  In ( ) a 
dispute under the BIT between Italy and Morocco, claimants were a group of Italian companies 
that were contracted to build a highway in Morocco.  After delivering the highway, a dispute 
arose over certain technical and financial issues relating to the performance of the contract.  The 
BIT states that “the term ‘investment’ designates all categories of assets invested . . . by a 
natural or legal person, including the Government of the other Contracting Party, in accordance 
with the laws and regulations of the aforementioned party.”56  A non-exhaustive list of what is 
included in the term “investment” follows, which includes “rights to any contractual benefit 
having an economic value”; and “any right of an economic nature conferred by law or by 
contract”57  The claimants argued that their contractual rights were investment under the 
aforementioned provisions of the BIT.58  
Morocco contended that interpreting the term “investment” to mean any contractual right “dilute 
the notion of investment into a broader notion of economic rights.”59  It further explained that the 
reference to “in accordance with the laws and regulations” of the host State in the definition of 
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investment indicates a to the host State laws for the definition of investment.  
Accordingly, Moroccan laws govern the definition of investment.  Under its law, this contract 
would not qualify as an investment, but rather a “contract of services.” 60
The tribunal agreed with the claimants, finding that the “construction contract create[d] a right” 
that is included in the contractual rights stated in the non-exhaustive list.61  It further rejected 
Morocco’s argument, finding that the provision to follow the laws and regulations of the host 
State “refer[red] to the validity of the investment and not to its definition.”62  The tribunal 
reasoned that this provision denies the protection of the BIT to “illegal” investments.63  It does 
not shape the definition of investment in any other way.  It accordingly found that the 
construction contract was an investment under the BIT. 
In another case, the tribunal explicitly stated that an asset-based definition means that anything 
with economic value qualifies as investment.  In , under the Greece-Yugoslavia BIT, 
the dispute arose from several contracts concluded between the claimant and a host State 
corporation, which included sale contract, extending loans to the corporation and a priority to 
purchase the corporation shares if it was privatized.64  The corporation did not satisfy its 
obligations under the contracts and was subject to privatization.  The host State argued that these 
were commercial contracts between private parties and not investment contracts, and accordingly 
do not qualify as investment.65  The tribunal rejected this argument. 
The tribunal first noted that the BIT’s definition of investment which refers to “every kind of 
asset” includes anything that has economic value.66  It further added that under such definition 
that includes “claims to money or any other claim under contract” that has an economic value, 
“there is no reason why claims arising from pure commercial activities, such as sales contracts, 
should be excluded from such a broad definition of investment.”67
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The tribunal quoted with approval an UNCTAD paper for the proposal that “a BIT stating that 
‘investment includes ‘every kind of asset’ suggest[s] that the term embraces everything of 
economic value, virtually without limitation.’”68  It reasoned that the “fact that some investment 
treaties narrow the notion of what constitutes an investment,” like the US recent BITs, 
“reinforces the impression that a broad investment definition such as the one contained in Article 
1 of the Greece-Serbia and Montenegro BIT may cover assets and activities that go beyond what 
is traditionally included in the notion of foreign direct and indirect investment.”69   
Another ICSID tribunal found that an asset is per se an investment under an asset-based 
definition.  In , a dispute under the BIT between Turkey and Pakistan, the tribunal 
interpreted the term investment under the BIT. The claimant investment arises from construction 
of six motorway lanes under a construction agreement with a public company. The BIT states 
that the “term ‘investment’, in conformity with the hosting Party’s laws and regulations, shall 
include every kind of asset”, and follows this by a non-exhaustive list of what is included in the 
term investment.71  The claimant argued the laws and regulations of the host State are relevant 
only for the validity of the investment and not for its definitions. It added that term investment as 
defined in the BIT “embraces everything of economic value, virtually without limitation.”72  
Pakistan argued that the conformity with the host State law should be interpreted as a 
qualification to the term investment, which must be interpreted under the host State laws. 73 It 
further contended that the claimant has not made a financial contribution since one third of the 
project price was advanced by the public company, which covered the claimant’s costs.  
The tribunal agreed with the claimant that the term investment under the BIT is “very broad”. 74  
It explained that using the words “every kind of asset” in defining investment is “‘[p]ossibly the 
broadest’ among similar general definitions contained in BITs.” 75 It stated that the claimant’s 
contribution by training of engineers and supplying equipments and personnel to the project “has 
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an economic value and falls within the meaning of ‘every kind of asset’ according to Article I(2) 
of the BIT.”76  It further found that claimant’s bank guarantees in the amount of the advance 
payment and paid commissions for issuing these guarantees constituted “a substantial financial 
contribution to the Project.”77  
The tribunal concluded that the claimant “did contribute ‘assets’ within the meaning of the 
general definition of investment set forth in. . . the BIT.”78  ’s analysis, accordingly, 
equated the term “asset” with investment under the BIT.
In yet another ICSID award, the tribunal found that any contractual right and any item in the 
non-exhaustive list constitutes an investment under a US BIT that defined investment as every 
kind of investment.  In a dispute under US-Argentina BIT, the claimant made its 
investment through two foreign companies that established a local company for the purpose of 
undertaking a concession to supply water in the Province of Buenos Aires.   Argentina 
contended that the dispute over the concession agreement rights is a contractual dispute, and 
such agreement could not constitute an investment.80  The tribunal rejected this argument, 
maintaining that the “concession contract qualifie[d] as an investment for purpose of the 
[Argentina-U.S.] BIT given the wide meaning conferred upon this term in the BIT that includes 
‘any right conferred by law or contract.’”81
The tribunal further elaborated on its interpretation of the term “investment” under the BIT.  It 
confirmed that each item stated in the non-exhaustive list qualify separately as investment. It 
stated:
The definition of investment lists a “company”, “shares of stock” and, in a separate category, “any right 
conferred by law or contract”. A company, shares held in a company or rights under a contract, any 
contract, qualify as an investment. Provided the direct or indirect ownership or control is established, rights 
under a contract held by a local company constitute an investment protected by the BIT. 
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. The only condition is that, whatever the form an investment may take, it must 
be directly or indirectly owned or controlled by nationals or companies of the other party to the BIT.82
Furthermore, in an SCC case, the tribunal confirmed that any asset that has a financial value 
would constitute an investment under a UK BIT.  In , a case under the UK-Czech BIT, the 
tribunal interpreted the meaning of investment under the BIT.83  The definition of investment 
under the UK-Czech BIT is similar to the definition in the UK Model BIT.  It states “the term 
‘investment’ means every kind of asset belonging to an investor of one Contracting Party in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party . . . in any sector of economic activity . . . .”  This is 
followed by a non-exhaustive list of what is included under the definition of investment.  The 
tribunal noted that under the UK-Czech BIT “an ‘investment’ is defined as an ‘asset’.”84  It 
referred to the non-exhaustive list that followed the definition in reaching the conclusion that the 
common feature between all the items in the list is that they all must have “a financial value.” 85
It concluded that “a claim can be accepted as an ‘asset’ if it has a financial value.” 86
The above line of cases adopts the proposition that any asset, and any item in the non-exhaustive 
list, is considered an investment under the BIT as long as it has economic value.  This led to 
finding promissory notes, operating licence, infrastructure contracts, service agreements, loans, 
banking operations, and minority shareholding in a company investment under BITs.87  Many of 
these cases did not examine the word “invested” that follows the word “assets” in the some BITs 
definition of investment or whether an asset is considered an investment under the host State law.  
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Awards that did examine such argument rejected the interpretation that assets must be 
“invested”, i.e., used in a profit-making activity.  They also rejected that assets must qualify as 
investment under the host State law in order to be considered investment if the definition refers 
to the host State law.
In , for example, the Greece-Yugoslavia BIT defined investment “as every kind of 
asset by an investor.”88  The respondent argued that the term “asset” was qualified by 
the term “invested,” which required that the asset was invested “in the sense of an activity, of 
entering the economy of the host State or contributing to its economy.”89 The tribunal found that 
such interpretation is tenable because other BITs that have similar definition do not include the 
term “invested” after the word “asset” in their definitions.90 However, it rejected this 
interpretation because it would “unduly restrict and unpredictably limit the meaning of an 
otherwise clear and straightforward investment definition.”91 The tribunal reasoned that the 
“core” of the investment definition is the words “every kind of asset.”92
Likewise, in , the tribunal rejected an argument that the term “invested” qualified “every 
kind of assets,” finding that this was an incorrect interpretation seeking to substitute the 
definition of investment in the BIT with the economic definition of the term investment.93  It 
found that the word “invested” does not add a substantive qualification of the term “assets.”  It 
stated:
To a considerable extent, this argument seeks to replace the definition of an “investment” in Article 2 of the 
Treaty with a definition which looks more to the economic processes involved in the making of 
investments. However, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is governed by Article 1 of the Treaty, and nothing in 
that Article has the effect of importing into the definition of “investment” the meaning which that term 
might bear as an economic process, in the sense of making a substantial contribution to the local economy 
or to the wellbeing of a company operating within it. Although the chapeau of Article 2 refers to “every 
kind of asset invested”, the use of that term in that place does not require, in addition to the very broad 
terms in which “investments” are defined in the Article, the satisfaction of a requirement based on the 
meaning of “investing” as an economic process: the chapeau needs to contain a verb which is apt for the 
various specific kinds of investments which are listed, and since all of them are being defined as various 
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kinds of investment it is in the context appropriate to use the verb “invested” without thereby adding further 
substantive conditions.
To sum up, this trend interprets the term investment broadly to mean that asset, and especially 
any asset mentioned non-exhaustive list, constitutes an investment. Such asset does not need to 
meet the characteristics of investments, nor be invested, i.e. participating in a profit making 
activity. Yet it is submitted that this is not what investment means, nor what BITs are supposed 
to protect. This broad interpretation stems from a broadly defined definition. It extends BITs 
protection to any transaction or asset that has economic value. Capital related to these assets and 
transactions would be entitled to all rights under BITs, including the right to transfer capital.
The second trend looks to the ordinary meaning of investment and the general purpose of BITs to 
protect investment, rather than the literal interpretation of the BITs’ definition of investment.  It 
reconciles the use of the term investment with the definition of that term under BITs in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning of the words and its object and purpose as mandated by 
the Vienna Convention.  
Assets that have the characteristics of investment are considered investment.  As for other assets 
that do not, this interpretation distinguishes between the situation where these assets are included 
in an investment, i.e. utilised along other assets that have the characteristics of investment either 
alone or in combination with the other assets and when these assets or rights exist separately.  In 
other words, these assets although included in the non-exhaustive list in the BIT’s definition of 
investment, they must be “invested” or a part of an “investment.”94  This interpretation satisfies 
the ordinary meaning of investment and the purpose of BITs to protect investment not property.  
Admittedly, this interpretation is a more persuasive interpretation in some Model BITs and BITs 
then others.  The Model German BIT is an example where the term “investment” might be taken 
as including only investment that has the characteristics of an investment.  Unlike the UK Model 
BIT, it does not define investment using the term “ every kind of asset,” but rather states 
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that the term investment “ s every kind of assets.” The meaning of the word “comprise” 
is to “include” or “contain”.95  These assets cannot be classified as investment if they were not 
included, invested or contained in an investment.  
And the reason of including a non-exhaustive list is not to qualify each item as investment 
rather it is to indicate that they will be protected under the BIT if they were invested or 
included in an investment.  As Rubins notes, the broad reference is meant to accommodate the 
developing nature of modern investment.96  Additionally, the last part in the definition of 
investment under the German Model BIT and the other Model BITs referring to the “alteration of 
the form in which assets ” supports this interpretation.97   It is not the existence of the 
assets in the host country that qualifies as investment, but rather investing these assets that 
makes qualifies them as investment. The act of investing the assets means that the assets are 
being utilized in activities that have the characteristics of investment.  
The UK Mode BIT on the other hand does not use the word “comprise,” but uses “ every 
kind of asset,” which suggests that any asset qualifies as investment.  Yet, it does not state “every 
asset,” but rather “every of asset,” which suggests that the purpose is to include any 
investment whatever its form.  This interpretation finds support in the UK Mode BIT language 
similar to that of the German Model BIT, which states: “A change in the form in which assets 
does not affect their character as investments . . . .”98  Accordingly, it could be
argued that the same interpretation can apply to the UK Model BIT.  
Furthermore, the US Model BITs that refer to “every kind of investment” in its definition of 
investment appear to emphasize that only assets that have the characteristics of investment are 
covered by this definition.  This is confirmed by the language used in the leading to the non-
exhaustive list, which refers to “investment of” these assets.  This 
language suggests that the each asset in the list is not per se an investment, but rather it would be 
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considered so if it is a part of an investment or has the characteristics of investment.  The core 
term here is “investment,” and these assets are only included if they are part of an investment. It 
is submitted that the circularity in the definition was on purpose to emphasise that only 
“investment”-as this term is distinguished from property with certain characteristics- is subject of 
BITs.  Meanwhile, it attains the flexibility of covering all kind of investment as it develops with 
time.99  Vandevelde thus notes:
The most common definition of “investment” in the European BITs has been “every kind of asset.”  The 
purpose of the BITs, however, was to protect investment, not all U.S:-owned property in the territory of the 
BIT party.  U.S. negotiators thus wished to make clear that an asset would be covered by the definition only 
if it had the character of an investment. … In effect, the treaty applies to all investment and to nothing more 
and nothing less.  Despite its circularity, this phrase was thought to convey the flexibility that BIT drafters 
wanted to incorporate into the definition.100
Consistent with this, Brownlie in his separate opinion in , noted that the Netherlands-Czech 
BIT, which contained an asset based definition, protects only “investment” and not “property 
rights.”101  He added that simply finding a commercial activity or an interest of an investor 
cannot be equated with investment.102  The definition of investment under the Netherlands-Czech 
BIT is similar to the German Model BIT.  It states “the term ‘investments’ shall comprise every 
kind of asset invested either directly or through an investor of a third State . . . .”103
In addition in an ICSID award, the tribunal followed a contextual interpretation under a UK BIT 
that followed the Model UK BIT to decide whether a transaction qualified as an investment 
under both the applicable BIT and ICSID Convention.  In , a dispute under the UK-
Egypt BIT that arose from a contract entered between the claimant, Joy Mining Machinery 
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Limited and an Egyptian public sector company to replace equipments used in mining.104   The 
claimant provided performance guarantees under the agreement. The contracted equipment was 
installed. After the installation there were problems in the functioning of the equipment.  Each 
party accused the other for the malfunctioning of the equipment.  The claimant was paid the full 
price pursuant to the contract.105  However, the performance guarantees were never released. The 
claimant had to renew them to avoid drawing down on them.106  
The claimant asserted that bank guarantees qualify as an asset under the investment definition of 
the UK-Egypt BIT. In addition, the bank guarantees are also included in the investment 
definition as “claims to money or to any performance under contract having a financial value.”107  
The tribunal framed the issue as whether the bank guarantee constituted an investment under the 
BIT.108  The tribunal found that a bank guarantee is merely a contingent liability and cannot be 
qualified as an asset, even under the broad definition in the BIT.109  The tribunal rejected also the 
contention that the bank guarantee qualifies as a claim of money or performance that has a 
financial value, noting that “[e]ven if a claim to return of performance and related guarantees has 
a financial value it cannot amount to recharacterizing as an investment dispute a dispute which in 
essence concerns a contingent liability.”110  
It then analyzed whether the underlying transaction or the bank guarantees qualify as investment 
under ICSID Convention.  It found that an investment “should have a certain duration, a 
regularity of profit and return, an element of risk, a substantial commitment and that that it 
should constitute a significant contribution to the host State’s development.”111  The transaction 
in this case did not satisfy these characteristics.112
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The tribunal appears to have adopted an objective interpretation to what investment means.  
Under ICSID Convention, it affirmed the objective criteria, while rejecting the subjective 
criteria, indicating that under ICSID Convention there is a limit on what parties can define as 
investment.113  It applied the characteristics of investment test to the underlying transaction and 
the bank guarantee to examine if they qualify as investment under the ICSID Convention.  Also, 
it rejected an interpretation that would have considered any obligation that has a financial value 
an investment under the BIT.  Yet, the tribunal stopped short of finding that the contextual 
interpretation applies to the definition of investment under the BIT.  It did not examine the 
underlying transaction to decide whether it qualified as an investment under the BIT as it did 
under ICSID Convention.  It only examined whether the bank guarantee qualifies as an 
investment under the BIT.  
In a more illustrative case of this interpretation, an UNCITRAL tribunal under the auspices of 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration adopted the objective interpretation of investment under a 
BIT, which has a definition of investment similar to the German Model BIT’s.  In , under 
Switzerland-Uzbekistan BIT, the BIT adopted an asset-based definition of investment. 114  It 
states that “‘investments’ shall include every kind of assets,” and followed this with a non-
exhaustive list.115  The non-exhaustive list includes “claims to money or to any performance 
having an economic value;” and “concessions under public law.”116  
The dispute arose from wheat supply transactions. The claimant entered into several contracts to 
sell wheat to various Uzbek corporations.  After supplying the wheat, no payment was made.  
The claimant initiated arbitration against these corporations under the contract, and it was 
successful in obtaining an arbitral award for the payment of its dues under the contracts.  
However, the claimant’s attempts to enforce the award in Uzbekistan failed.  The claimant 
argued that the terms “every kind of asset” is broad to include its rights under the contract and 
the arbitral award, and that “right to payment” under the contract and the arbitral award are thus 
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investment under the BIT.117  It further alleged that its asset would qualify as an investment if it 
is covered by one or more of the assets described in the non-exhaustive list.118
In rejecting this argument, the tribunal started its analysis by stating the ordinary meaning of 
investment as “the commitment of funds or other assets with the purpose to receive a profit, or 
‘return,’ from that commitment of capital.”119  It also defined asset as “property of any kind.”120  
The tribunal rejected this interpretation, which “deprives the term ‘investments’ of any inherent 
meaning.”121  It explained that there are other assets that might qualify as investment but are not 
included in the list, as it is not an exhaustive list.122  In order to find whether such assets qualify 
as investment, investment must have an inherent meaning that should not be ignored.123
The tribunal further stated, quoting the BIT’s preamble, that the claimant’s interpretation ignores 
the purpose and object of the BIT.  The object is to encourage foreign investment to achieve 
economic prosperity and cooperation, which “suggests an intent to protect a particular kind of 
assets, distinguishing them from mere ordinary commercial transactions.”124  Thus, to only look 
whether an asset is included in the list that follows the definition would not conform to the object 
and purpose of the BIT.125  
What’s more, the reading advanced by the claimant, the tribunal noted, leads to a result that is 
“manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 126  Such result would not leave any distinction between 
investment and ordinary commercial transactions.127  Also, any arbitral award would be 
considered an investment under the “claim to money” or “right given by decision of the 
authority’ categories.  Such result “would create, , a new instance of review of State 
court decisions” every time enforcement of an arbitral award is refused, without regard to the 
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underlying dispute, and under different rules and instrument than that normally applies to such 
enforcement.128  
Finally, the tribunal noted that this interpretation would convert every contract between a 
foreigner and the State into an investment, and similarly any award or decision in favour of the 
foreigner, which could not be the intention of the State parties to the BIT to have all their 
contractual obligations adjudicated under BITs without regard to the choice of law and forum in 
such contract.129
The tribunal concluded that investment “has an intrinsic meaning” separate from the categories 
of assets in the non-exhaustive list; which may or may not qualify to be an investment.130  It 
emphasized that an investment “entail[s] a contribution that extends over a certain period of time
and that involves some risk.”131  It acknowledged the right of State parties to a BIT to call an 
investment an asset that does not meet such meaning.132  “However, in such cases, the wording 
of the instrument in question must leave no room for doubt that the intention of the contracting 
States was to accord to the term ‘investment’ an extraordinary and counterintuitive meaning.”133
The tribunal applied its interpretation and found that the supply contract and the arbitral award 
which were “inextricably linked” did not qualify as investment under the BIT.134  
In reaching this result, the tribunal explained it understanding of the characteristics of 
investment.  First, the contribution can consist of committing anything with an “economic 
value,” whether it is “in cash, kind or labor.”135  The supply of wheat did not qualify as 
contribution because it was one sale of good for immediate payment and not a contribution in 
kind in an investment.136  
The second characteristic is duration.  No certain minimum duration, the tribunal noted, is 
required to find an investment, but rather all circumstances together with the whole commitment 
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of the investor should be evaluated.137  The claimant delivered wheat under the contract for a 
period of five months.  The tribunal found that such period did not qualify as duration typical for 
investment and no prior or subsequent transactions were made by the claimant.138
Third, the risk element in investment, the tribunal distinguished between normal risk that exists 
in every commercial transaction like the risk that the other party would not fulfil its end of the 
bargain, and the “investment risk.”139  The former does not constitute an element of investment.  
The latter does.  “Investment risk,” unlike the normal commercial risk, involves not knowing 
whether the investment would lead to profit and how much contribution the investor might have 
to commit even if all other parties have fulfilled their legal obligations. 140  Since in this case only 
commercial risk existed, while there was no investment risk, the tribunal found that this element 
was not satisfied. 141  
In conclusion, this interpretation looks to the ordinary meaning of the term investment in the 
context of the object and purpose of the BIT.  Only an asset or an accumulation of assets that 
satisfies the characteristics of investment is considered an investment under this interpretation 
unless the relevant BIT language explicitly requires different interpretation. This interpretation is 
preferred as it conforms to BITs objective to protect investment and not property. It is also a 
more balanced interpretation that allows the host state to distinguish between different kinds of 
economic transactions and enables it to regulate capital that arises from transactions that do not 
qualify as investment.
The term capital is not defined in the Model BITs and BITs in general.  In economics, this term 
refers to the assets and goods that produce other goods and services.142  While the funds or 
money strictly are not the same as capital, capital almost always include use of funds whether to 
buy the capital; as a result of capital use; or after sale of such capital.  Such funds are often 
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referred to as capital.  The term capital thus is used to refer to funds used to make and develop an 
investment, compared to funds used to settle instant commercial transactions.143  
This term is generally used in BITs to refer to the currency or funds used to fund the investment 
in the host State.  This is distinguished from the underlying investment or transaction itself.144  
Many terms are used to refer to a certain kind of capital: “Short-term” or “speculative” capital. 
Although there are technical differences, the point is the same: short-term capital flows or 
speculative capital is mainly attracted by the difference in interest rate and seeks a short-term 
profit. 145  On the other hand, long term capital is associated with what is known as “productive 
capital” that is invested in the long term, typically more than a year, in a project that that is aims 
at producing profit through producing or adding value to assets and selling them for profit.
For the purpose of defining capital, the IMF Articles distinguishes between funds arising from 
current transactions and funds arising from capital transactions.  The IMF Articles states:
Payments for current transactions means payments which are not for the purpose of transferring capital, and 
includes, without limitation:
(1) all payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current business, including services, and 
normal short-term banking and credit facilities;
(2) payments due as interest on loans and as net income from other investments;
(3) payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans or for depreciation of direct investments; and
(4) moderate remittances for family living expenses.146
The IMF Articles thus defines current transfers in the negative; funds that are not capital 
transactions.  It gives an example of the current transfers.  Two categories are considered current 
transfers, which are economically considered capital transfers.  These are categories number 2 
and 3 above.147  On the other hand, the IMF Article does not define capital transactions because 
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there is no need for the approval of the IMF to control capital movements.  Meanwhile, payments 
for current transactions and other measures need the IMF approval.148
Another related term is the “transfer of capital.”  In economics, it refers to “transfers of 
ownership of fixed assets; transfers of funds linked to, or conditional upon, acquisition or 
disposal of fixed assets; or cancellation, without any counterparts being received in return, of 
liabilities by creditors.”149  This component of capital, funds, is the subject of this study.    
Equally relevant is the term “capital account convertibility,” which can be defined as permitting 
a resident to purchase foreign assets, to receive foreign exchange for selling domestic asset to 
non-resident, and for non-resident to sell domestic assets and repatriate the returns through 
providing foreign exchange conversion in all cases. 150 In other words, it is the unrestricted 
ability to convert domestic currency into foreign currency for the purpose of undertaking capital 
transactions.151 Capital account convertibility involves getting rid of direct prohibitions and 
quantitative controls that ban capital transactions completely.152  In contrast to capital account 
convertibility, keeping the convertibility of current transactions is a basic objective of the IMF 
and is a condition for staying as a member country of the IMF. 153
Under BITs, capital transfer and convertibility includes all funds relating to investment.  This 
includes funds used to make or expand an investment, funds that result from investment like 
profits or as a result of liquidation, sale or compensation for the expropriation of the investment.  
The definition of investment is paramount to the identification of the funds covered.  Under the 
literal interpretation, any funds used to purchase or dispose of an asset would be covered by the 
BITs provision.  This would virtually any transfer relating to any economic transaction, which 
would include long term capital, short term/speculative capital, and funds related to current and 
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capital transactions. On the other hand, under the contextual interpretation, funds have to be 
related to an asset that has the characteristics of investment to be covered by BITs.  
Therefore, the interpretation of investment affects directly the scope of capital funds subject to 
the transfer obligations under BITs—the literal interpretation subjects all kind of funds relating 
to virtually any transaction that has economic value to the transfer obligation under BITs, while 
the contextual obligations would limit this obligation to capital arising from transactions that 
have the characteristics of investment.
BITs’ definition of the term investment-- BITs’ subject of protection-- is broad since it refers to 
any kind of asset. Under the literal interpretation, investment means that any kind of asset or 
transaction that has economic value which is followed by most tribunals such as .  The 
term’s interpretation broadens the ambit of BITs to cover any regulation of property or funds 
owned by foreigners in the host State.  
Under the contextual interpretation, only assets that have the characteristics of investment would 
qualify as investment under BITs. This is a better approach as it reasonably limits the ambit of 
BITs to investment and not all kinds of transactions and property rights.  This approach is 
followed by minority of tribunals such as .  Yet this is consistent with BITs objective to 
protect and promote investment and not property. It also permits states to distinguish between 
different kinds of economic transactions and exclude transactions that do not qualify as 
investment.
There is no right of establishment or admission under customary international law. It is rather 
based on some treaty obligations such as those included in BITs. Some BITs provide for NT or 
non-discrimination in the preadmission phase. A host State may admit the entry of foreign 
capital to establish or acquire investment in its territory. Many approaches in relation to the 
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admission of foreign investments and related capital have been taken by different BITs, as well 
as other treaties and codes. These approaches can be grouped into the following categories. 
The first category retains the power of the host state to admit foreign investment in accordance 
with its respective laws, which may include imposing certain conditions or performance 
requirements for admission.154 The second category grants most favoured nation treatment and/or 
national treatment on the admission of foreign investment, which is normally accompanied with 
a “negative list” of sectors or activities that are excluded from such treatment.155  The Model 
BITs, and BITs generally, use one of these two approaches or a combination of them.  
The third category, the “selective liberalization model” or “positive list”, liberalizes investment 
in certain sectors or industries, while retaining the discretionary powers for the rest of the 
sectors.156  This is the case of GATS and OECD.157 This may end up with a liberalization of 
almost all sectors, as in the case of the OECD Codes of Liberalisation of Capital Movements.158
It is useful here to note the distinction between the right of admission and establishment. The 
right of admission is distinguished from the right of establishment. Admission refers to the right 
of an investor to enter the territory of the host State to do business.159 The right to establishment 
refers to the right of an investor to conduct its business through certain form of establishment in 
the territory of the host State.160 It follows that admission precedes establishment, and thus the 
right of establishment includes the right of admission.161  
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A short term investment that only requires capital need only the right to admission and the right 
to establishment would not be necessary.162 On the other hand, a direct investment that requires 
control over the investment and physical presence in the host State would require the right of 
establishment in order to realize.163 The right to admission or establishment included in some 
BITs like the US BITs would depend on whether the activity is covered in the definition of 
investment. 
The right to admission may be qualified in BITs by the host State’s right to regulate, through its 
laws and regulations, the admission of foreign investment.164  Most BITs follow this approach, 
sometimes referred to as an “investment control model,” where the host state retains its 
discretion to admit foreign investment according to its laws.165  The requirement to follow host 
state law in relation to admission is typically not qualified in this category of treaty.166  
This means that foreign investment must follow the rules of the host State law regarding 
admission and establishment at the time of making its investment.167 If it does not, it will not be 
considered admitted “in accordance with the laws of the host State,” and will not be protected by 
the BIT.  Some commentators and tribunals have even suggested that this requirement is implicit 
even if not explicitly stated in the relevant BIT.168  Sacerdoti notes:
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Whenever foreign investment operations are admitted under general legislation, as is currently the case in 
most countries and in respect to most sectors, the expression “in accordance with its laws” is almost 
redundant. It requires that prescribed procedures be respected which is obvious-and authorizes the denying 
of the treaty benefits to illegal operations.169
It also follows that the State may change the rules of admission without affecting already 
admitted investment.  Consistent with this, Shihata notes:
It is therefore clear that in this largest group of BITs the obligation to admit investments is subject to 
whatever restrictions on such admission that may exist in the law of the host State at the time of the 
conclusion of the BIT and subsequently.  Moreover, the treaties place no limitations on the nature or extent 
of the restrictions that may be introduced by the State.170  
Drafting may differ from one BIT to another in this category, but they generally do not grant 
unrestricted rights of establishment or admission to foreign investment.171  A state party to BITs 
under this approach is not obliged to amend its laws regarding admission to guarantee NT or 
MFN to investors from the other party.172  It also has the discretion to amend its laws regarding 
admission after the entry into force of such BIT.173  Yet some BITs include broad admission 
clauses that generally refer to host state’s laws without detail, while other BITs include more 
detailed provisions. The latter type is preferred because they prevent the breadth of the 
provisions from resulting in ambiguity and incoherence that defy the purpose of these kinds of 
admission clauses.
Most European BITs belong to this first category which retains host State discretion (sovereign 
autonomy) in relation to the admission of foreign investment. The German and UK Model BITs,
for example, belong to this category.  The UK Model BIT states: “Each Contracting Party shall 
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encourage and create favourable conditions for nationals or companies of the other Contracting 
Party to invest capital in its territory, and, subject to its right to exercise powers conferred by its 
laws, shall admit such capital.”174
The UK Model BIT thus subjects the admission of foreign investment and related capital to the 
host state’s laws. In doing so, the UK Model refers to the admission of capital related to
investment.  It does not explicitly separate inward investment from related inward capital; and 
while it defines investment, it does not define capital. Two obligations on the host State are 
apparent from the above provision. First, there is the obligation to encourage and create an 
environment that is friendly to investment from the other party. Second, there is the obligation to 
admit such investment, but with the qualification that this is subject to the State’s discretionary 
powers conferred by its domestic laws.  
No right to admission exists under this provision, since it subjects admission to host State 
discretion.175  It also does not grant a right to national treatment or most favoured nation 
treatment at the admission stage.  Foreign investment must thus comply with host State laws 
regarding admission.  Pollan agrees that under this approach “[a] right to admission does not 
exist.”176  Shihata notes that “while admission provisions of this type of BIT[s] may establish a 
presumption in favor of admission, they effect no fundamental change on admission over what 
would have been the case had the BIT not been concluded.”177
Of course, this approach subjects admission to the host State’s domestic laws, which may 
themselves restrict the host state discretion in relation to admission.178  Newcombe and Paradell 
note that a violation of a BIT “might occur if the host state's refusal [to admit foreign investment] 
is in breach of local law because it would have failed to admit the investment in accordance with 
its own laws.”179  This constitutes a to the host State laws.180  
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Sacerdoti notes, citing to a BIT’s provision that requires admission in accordance to host State 
laws:
The current formula does have definite legal implications, both as to procedure (due process) and the 
substance, in that it subjects the making of an investment only to the legal rules in force at that time. 
, if not towards the investor, surely in respect of its national State. 181
Thus, the “in accordance with the law” provision appears to impose a restriction on the host State 
government that in admitting foreign investment it must comply with its own laws at the time of 
admission.  The application of relevant national law effectively becomes an international law 
obligation.  Although investor-state arbitration may not be available in some cases to the investor 
for purposes of enforcement of this obligation, the investor’s home State may be able to invoke 
its own rights under the treaty.182  
Similar to the UK Model BIT, the German Model BIT provides: “Each Contracting Party shall in 
its territory promote as far as possible investments by nationals or companies of the other 
Contracting Party and admit such investments in accordance with its legislation.  It shall in any 
case accord such investments fair and equitable treatment.”183
Additionally, the Protocol to the German Model BIT states: “Investment made, in accordance 
with the legislation of either Contracting Party, within the area of application of the law of that 
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Contracting Party by nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party shall enjoy the full 
protection of the Treaty.”184  
The German Model BIT thus subjects admission of foreign investment to the laws of the host 
State. It, accordingly, does not grant a right of most favoured nation or national treatment to 
foreign investors at the admission stage. The promotion of investment obligation is less stringent 
than that of the UK Model BIT. This is evidenced by using the words “as far as possible” in the 
German Model BIT, which connotes an obligation to exert effort, not to achieve a particular 
result.  
That said, the comment made above in relation to the UK Model BIT, regarding the prohibition 
of conditions of admission that violates the host State laws, applies equally here.  A host State 
may not impose a condition that violates its laws to admit a foreign investment under this 
provision. 
In addition, the Model German BIT, as other German BITs, refers to fair and equitable treatment 
in the admission provision.185  The reference can be read to require granting fair and equitable 
treatment to investment after admission.  However, requiring fair and equitable treatment in the 
same provision relating to admission could be read to require granting this treatment in the 
process of admission as well as in the post admission phase.186  The use of the same term “such 
investments” for the subject of admission and the subject of the obligation to accord fair and 
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equitable treatment suggests that the subject of treatment is the same, i.e. investment before 
admission.  This means that under the Model German BIT the decision to admit foreign 
investment is also subject to the obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment. This restricts 
further the discretion of the host State to admit foreign investment. 
Yet it is equally plausible that the reference to “such investment” is to the investment after 
admission.  This would accord with the purpose of this admission provision to subject the 
admission to host State laws and as such is the preferred interpretation that conforms with 
language, context and intention of the parties to this type of clause. This kind of broad 
obligations leads to ambiguity and may result in unpredictable results.
Some BITs that grant the host state discretion are drafted more narrowly. They specify the rights 
of the state to regulate admission of investment in a clearer way than the previous type.
For example, some UK BITs do not contain the same obligation to “admit” in accordance with 
the host state’s laws. The UK- Philippine BIT states:
Each Contracting Party shall encourage and create favourable conditions for investments, consistent with 
its national objectives, by companies or nationals of the other Contracting Party, subject to the laws and 
regulations of Party in whose territory the investment is made, including rules on registration and valuation 
of such investments, if any.187
This provision does not explicitly provide for a right to admission in accordance with the law, 
only to “encourage[ing] and creat[ing] favourable” atmosphere for foreign investment. This 
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approach is preferred since it clearly does not provide for a right to admission, which allows the 
host state to regulate admission.
Other UK BITs limit the scope of the covered investment to that which is specifically authorized 
by the host state. The UK-Singapore BIT, for example, states, “this Agreement shall only extend 
to, investments, whether made before or after the coming into force of this Agreement, which are 
specifically approved in writing by the Contracting Party in whose territory the investments have 
been made or will be made.”188  
A more detailed reference to parties’ laws exists in the UK-Indonesia BIT, which limits its 
application to investment that is admitted in accordance with a specific Indonesian law as 
amended from time to time.189 It also envisages the possibility that the United Kingdom may 
issue a law that regulates admission of foreign investment and provides that Indonesian 
investments will be covered by the BIT only if they follow such law.  It states:
This Agreement shall only apply to investments by nationals companies of the United Kingdom in the 
territory of the Republic Indonesia which have been granted admission in accordance with the Foreign 
Capital Investment Law No. 1 of 1967 or any law amending or replacing it.
In the event of the law of the United Kingdom making provisions regarding the admission of foreign 
investment, investments by nationals or companies of the Republic of Indonesia in the territory of the 
United Kingdom made after the coming into force of such provisions shall only enjoy protection under this 
Agreement if they have been admitted in accordance with such provisions.190
Another mechanism used by UK BITs is to impose a registration requirement in order for the 
investment to be covered by the BIT, if the host State law requires such registration.  The 
Philippine-UK BIT imposes the registration requirement as a BIT requirement only if the State 
law so requires.  It states:
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This Agreement shall apply only to investments brought into, derived from or directly connected with 
investments brought into the territory of one Contracting Party by nationals or companies of the other 
Contracting Party which are qualified for registration and are duly registered by the appropriate 
government agency of the receiving Contracting Party, if so required by its laws.191
This provision refers to the host State laws regarding registration. It confirms that investments 
that are not registered according to the host State law will not be covered by the BIT.  Of course, 
if the host State law does not require registration, investment will be covered without the need to 
register.  
While this requirement does not appear to add a new requirement to BITs that require that 
admission of investment must be in accordance with host State law, because if the registration 
requirement is mandated by the host State law the investment must be registered to be in 
accordance with the host State law, as will be seen below, some case law requires the existence 
of this provision to find a violation of the requirement that investment must be made in 
accordance with host State law. Accordingly, this kind of detailed provisions are preferred over 
the broad admission provision that only requires admission accordingly to the laws of the host 
state. It is notable that these explicit and detailed references to registration and host State 
authorization exist in early UK BITs made during the 1970’s.  This was a time in which the UK 
applied capital controls to protect its market.
Also, some German BITs regulate admission in a more narrow and detailed manner. Article 2 of 
the Germany- India BIT, for example, states:
(1) Each Contracting Party shall encourage and create favourable conditions for investors of the other 
Contracting Party and also admit investments in its territory in accordance with its law and policy.
(2) Each Contracting Party shall accord to investments as well as to investors in respect of such investments 
at all times fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security in its territory.192
This provision is different from the German Model BIT and other German BITs in two main 
ways. First, the admission of investment is not only in accordance to the host State law but also 
subject to its policy.  This accords a wide discretion to the host State as it does not restrict its 
discretion to only its laws, but also to its policy.  Second, the obligation to accord fair and 
equitable treatment appears to apply only to investments after admission.  This is evident from 
the reference to investments, which is defined in the BIT to mean “every kind of asset in 
accordance with the national laws of the Contracting Party where the ,”193 and 
from the words “in its territory,” which indicate that the investment is already admitted in the 
host State.
Similarly, the China-Germany BIT does not provide for fair and equitable treatment at the 
admission phase.  Article 2(1) regarding admission does not refer to fair and equitable treatment.  
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Article 3(1) accords fair and equitable treatment to investment “in the territory” of the host State.  
These provisions respectively state:
Each Contracting Party shall encourage investors of the other Contracting Party to make investments in its 
territory and admit such investments in accordance with its laws and regulations. 
…
Investments of investors of each Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable 
treatment in the territory of the other Contracting Party.194
These two examples are preferred over the German Model BIT provisions because they are clear 
in what they cover and they accord the host state more discretion to admit investment.
There are different tools and approaches that a host State may adopt to exercise its powers to 
admit foreign investment.  These vary from the most radical method, which is the complete 
prohibition of inward capital investment in all sectors, to a partial prohibition that applies only in 
specific sectors.195 The host State may also screen foreign investment and require a prior 
approval, licence or registration for all foreign investment or for certain sectors or activities.196   
In general, the main control exerted by a host State, other than general or partial exclusion, is 
through screening, requiring written approval, or registration.  The structure of screening systems 
is generally similar. The host State requires the potential investor to obtain first an authorization 
from a national authority in order to invest.197  The host State reviews the foreign investment 
proposal and applies certain criteria provided in its laws depending on its policy objectives to 
grant this authorization.198  
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To grant the authorization, a host State might require certain conditions, typically, in relation to 
the percentage of national ownership and the type of the investment.199  Factors like employing 
local workers and exporting products are taken into consideration in deciding to grant an 
authorization.200  Some countries give a temporary authorization pending the completion of all 
requirements such as feasibility studies201 and security checks.  
Such conditions are a manifestation of the host country prerogative to admit foreign investment 
in the way it sees it achieves its economic and social development goals.202  Conditions relating 
to national security still apply almost universally.203These control tools appear to be sanctioned 
by BITs that follow the host State discretionary power approach, if the host State laws provide 
for them.  Yet the theoretical foundation of this approach—foreign investment compliance with 
host State laws—is qualified by some case law, discussed below, which only requires 
compliance with fundamental principles of host State law to comply with BIT, except if the BIT 
explicitly requires that a certain requirement under host State law must be followed.
Case law that deals with the right to admission under BITs is sparse.  This is probably because 
before admission an investor does not have an investment in the territory of the host State, which 
is generally the jurisdictional basis for protection under BITs.  In addition, given the 
discretionary powers of State to admit the investment, the likelihood of a claimant prevailing in 
such a case are not high. The available remedies are also limited—conceivably, a tribunal might 
order specific performance requiring a host State to admit investment, or more likely, it may 
compensate the investor for its loss. The possibility of such remedies may not be enough to 
persuade an investor to file a costly arbitration.  First, by the time the arbitration is settled, it 
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might be too late for the investment to be successful.  Second, it is hard to quantify losses for an 
investment that was not made in the first place, and a tribunal might only award a prevailing 
claimant its pre-investment expenses and nominal damages.
There are cases, however, where the claimant’s investment was already admitted into the host 
State, but the host State maintained that such admission was in violation of its laws.  The 
inclusion of the requirement that investment must be“ in accordance to the host State law” in the 
definition of the investment in a BIT or in the admission clause means that an investment made 
in violation of the host State law will not qualify as an investment under the BIT or will be 
denied the protection of the BIT.  This principle has been applied by several tribunals.  Some 
even ventured to state that, even if the IIA does not include such provision, it will be deemed 
implied.204  
Yet some commentators and awards limit such requirement to compliance with “fundamental 
principles of the host State’s law” or to investment that is illegal .205  McLachlan, Shore & 
Weiniger note that:
In many investment treaties the definition of ‘investment’ includes a requirement that the categories of 
assets admitted as ‘investments’ must be made ‘in accordance with the laws and regulations of the said 
party’. The plain meaning of this phrase is that investments which would be illegal upon the territory of the 
host State are disqualified from the protection of the BIT. Attempts by respondent States to broaden the 
matters encompassed by this phrase have failed.206
Some awards maintain that in order for the host State law requirement of prior approval or 
registration of foreign investment to apply under a BIT, the relevant BIT must have specific and 
clear requirements of registration or approval.  Otherwise, an investment which does not comply 
with a host State law requirement of registration or specific approval will still qualify as a 
protected investment under the BIT.  
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For example, in , a claim brought under the Chile-Argentina BIT, the claimants violated 
the host State company law that requires registration.207  Article I (1) of the BIT had an “in 
accordance with the law” requirement in the definition of the investment.  In addition, Article II 
(1) of the BIT, provides that admission shall be in accordance with the host State law.  The 
tribunal noted that while Metalpar S.A. was registered before the dispute arose, the other 
claimant, Buen Aire S.A., was registered after the request of arbitration was made.208  
The tribunal turned to the consequences of the untimely registration of Buen Aire S.A.  It noted 
that the host law provides sanctions for the non-registration for the Claimants, which vary from 
rejecting its registration to imposing fines on the company and its managers.209  It refused to 
deny the claimant’s claims on this basis, reasoning that this would be disproportionate.210  It 
added that it would be illogical to impose this penalty on the investment, while the host State law 
provides for different penalties.211
This reasoning conflates two separate matters: the application of host State law as the choice of 
law under the BIT on the subject of legality or validity of the admission of investment, and the 
application of the sanction under the host State law.  The tribunal was not called upon to apply 
the host State law sanction, which it did not, nor to weigh the effect of different penalties under 
the BIT and host State law. Rather, the tribunal was called upon to determine under the BIT 
whether the investment was made in accordance with host State law.  If it was not, then the 
correct finding would be that that the investment has been illegally admitted and the Tribunal 
should then look to the BIT to ascertain the consequences of such illegal admission.  The tribunal 
is not vested with the power to ignore an explicit provision of the BIT because it finds it 
inappropriate or illogical.  This is akin to deciding , an approach which is not 
open to the tribunal in the absence of an express provision to the contrary.
That is not to say, however, that in all cases the tribunal is obliged to deny all protection of the 
BIT in such circumstances.  It might still find that applying the BIT or its choice of law would 
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result in a different remedy for this illegality.  But by ignoring the BIT’s explicit requirement, the 
tribunal ignored the BIT’s guarantee that foreign investment in the host State would 
comply with the host State’s laws.  In other words, the treaty provision to this effect was 
rendered ineffective by the tribunal.
In another case, an ICSID tribunal refused to deny protection to an investment that allegedly did 
not comply with certain procedural requirements.  In , under the Lithuania-Ukraine BIT, 
an “in accordance to the law and regulations” of the host State requirement for the admission of 
the investment was at issue.212  The host State contended that the claimant’s investments were not 
made in accordance with its law.  The alleged violations included procedural errors in the 
registration of the investment assets, including the “absence of signature or notarization.”213  The 
tribunal agreed with the award that the purpose of this requirement is to ensure that the 
protected investment is not “illegal.”214  The tribunal interpreted the requirement in light of the 
purpose and object of the BIT, which is “to provide broad protection for investors and their 
investments.”215  It noted that the investment, as admitted by the respondent, was not “illegal 
.”216  
Since all the assets at issue were registered by the host State, the tribunal found that this 
registration confirmed that the investment was made in accordance with the host State laws.  It 
did not find it necessary to examine the administrative procedure under the host State law. It 
explained that even if the respondent’s allegations were true, “exclud[ing] an investment on the 
basis of such minor errors would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the [BIT].”217  
The reasoning, unlike that in , does not ignore the BIT’s explicit legality 
requirement.  The tribunal found that the investment was made in accordance with the 
host State’s laws as evidenced by the host State’s registration of the investment, and that the 
alleged procedural errors did not qualify as a violation of the host State’s laws.
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As for the requirement of investment registration under host State law some tribunals have found 
that violating this requirement will only violate the legality requirement under a BIT if the BIT 
specifically so provides. For example, in , the UNCITRAL tribunal distinguished BITs 
that specifically require that investment obtain prior approval or registration and BITs that have 
the general “in accordance with host State law” requirement. 218  In that case, the BIT included 
only a general “in accordance with host law” requirement.  The tribunal stated:
It is important, however, that the specific approval requirements . . . are different from the broader
“in accordance with legislation” standard found in many other BITs including the one applicable 
to the present dispute. The present BIT does not require any approval on the part of host States. 
Thus, the two above-cited cases [requiring specific approval or registration under BITs that require 
the same] must be distinguished and cannot be relied upon by Respondent to demand registration 
or approval in order for the Claimant’s investment to be protected under the BIT.219
The tribunal found that this requirement only applies to ensure that the investment is valid and 
not illegal.220  This reasoning is problematic, which arises from the breadth of the 
admission provision.  It imposes an unwarranted restriction on the legality requirement, and 
effectively denies effect to the host State’s laws requiring prior registration of investment.  States 
entering into these BITs have reserved their right to regulate admission according to their laws, 
which includes requiring registration of investments.  That State parties should explicitly include 
a registration requirement in the BIT’s admission clause if they want this requirement to be 
recognized under the BIT is not reasonable.  There is no peculiarity to registration from other 
requirements that host States laws might mandate.  Further, State parties cannot be expected to 
explicitly provide for every possible type of requirement they may impose under their laws in 
any certain time and explicitly include it in order for it to be recognized.  The explicit reference 
to their laws should suffice.
Violations that are considered illegal include fraud and misrepresentation.  Applying the 
illegality requirement, an ICSID tribunal in declined jurisdiction under an “in 
accordance with law” requirement in the Spain-El Salvador BIT.  This was on the basis of its 
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finding that the foreign investor was awarded a concession through fraudulent means.221  The 
claimant had obtained the concession by defrauding the public bidding process, including by 
submitting false financial documentation, deliberately misrepresenting its experience and 
concealing its relationship with another bidder.222  The tribunal after reviewing the and 
the language of the BIT found that the “in accordance with the law” requirement in the 
admission provision of the BIT meant that an investment made in violation of the host State law 
would not be a protected investment covered by the BIT. It stated:
[B]y interpreting in good faith Article III of the Agreement, and by attributing to each of its words the 
meaning and scope the parties wanted to give them, and according to the will of the contracting States 
manifested in the it is clear that the only correct interpretation of said article must be 
in the sense that any investment made against the laws of El Salvador is outside the protection of the 
Agreement and, therefore, from the competence of this Arbitral Tribunal.223
The tribunal found that “because Inceysa’s investment was made in a manner that was clearly 
illegal, it [wa]s not included within the scope of consent expressed by Spain and the Republic of 
El Salvador in the BIT”.224
As can be seen from the foregoing, while most BITs require that investment is made or admitted 
“in accordance with host State laws,” this requirement has been interpreted restrictively by 
arbitral tribunals. An investment will only violate this obligation if it was illegal.  The illegality 
threshold is high. It appears that only a breach of “fundamental legal principles of the host 
country” will be held to meet this standard.225  
Having said that, when the relevant BIT explicitly requires compliance with certain legal 
requirement in the national law or the registration or approval of the foreign investment by the 
host State, some tribunals apply this requirement.  For instance, in , a dispute 
under the 1987 ASEAN Agreement, the foreign investment was admitted before the Agreement 
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was in force in the host State.226  Article II(1) of the ASEAN Agreement explicitly limits its 
application to investments “which are specifically approved in writing and registered by the host 
country and upon such conditions as it deems fit for the purposes of this Agreement.’”227  Article 
II(3) of the ASEAN Agreement provides that the Agreement applies to existing investment in the 
host State at the time of its entry into force provided that the investment is, for the purpose of the 
ASEAN Agreement, similarly approved in writing and registered.228  When the investment was 
made it was approved and registered as required by the host State law before the ASEAN 
Agreement entered into force.  However, it did not seek specific approval and registration after 
its entry into force nor did the host State grant any such approval after the Agreement’s entry 
into force.229  The tribunal noted that such approval and registration would suffice for the 
purpose of Article II(3) of the ASEAN Agreement in case of an investment that was approved 
and registered after the Agreement entered into force.230  However, the tribunal found that the
explicit requirement of Article II(3) “requires an express subsequent act amounting at least to a 
written approval and eventually to registration of the investment,”231  The original approval and 
registration before the entry in to force of the ASEAN Agreement did not meet this 
requirement.232  The tribunal concluded that the investment was not covered by Article II(3) and 
accordingly not protected by the ASEAN Agreement.233
Similarly, in , a dispute under the Inter-Governmental Agreement between the 
Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union and Malaysia (IGA), the tribunal similarly denied 
jurisdiction over a foreign investment that was not specifically approved as required by the 
IGA.234  The IGA requires that the invested assets in Malaysia be “in a project classified as an 
‘approved project’ by the appropriate Ministry in Malaysia, in accordance with the legislation 
and the administrative practice, based thereon”.235  The claimant invested in securities listed on 
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the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) through another entity.236  The tribunal found that 
such investment must satisfy the “approved project” requirement of the IGA.237  The claimant 
argued that the term “project” means activity, and that his ownership of stocks in the corporation 
is an investment in its activity.238  The claimant further argued that the approval requirement is 
satisfied, since the Malaysian Capital Issues Committee (CIC) approves the listing of any shares 
on the KLSE.239  Such approval should satisfy the “approved project” requirement.240  The 
tribunal rejected the claimant’s argument because the subject matter of the CIC approval is 
different from that of the approval required by the IGA.  It reasoned:
Approval by the CIC may satisfy a governmental requirement that the business of a corporation be 
approved by a governmental agency. But this is not the content or subject matter of the “approved project” 
requirements of proviso (i) [of the IGA]. What is required is something constituting regulatory approval of 
a “project”, as such, and not merely the approval at some time of the general business activities of a 
corporation.241
In this regard, the tribunal agreed with the respondent that “mere investments in shares in the 
stock market, which can be traded by anyone, and are not connected to the development of an 
approved project, are not protected” by the IGA.242  The tribunal concluded that the claimant’s 
investment did not qualify as a protected investment under the IGA because it is not an 
“approved project” within the meaning of this term in the IGA.243
In the same vein, in , the investment was made in violation of the host State laws.  The 
BIT contained “in accordance with the host State laws” requirement in the definition of 
investment and in the admission provision.  In addition there was a specific reference to the 
constitutional requirements that the foreign investment violated in the Protocol to the BIT and 
the instrument of ratification. The tribunal stated:
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The fact that there are three explicit references in the total of 16 provisions in the Treaty and Protocol plus 
an additional reference in the Instrument of Ratification, which selected only four items in the treaty 
deemed so important to the Philippines as to require additional recitation, indicates the significance of this 
condition. The parties had in mind explicit constitutional limitations in the Philippines. Article 2 of the 
Protocol as well as the Instrument of Ratification make that clear beyond peradventure of doubt.
The tribunal found that the investment was made intentionally in violation of the host State laws 
and the specific constitutional requirement.  Such violations were sanctioned by the BIT, which 
refers to the host State laws.  It stated:
The BIT is, to be sure, an international instrument, but its Articles 1 and 2 and ad Article 2 of the Protocol 
effect a to national law, a mechanism which is hardly unusual in treaties and, indeed, occurs in the 
Washington Convention. 
.244
The tribunal accordingly found that the investment did not qualify for the protection of the BIT.  
Yet in another case where certification was explicitly required in the BIT and registration was 
required by host State law, the tribunal did not find this requirement compulsory. In , 
a dispute under the Yemen-Oman BIT, Yemen argued that the claimant was not issued an 
investment certificate as required by the BIT and failed to register its investment in accordance 
with the Yemen Investment Law (YIL).245  Article 1(1) of the BIT states:
The term “Investment” shall mean every kind of assets owned and invested by an investor of one 
Contracting Party, in the territory of the other Contracting Party, and that is accepted, by the host Party, as 
an investment according to its laws and regulations, and for which an investment certificate is issued.246
The ICSID tribunal described the respondent’s objection as “unpersuasive” and “unattractive.”247  
It based its analysis on the preamble of the BIT that describes the objectives of the BIT stating 
“that offering mutual promotion and protection of such investments, on the basis of investment 
laws and regulations in force in both countries and on the basis of this Agreement, will 
                                                  
244 , para. (Aug. 16, 2007) (emphasis added).  For more analysis of this case, see chapter I on the 
definition of investment.
245 , para. 104.
246 para. 92 (quoting the Yemen-Oman BIT translation).
247 para. 99.
renvoi
A failure to comply with the national law to which a treaty refers will have an 
international legal effect
Desert Line
Fraport Award
Desert Award
Id.
Id.
126
contribute in stimulating investment ventures which will foster the prosperity of both Contracting 
Parties.”  The tribunal interpreted the reference to “mutual promotion and protection” of 
investment in relation to investment laws of the host State to mean that these laws may only 
encourage investment and cannot limit or restrict such investment. It stated:
The “mutual promotion and protection” is envisaged as effected “on the basis of” laws, regulations, and the 
BIT itself.  It is thus not described as by the laws, the regulations or the BIT, but rather the 
contrary - as on those normative sources. They are a support, not an impediment.248
The tribunal rejected the respondent’s argument that the claimant must show it followed “some 
mechanism of acceptance” for its investment to be in accordance with the host State laws.249  It 
reasoned that the “in accordance to its laws and regulations” requirement would have explicitly 
referred to the YIL if the parties intended that the YIL requirements apply on the investment.250  
In addition, the respondent did not prove to the tribunal that the YIL requires a specific form of 
acceptance. 251  The tribunal referred to other awards for the proposition that the “in accordance 
with the laws” requirement is intended “to ensure the legality of the investment by excluding 
investments made in breach of fundamental principles of the host State’s law, e.g. by fraudulent 
misrepresentations or the dissimulation of true ownership.”252 Since no such illegality was 
established, the tribunal concluded that the claimant’s investment was not in violation of the host 
State laws.253  In addition the tribunal found that because of the evidence proving that the 
claimant was dealing with high level officials in Yemen regarding its investment, including the 
President the “acceptance” requirement was also satisfied. 254
As for the “investment certificate” requirement, the issue for the tribunal was whether this was a 
“mere formalism” or a “material objective.”255  The tribunal chose the former, reasoning that the 
insistence on such formality is not in “the real interest” of the State parties to the BIT, and 
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contrary to the objective of the BIT to protect foreign investment. 256  Such formality cannot be 
upheld except if there is “an explicit and compelling demonstration to the contrary”.257  It stated:
A purely formal requirement would by definition advance no real interest of either signatory State; to the 
contrary, it would constitute an artificial trap depriving investors of the very protection the BIT was 
intended to provide. Such an idea must give way - in the absence of an explicit and compelling 
demonstration to the contrary - when there is, as we shall see, an obvious substantive justification for the 
requirement under general international law, which forms the context in which the BIT is called upon to 
operate.258
The tribunal further found that, unlike the term “accepted”, the term “investment certificate” is 
not qualified by the “in accordance with the laws” requirement.259  It follows that the 
“investment certificate” requirement should be interpreted “in a general sense, in light of the 
objectives of the BIT.”260  The tribunal distinguished between BITs that do not require an “
identification of investors” subject to the BIT and BITs that require such identification and 
specific approval of investment to be covered by the BIT.261  Admittedly, the Yemen-Oman BIT 
belongs to the later category that requires specific approval.  However, the tribunal found that 
there was no proof that the BIT State parties intended to have a “specific or indispensable 
formality.”262  The tribunal rejected the argument that the term “certificate” has a “plain and 
ordinary meaning” that can be interpreted according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.263  
In order for the formality to be mandatory, in the tribunal’s view, more specific guidance as to 
the type of required document and the issuing authority must be indicated in the BIT.  It stated:
[I]f an imperative formality were intended to be required, it would have been appropriate, if not 
indispensable, to identify the type of document required in each of the two countries and to identify the 
issuing department, or at least direct the attention of readers of the Treaty - prospective investors - to the 
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proposition that the precise nature of the required certificates is to be determined by “specific regulations in 
force from time to time.”264
If no specific reference is made, the requirement would be considered a mere formality that only 
requires substantive acceptance from the host State.  The tribunal referred to the ASEAN 
Agreement limiting its scope to investment “registered by the host country,” and other BITs, 
including UK-Indonesia BIT discussed above, for examples of specific references that satisfy 
this criterion.265  It concluded that since the BIT requirement lacked this kind of specificity, it 
only meant that the required certificate refers to “the substantive that the investment 
has indeed been for the purposes of Article 1(1).”266  The tribunal found that such 
acceptance existed in this case given the evidence that showed that the claimants have been 
dealing with the host State’s highest level officials regarding its investment.267
A major part of ’s reasoning is problematic in many respects.  While the facts of the 
case supported the result reached by the tribunal, the extreme requirements it imposed were not 
necessary for its main finding: that the host State has indeed accepted the investor’s investment 
and was estopped from challenging it.  For one, States cannot be reasonably expected to detail 
every document they require, each national law that applies, and each governmental department 
that issues registrations, in their BITs.  Even if this were possible, it would freeze State’s ability 
to amend their laws or administrative structures, which is again unreasonable.  Further, the 
reasoning assumes that the main legal framework for the admission of foreign investment which 
the foreign investor evaluates before making its investment is the BIT.  This is a flawed 
assumption.  The main legal framework that applies to foreign investment admission is the host 
State’s local laws.  These are what a foreign investor must undertake its due diligence to comply 
with.  This is what the BIT references in its admission clause.
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Yet some arbitral awards suggest that when it comes to whether an investment was made “in 
accordance with the host State law,” such requirement should be interpreted “in a more liberal 
way which is generous to the investor.”268
The broad admission clauses in BITs have led to ambiguity and different interpretations in 
practice.  It appears that there are three types of violations of the host state laws during the 
admission of investment that are identified in case law.  First, illegality that makes the 
investment “illegal ,” as described by the tribunal and applied by the tribunals in the 
and cases.  Second, illegality arising from a violation of “fundamental principles 
of the host State law” that constitutes a serious civil illegality, like that in .  Investments 
that were made while tainted with these two kinds of illegality are not protected under BITs.  
Accordingly, tribunals have found that investments that were made through bribery, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, or through an intentional conspiracy to invest in violation of constitutional 
and criminal prohibitions are not protected by BITs.
Illegal actions under these first two categories may overlap.  The same transaction may be illegal 
and violate fundamental principles of host State law.  Indeed, illegal transactions that 
belong to the first category will almost always be covered by the second category. 
Third, illegality arising from violations of host State laws and regulations that does not fall in the 
above two categories were not considered by some tribunals to be in violation of the “in 
accordance with host State laws” requirement.  This has included failures to register the foreign 
investment as required by the host State law and minor administrative violations.  Investments 
made in violation of such rules have been considered made “in accordance with the laws of the 
host State,” and such investments benefit from the protection of the BIT.  Yet, if the relevant BIT 
specifically requires registration or abiding by a specific requirement of a certain law of the host 
State at the time of the initiation of the investment, an investment that violates such specific 
requirement will not be considered validly made under the BIT.  
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As noted above, this last category is problematic.  It poses a question of whether the host State 
indeed retained discretionary power to admit investment under the “in accordance with the host 
State laws” requirement.  It suggests that if a foreign investor does not commit a crime by 
bribing or violating a fundamental legal rule like fraudulent misrepresentation, its transactions 
will be considered investment even if they are not in fact in conformity with legal rules in the 
host State.  Only if the BIT itself requires registration or refers explicitly to a registration 
requirement under host State law will a violation of such requirement be considered a violation 
of the BIT such that the BIT protections do not apply.  Of course, if a “in accordance with the 
host State laws” requirement will not be given effect unless specific legal requirements are 
specified in the BIT, the host State’s discretion to regulate admission is no more than theoretical.
A principal mechanism that a host State can deploy to regulate the admission of investment is 
screening or requiring registration of such investment.  If a host State requires that any foreign 
investment be registered or licensed in its territory, either generally or in specific sectors or 
activities, and a foreign investor undertakes the investment nevertheless without such registration 
or license, it may still be considered to have made investment ‘in accordance with the law” 
according to the case law discussed above.  Consequently, it would enjoy the rights afforded by 
the BIT including the right to transfer capital relating to its investment.
In addition, this interpretation conflates the national legal regime for admission of investment 
and the international legal regime for its protection.  The host State law is the proper law 
governing the admission of investment, as is confirmed by the explicit reference in the BIT.  
Accordingly, an investor is obliged to examine the host State law, not the BIT, before making its 
investment.  This makes the tribunal’s requirement that the BIT include a detailed 
explanation of the admission procedures of each State party difficult to justify.
Consistent with this reasoning, a recent award departed from the approach.  The 
issue in this recent case was not whether the investment was registered but whether the subject of 
investment was licensed as required by the host State’s law.  It found that investment made in 
violation of host State law would be considered illegal and denied BIT’s protection even when 
the illegality was unknown to the foreign investor.  In , foreign investors made deposits 
with the Villalobos brothers, two Costa Rican nationals, in Costa Rica in return for a high 
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interest rate.269  The Villalobos brothers’ solicitation of funds was in violation of Organic Law of 
the Central Bank, which prohibits financial intermediation without authorization.270  The dispute 
was filed under the Canada-Costa Rica BIT, which requires investment to be in accordance with 
the host State law. The ICSID tribunal found that this requirement was “objective and 
categorical,” and the foreign investor must comply with it “regardless of his or her knowledge of 
the law or his or her intention to follow the law.”271
As the investors had made deposits with an unauthorized financial intermediary, their investment 
was not in accordance with the host State’s law.272   The tribunal emphasized that investors must 
undertake their due diligence before investing, and that ignorance of the law is not an excuse.  It 
stated:
[P]rudent investment practice requires that any investor exercise due diligence before committing funds to 
any particular investment proposal. An important element of such due diligence is for investors to assure 
themselves that their investments comply with the law. Such due diligence obligation is neither overly 
onerous nor unreasonable. Based on the evidence presented to the Tribunal, it is clear that the Claimants 
did not exercise the kind of due diligence that reasonable investors would have undertaken to assure 
themselves that their deposits with the Villalobos scheme were in accordance with the laws of Costa 
Rica.273
The tribunals accordingly dismissed all the claimants’ claims as they did not qualify as 
investment under the BIT.
For the reasons explained above, this result is to be preferred.  If the host State laws and 
regulations are published, or otherwise obtainable by undertaking due diligence, and the investor 
fails to comply with them, such investment should not be considered valid under the provisions 
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of a BIT that have been discussed above.  However, if the host State’s law is not clear, or 
available through reasonable due diligence, or if the proper authority in the host State 
government is estopped from raising such violation because it has “knowingly overlooked them 
and endorsed an investment which was not in compliance with its law,” it would be appropriate 
to find that the foreign investment has complied with the BIT and host State law in making its 
investment.274
The above also shows the problem of broad obligations and clauses that lead to different 
interpretations and ambiguity in practice. This restricts the host state right to admit investment 
and accordingly its right to regulate capital under BITs. Narrower clauses or clauses that 
specifically provides for the host state discretion to admit foreign investment is thus preferred.
Some BITs extend NT and/or MFN treatment to the parties’ foreign investors.  Granting NT and 
MFN to foreign investment in both pre-entry and post-entry phases is viewed as an important 
tool to avoid distorting competition and to ensure an efficient economy. As discussed, the 
argument runs that, due to its progressive integration, non-discrimination policy leads to an 
efficient global economy.275  
NT with regard to the right of establishment obliges the host country to allow foreign investors to 
carry out business in the host country like nationals and under the same conditions that apply to 
nationals in establishing or acquiring investment.276  Foreign investments from the other party 
may not be discriminated against on the basis of their nationality.  This means that foreign 
investors may not be required to do what is not required from their national competitors in order 
                                                  
274 , paras. 346, 396; , para. 120 ( agreeing with that the government should be 
estopped from raising the violation of its national law if it intentionally ignored the violation of its law, and asserting 
that such result is applicable when the violation relates to a mere formality.)
275 See Chapter II; UNCTAD, in UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements, UN Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11 (Vol. IV), at 3 (1999).
276 Juillard, n.5, at 451.; Michael R. Reading, 
, 42 Duke L.J. 679, at 699 (1992).
C. Most Favoured Nation Treatment, National Treatment and Prohibition of 
Performance Requirements 
i. General
Fraport Award Desert Lines Fraport
a fortiori
see also National Treatment,
supra Note: The Bilateral Investment Treaty in ASEAN: A 
Comparative Analysis
133
for their investment to enter into the host State.277  This includes not imposing minimum national 
ownership or shareholding on foreign investment.278  
To extend MFN to admission and establishment means that the foreign investment from state 
parties to the BIT may not be discriminated against vis-a-vis other foreign investments.  If third 
party foreign investors are accorded national treatment or right to free admission in the State of 
one party, the other State party investments are entitled to the same treatment. MFN treatment 
may thus grant a foreign investor better treatment than a national, if a third party investor 
receives such better treatment.279  
The US Model BITs extend national treatment and most favoured nation treatment to the right of 
establishment. Earlier US model BITs and the most recent model of 2004 have different 
wordings in the relevant parts, but they all grant national treatment and most favoured nation 
treatment to foreign investors at the pre-entry phase.  The 1992 Model US BIT states:
Each Party shall permit and treat investment, and activities associated therewith, on a basis no less 
favorable than that accorded in like situations to investment or associated activities of its own nationals or 
companies of any third country, whichever is the most favorable, subject to the right of each Party to make 
or maintain exceptions falling within one of the sectors or matters listed in the Annex to this Treaty.280
The 2004 Model US BIT 2004 states: 
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Article 3: National Treatment
1. Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in 
like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.
2. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like 
circumstances, to investments in its territory of its own investors with respect to the establishment, 
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments. 
. . .
Article 4: Most-Favored-Nation Treatment
1. Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in 
like circumstances, to investors of any non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.
2. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like 
circumstances, to investments in its territory of investors of any non-Party with respect to the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments.281
The above provisions are broad and grant rights to investment in the pre-establishment phase.  
As such, they represent “the pre-entry model” of admission in BITs.282 US BITs, thus, bestow on 
the foreign investor a right to receive national treatment and most favoured nation treatment, 
whichever is more favourable, in the pre-entry phase.283  The 1992 Model and BITs following 
this model use the term “permit” and accord foreign investment national treatment or MFN 
                                                  
281 . 
, 
signed February 19, 2008, art. 3-4 (containing similar provision); 
, signed 
November 4, 2005, art. 3-4 (entered into force November 1, 2006) (containing similar provision).
282 Newcombe & Paradell, n 162, at 137-139.  The same approach is followed by NAFTA, which grants 
national treatment to the parties’ foreign investors and investment in the pre –entry phase.  It provides that:
1. Each Party shall accord to  investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to  its 
own investors with respect to  the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition 
of investments. 
2 . Each Party shall accord to  investments of investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like 
circumstances, to  investments of its own investors with respect to  the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments. NAFTA, art. 1102.
283 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, UNITED STATES IN VESTMEN T TREATIES: POLIC Y AND  PRAC TICE , at 75 (Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers, 1992) (U.S. “BITs require the of MFN or national treatment with respect to the right of 
establishment . . . .”) (emphasis in original); Jeffrey Lang, 
, 31 Cornell Int’l L.J. 455, 457 (1998).
US Model BIT 2004 See also Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment
Treaty Between the United States of America and 
the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment
See supra .
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treatment in this phase.284  This is broad and appears to cover admission and establishment, since 
the word “permit” is not qualified.  
Moreover, NT and MFN are also expressed to cover “associated activities”. As this term is 
defined under the US Model BIT 1992, it grants broad coverage over many activities that include 
establishing and operating companies and other entities, and entering into contracts and 
acquiring different kinds of property.285  Granting national treatment to these activities restricts 
further the host state’s ability to restrict the underlying investment activity.
The US 1994 Model and 2004 Model use the terms “establishment,” “acquisition” and 
“expansion”.  Juillard apparently refers to the establishment right when he notes that “national 
treatment, as far as it refers to the pre-establishment phase, means that foreigners may engage in 
the same economic activities under the same conditions as nationals –
.”286  
                                                  
284 Newcombe & Paradell, n 162, at 137.  , , art. II(1) (“Each Party shall 
permit and treat investment, and activities associated therewith, on a basis no less favorable than that accorded in 
like situations to investment or associated activities of its own nationals or companies, or of nationals or companies 
of any third country, whichever is the most favorable, subject to the right of each Party to make or maintain 
exceptions falling within one of the sectors or matters listed in the Protocol to this Treaty.”); 
signed Jan. 19, 1993; art. II (1), (entered into Force Jan. 12, 1994) (“Each Party shall permit and treat 
investment, and activities associated therewith, on a basis no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to 
investment or associated activities of its own nationals or companies, or of nationals or companies of any third 
country, whichever is the most favorable, subject to the right of each Party to make or maintain exceptions falling 
within one of the sectors or matters listed in the Annex to this Treaty.”); 
, signed May 28, 1992, art. II(1) (entered into force Jan. 15, 1994) (“Each Party shall permit 
and treat investment, and activities associated therewith, on a basis no less favorable than that accorded in like 
situations to investment or associated activities of its own nationals or companies, or of nationals or companies of 
any third country, whichever is the most favorable, subject to the right of each Party to make or maintain exceptions 
falling within one of the sectors or matters listed in the Annex to this Treaty.”); 
, 
signed December 3, 1985; art. II(1) (entered into force May 18, 1990) (“Each Party shall permit in its territory 
investments, and activities associated therewith, on a basis no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to 
investments of nationals or companies of any third country, and within the framework of its laws and regulations, no 
less favorable than that accorded in like situations to investments of its own nationals and companies.”); 
, signed May 15, 1990, art. II(1) (entered into force Feb. 7, 1993) (“Each Party shall permit 
in its territory investments, and activities associated therewith, by nationals and companies of the other Party on a 
basis no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to investments of nationals or companies of any other 
country and, within the framework of its existing laws and regulations, no less favorable than that accorded in like 
situations to investments of its own nationals and companies.”).
285 , art. 1(e). 
286 Juillard, n.5, at 451.
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This interpretation appears to be applicable to BITs that grant NT with regard only to the right of 
establishment. However, the US BITs include language that is broader than the right of 
establishment. This language accords national treatment in “permit[ting]” or for “establishment,” 
“acquisition” and “expansion” of investment.287 No explicit requirement that the establishment 
be permanent exists.
US Model BITs and US BITs, thus, prohibit discrimination based on nationality in the admission 
and establishment foreign investment, save in respect of the exceptions that are provided for in 
the BIT.  This restricts the discretionary power of host states to prevent or limit admission of 
foreign investment.  Only if the host state restricts nationals and other foreign investors from 
certain sectors or activities would it be able to regulate the entry of foreign investment or 
condition such entry in these sectors or activities.  
This includes screening on ground of nationality. 288  Accordingly, under US BITs, a host State 
cannot impose a screening procedure or conditions for foreign investment from the other party 
without applying the same to its nationals and other foreign investments. 
It is important to note that NT and MFN treatment obligations are restricted to treatment 
accorded to national and other foreign investment in “like situations” or “like circumstances.” 
There is no available BIT case law applying national treatment and MFN in the admission phase, 
although some cases are available regarding the application of national treatment on already 
admitted investment, which can shed light on how would national treatment be applied to 
admission.  The question is what would be the comparable situations or circumstances that can 
be used to compare between the foreign investment and national investment at the entry phase.  
This is generally a difficult question that has to be left for the facts of each case.289  
                                                  
287 Shihata, n 166, at 56 (“In U.S. BITs, . . . the national and MFN standards are made applicable to the 
‘establishment’ or ‘acquisition’ of investments, or in other words to their admission . . . .”);  Vandevelde, n. 
35 at 237 (“[T]he right to ‘establish’ or ‘acquire’ investment . . . should not be regarded as mutually exclusive.  In 
fact, U.S. BIT negotiators tended to use the terms interchangeable, along with the term to ‘make’ an investment.”). 
288 Department of State, , at VII-VIII (Article II(1) of the BIT “ensure[s] 
the better of national or MFN treatment in both the entry and post-entry phases of investment.  It thus prohibits, 
outside of exceptions listed in the Annex, ‘‘screening’’ on the basis of nationality during the investment process, as 
well as nationality-based post-establishment measures.”); Department of State, 
, (Washington, September 8, 2000); Victor Mosoti, 
, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. 
& BUS. 95, at 121 (2005).
289 UNCTAD, n 275, at 33-34.
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However, it can be assumed that “like circumstances” exist in relation to conditions imposed on 
nationals and other foreign investment in the same business sector who compete with the foreign 
investor, since the purpose of the national treatment is to prevent discrimination based on 
nationality.290  Some tribunals have narrowed the extent of comparison to “identical” national 
investors if these exist.  Thus, in , the tribunal rejected a comparison between the 
claimant, which produces methanol, with national investors that produced ethanol, because there 
were national investments that produced methanol like the claimant.291  The tribunal reasoned 
that “[i]t would be a forced application of Article 1102 if a tribunal were to ignore the identical 
comparator and to try to lever in an, at best, approximate (and arguably inappropriate) 
comparator.”292
However, in , a dispute under the US-Ecuador BIT, the tribunal was confronted with 
the scope of the “in like situations” qualifier of national treatment.293  The claimant, which was 
in the oil exploitation and exportation business in Ecuador, claimed that it was entitled to a 
refund of Value Added Tax (VAT) because it exported the produced oil, as mandated by national 
law.294  It contended that Ecuador violated national treatment and MFN treatment because other 
producers who export their other goods (flowers, mining and seafood products) received VAT 
refunds.295  
Ecuador argued that the comparison should be with producers from the same sector, i.e., oil 
producers.296 It maintained that other national oil producers had also been denied VAT refunds 
and that no foreign producer of oil received a VAT refund.297  
                                                  
290 , NAFTA Ch. 11 (Award on the Merits, Phase Two), para. 78 (Apr. 10, 2001) 
(“[T]he treatment accorded a foreign owned investment protected by Article 1102(2) [regarding national treatment] 
should be compared with that accorded domestic investments in the same business or economic sector.”).
291 , UNCITRAL (Final Award), para. 17 (Aug. 3, 2005) (“[I]t would be as perverse to 
ignore identical comparators if they were available and to use comparators that were less ‘like’, as it would be 
perverse to refuse to find and to apply less ‘like’ comparators when no identical comparators existed. The difficulty 
which Methanex encounters in this regard is that there are comparators which are identical to it.”). 
292 para. 19. 
293 , LCIA Case No UN 3467 (Award) , IIC 202 
(2004), (July 1, 2004) [hereinafter ]
294 . para. 30.
295 . para. 168. 
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The tribunal rejected Ecuador’s narrow interpretation, which was based on WTO law.  It found 
that the purpose of the national treatment in the BIT and WTO agreements were different. While 
the WTO agreement’s purpose was to avoid discrimination between imported products and 
national products, the BIT’s purpose was to avoid discrimination between different exporters.  It 
stated:
[T]he purpose of national treatment in this dispute is the opposite of that under the GATT/WTO, namely it 
is to avoid exporters being placed at a disadvantage in foreign markets because of the indirect taxes paid in 
the country of origin, while in GATT/WTO the purpose is to avoid imported products being affected by a 
distortion of competition with similar domestic products because of taxes and other regulations in the 
country of destination.
In the first situation, no exporter ought to be put in a disadvantageous position as compared to other 
exporters, while in the second situation the comparison needs to be made with the treatment of the “like” 
product and not generally. In any event, the reference to “in like situations” used in the Treaty seems to be 
different from that to “like products” in the GATT/WTO. The “situation” can relate to all exporters that 
share such condition, while the “product” necessarily relates to competitive and substitutable products.
The tribunal concluded that the claimant was not accorded national treatment because other 
national companies were entitled to tax refunds.  This amounted to discrimination, 
notwithstanding that there was no intent to discriminate.299  The tribunal found Ecuador in 
breach of its obligation to accord national treatment. 300
The result of the tribunal’s rejection of the narrow interpretation of “like situations” 
is peculiar.  In this case, the foreign investor would be entitled to better treatment than its 
national competitors, and also other third party state foreign competitors that do not have similar 
protection under their respective states’ BITs.  The tribunal’s interpretation of “like situation” 
that is inclusive of all exporters, if applied on entry might lead to similar results, whereby 
different conditions applicable for certain industries but not to others would entitle a foreign 
investor to claim violation of national treatment.  In light of this, the interpretation rendered by 
the tribunal is more convincing.
This is a result of the breadth of the NT provision that refers to the broad criterion of “in like 
situations” or “in like circumstances”.  This allowed the tribunal to reach a broad interpretation 
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that restricts the host state power to distinguish between different investors in different industries 
or sectors according for any rational reason.  
This result would have been more reasonable if the dispute was under a BIT that provided for the 
best national treatment available.  For example, the Czech-US BIT defines national treatment as 
the best treatment accorded to nationals.  It states “‘national treatment means treatment that is at 
least as favourable as the most favourable treatment accorded by a Party to companies or 
nationals of third Parties in like circumstances.”301  However, national treatment is still qualified 
by “like circumstances,” which suggests that such treatment is confined to comparable national 
investments, mainly identical competitors.302  Vandevelde notes:
The BITs provide little guidance concerning the meaning of the phrase “in like situations.” In general, 
however, one purpose of the national and MFN treatment provisions is to prevent the host state from 
providing a competitive advantage to some investments based on their nationality. Thus, the fact that 
investments are in competition with each other militates in favor of considering them to be “in like 
situations,” though it is not conclusive.303
Some US BITs use the term “nondiscriminatory” to reach the same result.  For example, the 
Bulgaria-US BIT states: “Each Party shall permit and treat investment, and activities associated 
therewith, on a , subject to the right of each Party to make or maintain 
exceptions falling within one of the sectors or matters listed in the Annex to this Treaty.”304  It 
defines the term “nondiscriminatory” treatment as “treatment that is at least as favorable as the 
better of national treatment or most-favored-nation treatment.”305  It accordingly accords both 
national treatment and MFN.  
Even if no definition of “discriminatory” is provided in the BIT, it has been interpreted to 
include national treatment.  For instance in , a claim under the US-Romania BIT, 
the ICSID tribunal interpreted discriminatory measure to mean “that a certain measure was 
                                                  
301
, signed Oct. 22, 1991, art. I(1)(g) (entered into Force Dec. 19, 1992).
302 Vandevelde, n. 35, at 240.
303 .
304 , art. II (1) (emphasis added).
305 art. I(1)(F).
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directed specifically against a certain investor by reason of his, her or its nationality.”306  The 
other comparable categories of nationals or third party investors in like situations must be 
accorded more favourable treatment, which may include not having been subjected to similar 
measures.307
The NT and MFN apply immediately under US BITs. There is no gradual application for the 
applying the admission obligations.  Notably, US Model BITs and US BITs preclude the 
application of NT and MFN treatment to certain sectors and matters that are specified in an 
annex.308 The US Model BIT 1992 requires that existing exceptions in the sectors and matters 
specified in the annex to be notified to the other party together with any future exceptions that 
must be limited “to a minimum.”309 Any future exceptions may not apply to existing 
investments.310  
No similar notification requirements exist in the US Model 1994.  The US Model 1994 does not 
prevent future exceptions from applying to existing investment.  It only prevents the future 
exceptions from requiring “the divestment, in whole or in part, of covered investments existing at 
the time the exception becomes effective.”311  
The US Model 2004 contains a more detailed regulation of the exceptions.312  Three annexes 
exist: one for all existing non-conforming measures in general (Annex I); one for all excepted 
                                                  
306 , ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11 (Award), para. 180 (Oct. 12, 2005) [hereinafter 
].
307 .  , ICSID Case No. 
ARB/99/2 (Award), para. 368 (June 25, 2001) (“Article II(3)(b) of the [U.S.-Estonia] BIT further requires that the 
signatory governments not impair investment by acting in an arbitrary or discriminatory way. In this regard, the 
Tribunal notes that international law generally requires that a state should refrain from “discriminatory” treatment of 
aliens and alien property. 
’”) (emphasis added).
308 ., , art. II(1); , art. 2 (2) (a); 2004, art. 14. 
309 , art. II(1). 
310 ., . 
311 , art. 2 (2) (a).
312 , art. 14. It states:
1. Articles 3  [National Treatment], 4  [Most-Favored-Nation Treatment], 8  [Performance Requirements], and 9 [Senior Management 
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(a) any existing non-conforming measure that is maintained by a Party at:
(i) the central level of government, as set out by that Party in its Schedule to  Annex I or Annex III,
iii. Immediacy and Negative List
Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania
Noble Award
Id Cf. Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil Genin v. Republic of Estonia
Customary international law does not, however, require that a state treat all aliens (and 
alien property) equally, or that it treat aliens as favourably as nationals. Indeed, ‘even unjustifiable differentiation 
may not be actionable.
See for e.g U.S. Model BIT 1992 U.S. Model BIT 1994 U.S. Model BIT
See for e.g., U.S. Model BIT 1992
See for e.g Id
U.S. Model BIT 1994
U.S. Model BIT 2004
141
non-conforming measures in the financial sector (Annex III); and one for all excepted sectors 
and activities (Annex II).313  The first two (Annexes I and III) specify the existing measures that 
do not conform with national treatment and MFN treatment.  A party may amend the existing 
non-conforming measures to make them more in conformity with the national treatment or MFN.  
It may not however amend them otherwise.  The third annex (Annex II) that contains the sectors 
and matters excepted from the NT and MFN can be amended without such qualification, except 
that an existing investor may not be forced to sell its investment because of its nationality.  As 
Shihata notes, “US BITs thus achieve a ‘freezing’ or stabilization of the areas in which each 
State can apply restrictions to investors from the other State.”314
The liberalization of investment in US BITs conforms to the US national interest as defined by 
US foreign policy: it grants US investors access to foreign countries.  BITs are considered an 
instrument to enforce such policy, which conforms to the ideology behind the US BITs 
programme to allow investment and capital flows associated thereto to move according to market 
rules only, without government interference. 315 This approach, which was also followed by 
Canada and Japan, highlights the change in the role of BITs from protecting foreign investment 
to being an instrument to liberalise the movement of foreign investment and capital. 316  Some 
European BITs have also started to follow suit. An example is the Italian Model BIT.317
The US Model BITs thus require the immediate application NT and MFN on the admission of 
investment except for certain sectors that are included in a list. The immediacy of the NT and 
                                                                                                                                                                   
(ii) a regional level of government, as set out by that Party in its Schedule to  Annex I or Annex III,  or
(iii) a local level of government;
(b) the continuation or prompt renewal of any non-conforming measure referred to  in subparagraph (a); or
(c) an amendment to  any non-conforming measure referred to  in subparagraph (a) to  the extent that the amendment does 
not decrease the conformity of the measure, as it existed immediately before the amendment, with Article 3  [National 
Treatment], 4  [Most-Favored-Nation Treatment], 8  [Performance Requirements], or 9  [Senior Management and Boards of 
Directors].
2 . Articles 3  [National Treatment], 4  [Most-Favored-Nation Treatment], 8  [Performance Requirements], and 9 [Senior Management 
and Boards of Directors] do not apply to  any measure that a Party adopts or maintains with respect to  sectors, subsectors, or activities, 
as set out in its Schedule to  Annex II.
3 . Neither Party may, under any measure adopted after the date of entry into force of this Treaty and covered by its Schedule to Annex 
II, require an investor of the other Party, by reason of its nationality, to  sell or otherwise dispose of an investment existing at the time 
the measure becomes effective.
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MFN application to admission of investment combine with a negative list approach is flawed. 
This approach entails an immediate lifting of all restrictions on the admission of foreign 
investment including screening and requiring registration. This does not allow developing 
countries to regulate the admission of different investments according to their needs and to 
prevent short-term investment and certain kinds of investors that can threaten the stability of the 
economy. The inclusion of a negative list is not sufficient for covering different kinds of short-
term investments and does not apply to the kind of investors. It does not also accommodate 
developing countries incapability to identify the sectors that might be threatening to their 
economy.
This chapter has discussed the breadth of the term investment and the admission of investment 
provisions under BITs. The broad meaning given to investment leads to ambiguity and 
incoherence in practice, and unduly broadens the ambit of capital entitled to transfers, 
transactions subject to admission and investor-state arbitration.  
While the contextual interpretation of the term investment —which requires certain 
characteristics in an asset to qualify as investment—is more close to the object and purpose of 
BITs, it is not shared by most tribunals and commentators. Many follow the literal 
interpretation—which do not adopt any limitation on the term investment under BITs.  They 
consider that each asset or contract that has an economic value and each item included in the 
non-exhaustive list is separately considered investment under BITs.
However, some recent practice of certain States, including the US, has clarified that an asset 
must have certain characteristics to be considered investment.  This practice is still at its 
inception and mostly followed by developed States which had been subject to investor-state 
arbitration.  It is still early to see whether this practice will have any effect on BITs jurisprudence 
in general, or would be followed by other states.
The importance of the definition of investment under BITs is more than jurisdictional.  
Substantively, BITs regulation of the right of admission of investment and transfer of the 
proceeds are widened or limited by the investment definition. A foreigner’s right to own property 
IV. Conclusion
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might be protected under a BIT that gives a NT to admission or establishment of investment, 
since mere fact of owning an asset would qualify as investment under the literal interpretation 
trend. Generally, any right in the preadmission or pre-establishment stages is tied to the relevant 
BIT and to whether its definition of investment covers that activity.318
Similarly, under the literal interpretation trend, the proceeds of a sale of any asset or a contract 
would be considered investment proceeds subject to the transfer obligations under BITs.  Funds 
arising out of any transaction would thus be guaranteed transferability in and out of the host 
state.  
The breadth of the investment definition is problematic because it extends the scope of BITs’ 
protection and its guarantee of capital transferability in a manner that unnecessarily covers assets 
and property that are not rightly characterized as investment and accordingly extends the 
transferability of capital beyond what is necessary to protect and promote investment. 
It is true that some tribunals and recent State practice of certain countries, like the US, have 
clarified this definition by limiting it to assets that have the characteristics of investment.  Yet the 
majority of BITs are still missing this express limitation on the term.  Similarly, most awards do 
not limit the term investment under BITs to assets that have the characteristics of investment.  
Instead, they consider any asset that has economic value is considered an investment.
In addition, most BIT admission provisions are broadly drafted and allow the admission of 
investment according to the host State’s laws and regulations. These broad provisions have led to 
interpretations that find that foreign investors’ violation of the registration requirement in the 
host state laws and regulation does not constitute violation of the BIT admission provision.  The 
breadth of these admission provisions and their interpretation can result in the host State losing 
its discretion to require registration of investment and accordingly, its discretionary power to 
admit investment.  Further, the admission of investment under US BITs is subject to national and 
most favoured nation treatment.  This further restricts the State’s discretionary powers to control 
admission of capital through restricting the underlying investment. 
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First, some BITs’ treatment of the subject of regulation of admission of investment and some 
arbitral decisions lead to restricting this discretion.  There are two main approaches under BITs 
for the treatment of admission of foreign investment: (i) host State discretion approach; and (ii) 
non-discrimination approach. The former provides for the admission of investment in accordance 
with the host State laws.  This in theory permits the host State to regulate the admission of 
investment under its laws.  Accordingly, it was found that a violation of the host State law that 
requires authorization for making certain investment would be in violation of the BIT’s legality 
requirement even if the foreign investor did not know if the violation because it has a duty to 
undertake a due diligence and know the law.  
However, many arbitral awards have found that this is a legality requirement: only if the 
investment is illegal or violates a fundamental principle of host State law would it be in 
violation of this requirement.319  Tribunals found, accordingly, that violation of host State’s laws 
requiring prior registration was not in violation of the legality requirement under BITs except if 
the relevant BIT specifically provide that certain procedure should be followed.  In addition, 
some tribunals indicated that a liberal interpretation of this requirement in favour of foreign 
investors is generally warranted.  
Second, under the non-discrimination approach, the host state must grant national treatment and 
MFN to the foreign investor: the same treatment to foreign investment in the admission phase 
that it grants to its nationals and other foreigners except in the sectors or activities included in the 
negative list annexed to the relevant BIT. This limits the host state power to distinguish between 
different kinds of investment and investors due to the broad application of NT and MFN. It also 
requires the immediate application of these obligations, which is an approach that does not 
accommodate the need of developing states.
                                                  
319 , , para. 319  (acknowledging that the investment must be made in accordance with host 
State law to be protected by the BIT, but limits this rule to violations of certain legal rules of the host State: 
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The combination of the broad definition of investment and broad and immediate admission 
provisions in BITs restrict unduly the ability of states to regulate the admission of investment 
and to distinguish between different kinds of investment.
146
Customary international law is silent on the issue of the foreign investor right to transfer funds, 
and does not impose an obligation on the host country to allow the movement of funds. This 
right includes the right to regulate inward and outward capital, which is a part of a State’s 
“monetary sovereignty.”1 Methods of regulation of capital movement through capital controls 
have already been discussed.2  
This right to regulate capital movements is confirmed by the Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund.  They provide that, “Members may exercise such controls as are 
necessary to regulate international capital movements, but no member may exercise these 
controls in a manner which will restrict payments for current transactions or which will unduly 
delay transfers of funds in settlement of commitments  . . .”3
BITs, in turn, fill this void by directly treating the ability of foreign investors to import and 
repatriate funds related to their investments. By and large, BITs oblige the host State to permit 
the repatriation of funds arising from investment. While most BITs regulate transfer of capital, 
not all of them explicitly regulate inward transfers. 
Some provide only for the repatriation of capital, that is, outward transfers.  Some BITs just 
provide for the free transfer of capital related to investment without qualification, and some 
explicitly provide for the transfer of both capital inflows and outflows.  In these last two 
categories, capital inflows related to investment must be permitted.  No discretion is left to the 
host state. Another category leaves discretion to admit capital and subject it to the laws of the 
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host State.  Some categories allow for exceptions in case of financial crises or balance of 
payment problems. Where there is no exception to deal with financial crises or balance of 
payment problems, this problematic lack of discretion is exacerbated.
BITs, in general, oblige the host State to allow certain capital transfers relating to investment. In 
this respect, BITs are used as a vehicle to liberalize foreign investment-related capital flows 
between its parties.4  The obligation to permit transfers may differ from one BIT to another in 
terms of its nature and content. It typically requires lifting capital controls over capital outflows 
related to foreign investment, and prevents the host State from using capital controls in relation 
to the transfer of capital related to these investments, which may -- as previously discussed -- be 
necessary to preserve the financial stability of the host State.5   
It is true that “[t]he growth of international investment depends on capital accounts that are at 
least partly open.”6  Yet the available evidence suggests that not all capital flows are beneficial 
for the host State economy and that complete liberalization may be a prime cause of financial 
crises.  
This chapter analyses the nature of the BITs obligation to permit the transfer of funds and capital 
resulting from foreign investment, and the effect of this obligation in conjunction with other 
BITs obligations and standards on the regulatory power of the State to regulate capital transfer 
and use capital controls. It evaluates whether BITs regulation balances between the investor’s 
need to transfer funds and the host state need to regulate capital.  It identifies the themes where 
BITs regulation has been absolute, broad and immediate and the effect of that.  In doing so, it 
uses the Model BITs for illustration.  It starts by analyzing BITs different approaches in directly 
regulating capital outflows and inflows.  
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The repatriation of capital resulting from foreign investment is an important component in any 
BIT, and is a main concern for the host state, the home State, and foreign investors. The host 
State typically desires to keep the foreign capital and prefers if the capital proceeds were to be 
reinvested. The host state may also be concerned with the possibility of sudden substantial 
capital outflows that may upset—among other things—its economic stability and balance of 
payment in addition to burdening its foreign currency reserves.7  In addition, the state parties 
should be cognizant of the effect of obligations they undertake in this respect on their regulatory 
powers over capital movement and foreign exchange. 
On the other hand, the foreign investor and the home State will be keen to assure that repatriation 
of the original capital and its proceeds are permitted, preferably without restrictions or with 
minimal ones. Most importantly, the foreign investor might be required to pay loans or other 
financial obligations it incurred to make its investment, and the ability to transfer these amounts 
when they are due is crucial.  
Yet the regulation of outward capital under the Model BIT does not generally establish a balance 
between these interests. Rather, all the Model BITs require the transfer of funds related to 
investment as an absolute and broad obligation without providing for exceptions or 
distinguishing between different kinds of capital. It is also immediate in nature. The drafting and 
the scope differ nonetheless.  
The UK Model BIT states:
Each Contracting Party shall in respect of investments guarantee to national or companies of the other 
Contracting Party the unrestricted transfer of their investments and returns.  Transfers shall be effected 
without delay in the convertible currency in which the capital was originally invested or in any other 
convertible currency agreed by the investor and the Contracting Party concerned. Unless otherwise agreed 
by the investor transfers shall be made at the rate of exchange applicable on the date of transfer pursuant to 
the exchange regulations in force. 8
                                                  
7 Chapter II; UNCTAD, , UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements, UN Doc. UNCTA/ITE/IIT/20, at 7 (2000) [hereinafter UNCTAD, ]
8
, art. 6, Rudolf Dolzer & 
II. Treatment of Capital Outflows
A. General
See Transfer of Funds in
Transfer of Funds .
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of …………. for the Promotion and Protection of Investments reprinted in
149
The German Model BIT states:
Each Contracting Party shall guarantee to nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party the free 
transfer of payments in connection with an investment, in particular 
(a) of the principal and additional amounts to maintain or increase the investment;
(b) of the returns;
(c) in repayment of loans;
(d) of the proceeds from the liquidation or the sale of the whole or any part of the investment;
(e) of the compensation provided for in Article 4.
. . . 
(1) Transfers . . . shall be made without delay at the applicable rate of exchange.
(2) This rate of exchange shall correspond to the cross rate obtained from those rates which would be 
applied by the International Monetary Fund on the date of payment for conversions of the currencies 
concerned into Special Drawing Rights.9
The US Model BIT 1992 states:
1. Each Party shall permit all transfers related to an investment to be made freely and without delay into 
and out of its territory.  Such transfers include: (a) returns; (b) compensation pursuant to Article III; (c) 
payments arising out of an investment dispute; (d) payments made under a contract, including amortization 
of principal and accrued interest payments made pursuant to a loan agreement; (e) proceeds from the sale or 
liquidation of all or any part of an investment; and (f) additional contributions to capital for the 
maintenance or development of an investment.
2. Transfers shall be made in a freely usable currency at the prevailing market rate of exchange on the date 
of transfer with respect to spot transactions in the currency to be transferred. 
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, either Party may maintain laws and regulations (a) 
requiring reports of currency transfer; and (b) imposing income taxes by such means as a withholding tax 
applicable to dividends or other transfers. Furthermore, either Party may protect the rights of creditors, or 
ensure the satisfaction of judgments in adjudicatory proceedings, through the equitable, non-discriminatory 
and good faith application of its law. 10
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From the above, it follows that the Model BITs provide for the right to transfer under five 
themes. The first theme is the nature of such right.  The second theme is the categories of 
payments entitled to such right. The third theme relates to the currency of transfer. The fourth 
theme deals with the exchange rate that applies to the transfer.   The fifth theme deals with the 
timing that the host state must permit the transfer. 11
Under the Model BITs -- unlike the national treatment, which is relative in nature -- this 
obligation grants an absolute, and, in case such right is not enjoyed by national investors, a 
“preferential treatment” to foreign investors. 12  
The German Model BIT provides for the liberalization of transfers in absolute terms, using the 
term “free transfer”.13  In the same vein, the UK Model BIT prohibits the host state from 
imposing restrictions on the outflows of funds that originate from foreign investors’ 
“investments” and “returns” thereof, using the term “unrestricted transfer”.14 However, the UK 
in some BITs uses the term “free transfer”.15  The use of the two terms does not appear to mean 
different results. It is probably correct that in most cases, interpreting the two terms will lead to 
the same result of allowing capital payments related to investment to be repatriated.  
Similarly, the US BITs provide for the freedom to repatriate the investment proceeds and capital. 
The US Model BITs do not allow for limitation on the free outflow transfer of capital related to 
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investment, except for stipulated exceptions.16 This makes the nature of the obligation absolute 
as well.
It is safe, accordingly, to conclude that the obligation to permit outflows in the Model BITs is 
absolute. It does not seem to allow for any exception other than those stipulated therein. 
Generally, the obligation to permit the transfer of capital outflows related to investment entails 
the right of an investor to acquire and repatriate amounts arising out of the investment, and to 
convert these amounts before repatriation.17  In , under UK-Tanzania BIT, the tribunal 
stated that the transfer clause “guarantees that if investors have funds, they will be able to 
transfer them.”18  It further stated that “[t]he free transfer principle is aimed at measures that 
would restrict the possibility to transfer, such as currency control restrictions or other measures 
taken by the host State which effectively imprison the investors’ funds, typically in the host State 
of the investment.”19
Similarly, in , under US-Argentina BIT, the tribunal stated that “the U.S. BITs 
‘prohibit virtually all restrictions,’ thus limiting the Parties’ prerogatives under customary 
international law to impose currency exchange restrictions.”20
A similar result was reached by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in several cases filed by the 
European Commission, asserting the incompatibility of certain BITs transfer provisions with the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC).21  Some of these transfer provisions are 
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similar to that of the Model BITs.22  While the EC mandates the free movement of capital 
between EC members and between EC members and third countries,23 it also obliges EC 
countries to restrict capital transfers in certain cases upon a decision by the European Council.24
The ECJ found the transfer provisions in certain BITs concluded by Austria, Sweden and Finland 
incompatible with EC because they do not permit restrictions on capital flows.25    
This obligation thus eliminates the host country's power to restrict certain transfer of funds 
relating to investment.  But what is the scope of this obligation? What funds and transfers are 
subject to this obligation? 
Generally, the scope of the obligation to permit transfers may differ with regard to the subject of 
the transfer obligation as well as the time of making the investment that is entitled to the right to 
transfer.  The wordings in the Model BITs differ in this concern, although final result may not 
always be different.  
For the subject of transfer, the German Model BIT obliges the host state to ensure that any 
payment related to an investment shall be freely transferred. 26  While investment is broadly 
defined, the subject payments are not defined, but a non-exhaustive list is given, which includes 
returns, loans’ payment, amounts arising from liquidation and any sale of investment, and 
compensation for expropriation.27  
But what type of outflow transfers are subject to this obligation? It is not any transfer in 
connection to investment, but rather a transfer that constitutes “a payment.”  The difference is if 
an outflow transfer is just made for the purpose of changing the place of the funds, instead of 
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payment to shareholders or to a lender for example, in which the former would not be subject to 
the transfer provision.
While the German Model BIT liberalizes “all payments in connection with an investment,” the 
UK Model BIT bans any restriction on the transfer of investment and returns. 28  The subject of 
the transfer obligation in the UK Model BIT is thus investment and return, and not any transfer 
relating to investment. The UK Model BIT does not provide a non-exhaustive list of the transfers 
subject to the transfer provision.  Yet, both investment and return are defined in the UK Model 
BIT, and non-exhaustive lists are provided on what these two terms include.  
As for the US Model BIT, it provides for the obligation of the host country to allow all transfers 
related to an investment both inflows and outflows, offering a non-exhaustive list.29 This 
obligation is broadest between the Model BITs since it does not limit the transferability of funds 
to certain category or transaction.
Model BITs transfer provisions refer to non-exhaustive lists to illustrate the transfers subject to 
the transfer provision.  Just like the investment definition, the scope of the transfer obligation in 
the Model BITs is broad and includes funds arising from foreign direct investment, indirect 
investment, and other transactions. These categories include investment and liquidation 
proceeds, returns, and loan payments among others.
While the definition of investment, which is broad in the Model BITs, has been discussed,30 one 
category of capital outflows that the Model BITs specifically guarantees is “returns”.   BITs by 
and large liberalize outflows that consist of “returns” and define this term.31  While the definition 
differs from one BIT to another, 32 the Model BITs' definition of returns is very similar. 
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In the UK Model BIT, “returns” is defined to include any sum of money arising from an 
investment.33 A non-exhaustive list is provided, which “includes profit, interest, capital gains, 
dividends, royalties and fees.”34  Similarly, the German Model BIT defines returns as any sum 
generated from an investment, which includes “profit, dividends, interest, royalties, or fees.”35
The Model US BIT defines returns as any sums arising from or related to investment.36 It 
provides a non-exhaustive list of what is considered “returns.” 37 Accordingly, the common 
feature in the Model BITs is their broad definition of returns to include all amounts that arise 
from investment.  It should follow that for the UK and US Model BITs, any amount arising from 
investment or even related to it in the US Model BIT would be subject to the transfer position 
without any other qualification as to the type of the transfer or its purpose.  For the German 
Model BIT, the funds must arise from an investment and must also qualify as a payment.  Yet 
this broad interpretation of the US Model BIT was rejected by an arbitral tribunal under the US-
Argentina BIT, discussed below.  
Another category that the Model BITs liberalize is loan repayment. Likewise, different BITs 
adopt various definitions for this category. 38  The German Model BIT mandates the 
liberalization of transfers “in repayment of loans”.39 The UK Model BIT includes in its definition 
of investment “claims to money”.40  In addition, some UK BITs provide explicitly for the 
transferability of loan payments.41  The US Model BITs provides for the free transfer of 
“payment made pursuant to a loan agreement.”42  This category is important to guarantee that 
foreign investors can meet their obligations under their loan agreement, and thus are able to raise 
funds for their investment in the host State. 
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BITs also usually provide for the free transfer of the proceeds of liquidation. Some BITs and the 
German and US Model BITs provide explicitly for the free transfer of both partial and total 
liquidation.43 Others BITs do not provide for such distinction and simply provide for the free 
transfer of the proceeds of liquidation or investment. 44
Some BITS provide for the free transfer of the royalties and other licensing fees paid for 
intellectual property rights, such as copy right, trademarks, and know how. 45 The Model BITs 
include the royalties in their definition of returns.46 The US Model BIT 2004 explicitly mandates 
the liberalization of the transfers of “royalty payments”.47
The Model BITs, also, provide for the freedom of the transfer of the funds that arise from paying 
a compensation for the expropriation of investment. 48
In addition, the Model BITs stipulate that the investment will still be covered by the protection of 
the BITs, even if its form changes.49 Accordingly, the scope of the transfer provision will include 
also the amounts arising from the change in the form of investment, since it will be considered 
“investment” covered by the freedom of transfer provision. 
In many BITs concluded by the Model BITs countries, however, the drafting and the scope of the 
transfer provision are different than what is provided in the Model BITs. In addition, the scope of 
allowed transfers changes from one BIT to another for the same country.
For example, the Egypt-UK BIT provides for the freedom of transfer with regard only to 
“returns.”50 “Returns” is defined as the sums that arise from an investment. 51 The same does not 
apply to the investment capital. The Egypt-UK BIT provides that with regard to “transfer of 
                                                  
43 , 5 (d); , art. IV (1) (e).
44 , art. 6.
45 Dolzer & Stevens, n 31 , at 93
46 , art. 1 (2); , art. 1 (b); 1992, art. I (1) (d).
47 US , art. 7(1) (c).
48 , art. 5 (1); , art. 5 (1); 1992, art. IV (1) (b).
49 , art. 1; , art. 1; , art. I (3). , however, 
does not provide for this rule.
50
, signed June 11, 1975, 
art. 6 (1) (entered into force February 24, 1976) [hereinafter ].
51 art. 1 (b).
German Model BIT US Model BIT 1992
UK Model BIT
supra . 
German Model BIT UK Model BIT US Model BIT 
Model BIT 2004
German Model BIT UK Model BIT US Model BIT 
German Model BIT UK Model BIT US Model BIT 1992 US Model BIT 2004
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt for the Promotion and Protection of Investment
UK-Egypt BIT
Id.
156
capital this shall be effected in accordance with the relevant laws of the two Contracting 
Parties.”52  
This means that, under the Egypt-UK BIT, the transfer of the original capital after liquidation or 
sale of assets should be allowed, subject to conditions imposed by laws of the host country. 
These conditions may include capital controls that temporarily restrict capital transfers or that 
may impose certain limits on the amounts that can be transferred within a certain period of time. 
Accordingly, capital transfer may be restricted in terms of quantity or time or otherwise by virtue 
of applicable laws without abolishing totally the right to transfer.  The Egypt-US BIT and the 
Egypt- Canada BIT, on the other hand, provide for the freedom of transfer of amounts arising 
from the liquidation of investment without similar qualifications.53 This permits a UK investor in 
Egypt from benefiting from MFN and requiring the same treatment granted under these BITs.
While the US Model BIT has the broadest transfer provision, since it liberalizes all transfers 
related to investment without limiting the subject or the type of transfer, case law has imposed 
limitation to the subject of the transfer provision.  In , the tribunal found that this 
provision in US BITs is not limitless.54  In that case, the investor was not able to transfer funds 
from an account in Argentina to another account outside Argentina because, as a result of the 
Argentinean economic crisis in 2001, Argentina banned bank withdrawals and transfer of 
funds.55  
The issue was framed by the tribunal as whether the desired transfer qualified as a “transfer[] 
related to an investment” under the US-Argentina BIT.56  The tribunal identified the purpose of 
the transfer provision to allow foreign investors to repatriate the income from investment and the 
investment value and capital gains at liquidation.57  It then referred to this purpose and the non-
exhaustive list for interpreting what transfers are considered “related to investment,” and, 
accordingly, subject to the free transfer provision. It interpreted the transfers subject the free 
transfer provision, calling them “protected transfers,” stating:
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Protected transfers are those essential for, or typical to the making, controlling, maintenance, disposition of 
investments, especially in the form of companies; or in the form of debt, service and investment contracts, 
including the making, performance and enforcement of contracts; the acquisition, use, protection and 
disposition of property of all kinds, including intellectual and industrial property rights; and the borrowing 
of funds, to name the kind of investments and associated activities mentioned in Art. I of the BIT more 
relevant to this issue.58
The tribunal then found that the transfer at issue did not qualify as a “protected transfer” because 
“[i]t was merely a change of type, location and currency of part of an investor’s existing 
investment,” and the funds were not “proceeds of liquidation,” but were only transferred to 
protect them from devaluation.59  
While noting the legitimate character and purpose of the transfer as a business decision, the 
tribunal emphasized that the transfer was not required to pay an obligation or to transfer the 
ownership of the funds at issue, which makes it not “related to an investment.”60
’s interpretation is curious in many respects: first, it maintains that not all transfer of 
funds by the foreign investment for business purposes would be subject to the freedom of 
transfers provision; second, it confines the subject of the transfer provisions to those that are 
made for making, managing (including payment of loans and other payment obligations), paying 
foreign investors and liquidating the investment; third, it specifically excludes transfers made to 
protect investment from devaluation and, by analogy, other short-term investment for the 
purpose of benefiting from interest rate differences in other countries without changing 
ownership of the funds. 
This appears at odds with the seemingly limitless terms of the transfer provision in the U.S-
Argentina BIT, which permits any transfer related to investment without confining this to the 
liquidation of investment, or to payment of obligation, profits or capital gains.  This 
interpretation would be more appropriate to the transfer provision in the German Model BIT, 
which uses to the term “payment” to qualify the subject of the transfer obligation.  This problem 
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arises from the breadth of the transfer provisions that leads to ambiguity and unpredictable 
results, which does not always benefit the foreign investor.
In conclusion, transfer provisions in the Model BITs are drafted differently, but they all are 
absolute in nature and have a broad scope that covers any funds relating to investment.  Yet, 
while the subject of the transfer provisions is broad, it might be subject to the limitation that the 
transfers are made to pay the shareholders or other stakeholders of the investment, and not only 
made to protect the funds from devaluation.  
The time of transfer is an important issue. Hardship might arise to foreign investors if they 
cannot make the transfer in a timely fashion.  On the other hand, immediate transfer of capital 
may also burden the host state if substantial transfers are required to be allowed during economic 
turmoil, which can exacerbate the situation.
Terms like “without delay” and “without undue delay” are usually used in BITs to characterize 
the timing obligation regarding the execution of the transfer incumbent upon the host state.61 It is 
also common to provide that procedures for the transfer shall be “carried out expeditiously.”62
The Model BITs provide that the transfer must be made “without delay.”63
The obligation to permit transfers “without delay” does not set a specific time and does not mean 
immediate permission.64 It means that a reasonable time is allowed to satisfy formal 
requirements as defined in German BITs. 65 It is a relative criterion, which may entail different 
time limits dependant on the circumstances. Such circumstances include the amount of transfer 
and the general economic circumstances of the host state.  
In some cases, the US BITs included a definition for the term “without delay”. The US-Turkey 
BIT defines the term “without delay” to mean allowing the transfer “as rapidly as possible in 
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accordance with the normal commercial transaction procedures”. 66  It further adds a time limit of 
two months from the application date. 67
Similarly, the German BITs specify a maximum amount of time for the transfer to be made, 
usually not exceeding two months from the application for the transfer. 68  Other model BITs 
refer to the time customarily needed for such financial transactions to be effected. 69
The timing factor can be relevant with regard to certain formal requirements or capital controls 
in the nature of requiring authorization to transfer capital. In the latter case, under the UK and the 
US model BITs, there is no specific time limit, but rather a general requirement that this be 
allowed “without delay.” However, under the German model BIT, there is a time limit of two 
months.70  
The freedom of transfer obligation typically includes requiring the host country to allow the 
foreign investor to convert the national currency to a foreign currency.71 This raises questions of 
which type of currency the host country should provide, and at which exchange rate. The Model 
BITs differ in their methods of dealing with this issue. 
The UK Model BIT provides that the repatriation of funds must be
“in the convertible currency in which the capital was originally invested or in any other convertible 
currency agreed by the investor and the Contracting Party concerned. Unless otherwise agreed by the 
investor transfers shall be made at the rate of exchange applicable on the date of transfer pursuant to the 
exchange regulations in force.” 72
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The UK Model BIT, thus, mandates that the transfer be in “the convertible currency” that the 
funds used in the investment were originally denominated, or any other “convertible currency” 
agreed upon between the foreign investor and the host country. 73  The applicable exchange rate 
is decided according to the host country's exchange regulations in effect. 74
Many questions can arise out of this provision. The original investment may have been 
introduced in the national currency. In this case, the provision does not suggest an answer. The 
“other convertible currency” alternative requires the agreement of both the foreign investor and 
the host country, which may not be available. In this case, the host country should not be obliged 
to agree on certain “convertible currency”, since the original investment was in the national 
currency. The consideration behind the obligation assumes that the foreign investor brought 
“convertible currency” into the host country and should therefore be allowed to transfer its 
profits back in this currency or in another convertible currency. However, when the original 
investment was made in the national currency, the solution would appear to allow conversion 
into a convertible currency agreed to between the host country and the investor if the parties 
agree. If not, an investor may be able to invoke MFN or national treatment if another foreign 
investor or national is entitled to better treatment.  
In the absence of agreement or better treatment, the question would be whether a foreign 
investor, under this Model BIT, is entitled to convert the national currency into convertible 
currency.  It would appear that the right to repatriate funds relating to investment and returns 
includes the right to convert the national currency to another currency, and thus, the investor 
would be entitled to convert the national currency for the purpose of repatriation.  On the other 
hand, while repatriation is allowed, the foreign investor in this case would not be entitled to any 
more right of conversion than it had under customary international law. 
Another scenario is if the original currency of investment ceases to be “convertible”.  The UK 
Model BIT does not seem to require that the original currency stay convertible. The host country 
will thus satisfy its obligation if it permits the exchange with the original currency.
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While the German Model BIT does not provide for the type of currency that should be provided 
for the transfer, it provides that the exchange rate shall be the one used by the IMF “on the date 
of payment for conversions of the currencies concerned into Special Drawing Rights.”75
In this respect, the German BITs do not have a standard rule.  Some German BITs follow the 
German Model BIT, like the German-Bolivia BIT.76  Other German BITs have different rules on 
the type of currency and exchange rate.  The German-India BIT, for example, provides that the 
transfer must be in a “convertible currency.”77  It also provides that the exchange rate for the 
transfer shall be “the prevailing market rate of change” at the time of transfer, and if such 
exchange rate does not exist, the applicable exchange rate used by the IMF in relation to the SDR 
will be applied.78
On the other hand, the Thailand-Germany BIT provides that the host country shall allow the free 
transfer of funds related to investment in “freely usable currencies.”79  It provides that the market 
rate of exchange on the transfer day shall apply to transfers related to investment. 80  In case 
there is no foreign exchange market, the rates used by the IMF to convert currencies to Special 
Drawing Rights (SDRs) shall apply. 81
The Korea-German BIT provides for different options for the applicable exchange rate.82 It 
provides that the applicable rate is the one “effective for current transactions” at the date of the 
transfer.83 It refers to the previous regime of par value to decide the exchange rate. 84 However, it 
foresees the change of the system and provides for another criterion to decide the applicable 
exchange rate, which is the current official exchange rate effective in the host country between 
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its currency and the US dollar, or any other “freely convertible currency or to gold”. 85  In case 
such official rate does not exist, the competent authority in the host country shall decide one, 
provided it “is fair and equitable.”86 There is no criteria given to what could be “fair and 
equitable.” 
As for the US Model BIT, it uses the term “freely usable currency” for the currency to be 
provided for transfers.87 The US BITs typically follow suit and provide for the right of the 
investor to exchange local currency for foreign, albeit sometimes using slightly different terms 
and styles of drafting. 88
What is considered “freely usable” or “convertible currency” is not always defined in BITs.  The 
Model BITs do not provide a definition except for the 2004 US Model BIT.  One suggested 
definition for the terms “freely usable currency” and “freely convertible currency” is “a currency 
that may be freely exchanged for other currencies in the principal foreign exchange markets.”89
This definition is apparently referring to the IMF Articles of Agreement that defines “a freely 
usable currency” as “a member’s currency that the Fund determines (i) is, in fact, widely used to 
make payments for international transactions, and (ii) is widely traded in the principal exchange 
markets.”90
Some BITs refer explicitly to the IMF definition. The US-Cameroon BIT, for example, provides 
that the "transfers shall be at the prevailing rate of exchange generally used by the IMF.”91 In the 
same vein, the US Model BIT 2004 defines “freely usable currency” as the “‘freely usable 
currency’ as determined by the International Monetary Fund under its Articles of Agreement.”92
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Although it is asserted that these terms are used interchangeably, they could be interpreted 
differently. By and large, there is no consensus on the conditions that should be satisfied for a 
currency to be deemed a “convertible currency.”93 A freely usable currency as defined by the 
IMF Articles and determined by the IMF may not be formally convertible or free from exchange 
regulations.94  This means that such currency may not satisfy the relevant BIT obligation.
In sum, while the Model BITs specify the exchange rate and currency, they are inconsistent, 
broad and may lead to ambiguous situations. 
BITs, by and large, allow some restrictions on free transfer of capital outflows related to 
investment.95  There are two main categories of restrictions. The first category of these 
restrictions does not constitute real exceptions to the freedom of transfer, but rather an 
application of other laws that do not intend to restrict capital movement. This includes 
formalities, restrictions related to tax withholding and enforcing laws, and court judgements.  
The German and the US Model BITs provide for some of these restrictions. The UK Model BIT, 
on the other hand, does not explicitly provide for any exception.  
The German Model BIT permits “transfer formalities”, which may not delay the transfer for 
more than two months.96 There are no other exceptions in the German Model BIT regarding 
repatriation of funds.  The US Model BITs also provide for this kind of exception. 97  The US 
Model BIT 1992 and US BITs, generally, permit three kinds of these restrictions.  The first kind 
is the requirement of reporting foreign currency transfers.98 This requirement may cause some 
delay to allow for administrative processing, but it does not normally impose a high burden on 
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investors. 99  Some US BITs refer to formalities in general, but these formalities may not 
encroach on the right to transfer.100
The second kind relates to the power of the state to withhold income tax that applies “to dividend 
or other transfers”. 101 This is important to ensure the payment of due taxes on the foreign 
investor activities in the host state.  The third kind relates to the enforcement of court decisions 
and protection of creditors’ rights. 102  The US Model 2004 provides for a similar, albeit more 
detailed, exception.103 As mentioned, some US BITs approve formalities that do not encroach on 
the right to transfer.104
The second category of restrictions constitutes a real exception to the free transfer of capital 
related to investment. This is the exception that allows a country facing economic difficulties to 
temporarily restrict the transfers.
Provisions regarding the liberalization of capital transfers pose many difficult practical problems, 
in addition to the legal ones. The exception is usually triggered by financial and economic 
hardships faced by the host state. Many developing countries suffer from balance of payments 
problems, which may not permit them to satisfy the obligation of allowing substantial amounts 
of convertible foreign currency to be exchanged.105  Developing countries enter into BITs to 
promote foreign investment and foreign capital. Repatriation of initial capital and substantial 
amount of proceeds leads to the opposite result. 106  
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Some BITs maintain the balance between investors’ right to repatriate capital and the need of the 
host state to limit outflows in case of economic crises.107 This is why in some BITs, an exception 
is made on the principle of free transfer of capital relating to investment. In exceptional 
economic and financial circumstances, the host state may exercise its powers as conferred by its 
national laws to regulate the outward capital related to investment protected by a BIT.108
Many German, UK, and US BITs follow the Model BITs, and do not include any explicit 
exception to the freedom of transfer.109 Yet some BITs entered into by the Model BITs countries 
provide for such exceptions. These exceptions differ, however, from one BIT to another in terms 
of their nature and scope.
The Philippines-UK BIT, for example, allows the host country to apply necessary measures to 
protect the “integrity and independence of its currency, its external financial position and balance 
of payments” in accordance with the IMF Articles.110 It thus gives a broad discretion to the host 
country to restrict transfers in case of wide range of economic difficulties Similarly, the Panama-
UK BIT entitles the host country to take measures that restricts transfer as an exception to the 
right to repatriate funds related to investment “in exceptional balance of payments difficulties 
and for a limited period”.111  Likewise, the measures that the host country can take are not 
defined. The only conditions are that the measures are temporary. Both BITs provide that the 
host country must use its powers “equitably and in good faith”. 112 This gives the host country 
facing such difficulties a wide discretion to temporarily restrict capital outflows.  
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These measures are broader than those granted under other UK BITs, like the UK-China BIT, 
which contains a similar, although narrower, exception.113 For one, it restricts the scope of the 
powers granted to the host country since they cannot be used to restrict investment proceeds 
which consist of “profits, interest, dividends, royalties or fees”. 114 In addition, for all other 
transfers related to investment, twenty percent must be allowed yearly.115  This type of exception 
is reasonable since it allows the investor to meet its obligations, distribute profits, and transfer a 
percentage of its investment capital while also allowing the host country to deal with economic 
crisis. 
In the same vein, some US BITs acknowledge the fact that the host country may not be able to 
permit foreign currency exchange in case of financial crises. 116  The US-Turkey BIT, for 
example, allows Turkey to postpone the transfers arising from liquidation or sale of the 
investment in case of “exceptional financial or economic circumstances relating to foreign 
exchange”.117  Turkey has to abide by any contractual obligation with the foreign investor. The 
postponement measure may only be maintained for the time “necessary to restore its reserves of 
foreign exchange to a minimally acceptable level”, and with a time limit of three years from the 
time of the transfer application. 118   In addition, the BIT provides that such measures must be 
conforming to Article II of the BIT. 119 This refers to the MFN and national treatment and 
contract sanctity principles, among others. This means that MFN and national treatment 
obligations explicitly apply to the delay measures.120 Accordingly, if another foreign investor 
benefits from a BIT that does not provide for such exception or for a differently drafted 
exception, this exception may not apply.
To sum, while many BITs do not include economic difficulties exceptions, some do.  They are 
inconsistent and they may be subject to MFN, which could negate their availability. 
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Once the investment is admitted, it will need funds to conduct its business in the host State and 
may need funds at a later point to maintain or expand it.121  Different BITs have different rules 
on the transfer of funds.  One main distinction is between those that regulate transfer of funds 
into and out of the host State and those that regulate the transfer of funds only out of the host 
State.122  The latter type is discussed elsewhere.123
The regulation of inward capital in the Model BITs is not uniform, but there exists main two 
approaches: (1) host State discretion and (2) free transfer of inward capital.
The UK Model BIT does not treat inward capital related to investment separately from the 
investment.124  It leaves admission for both investment and capital to the host State laws and 
regulation.  It provides that “[e]ach Contracting Party shall encourage and create favourable 
conditions for nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party to invest capital in its 
territory, and, subject to its right to exercise powers conferred by its laws, shall admit such 
capital.”125  It does not impose any condition on such power under the host State’s laws.  
Accordingly, it does not directly restrict the host State right to regulate inward capital under its 
laws.  
Yet if the same interpretation on admission of investment discussed above taken by some 
tribunals applies to capital inflows, this would restrict this discretion to restrict capital inflows 
relating to those inflows which are illegal or which violate fundamental principles of host 
State law.  Following this interpretation, a host State may not impose direct capital controls that 
ban capital inflows related to certain type of investment, except if the underlying investment is 
illegal or in violation of host State fundamental principles.  
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A host State may still, however, impose indirect capital controls, such as taxation on certain 
types of transfers or URR, as long as they do not discriminate on the basis of nationality or 
arbitrarily, as will be discussed further below in relation to the indirect regulation of capital 
inflows.
On the other hand, another interpretation that accords to the Model BIT’s plain meaning would 
permit the host State to impose restrictions on capital inflows under its laws and regulations.  In 
addition, this would apply to any further capital inflows other than those required to establish the 
investment—the host State could impose restrictions on further contributions to the capital.  
Accordingly, under this interpretation, a host State could impose both direct and indirect capital 
controls.
It should be noted that not all UK BITs follow this model.  The UK-Philippine BIT, for example, 
states:
Each Contracting Party shall in respect of investments permit nationals or companies of the other 
Contracting Party the free transfer of their capital and of the earnings from it, subject to the right of the 
former Contracting Party to impose equitably and in good faith such measures as may be necessary to 
safeguard the integrity and independence of its currency, its external financial position and balance of 
payments, consistent with its rights and obligations as a member of the International Monetary Fund.126
This provision is not clear on the scope of free transfers of funds relating to capital.  There is no 
general limitation on the admission of capital that keeps it within the exclusive ambit of the host 
State’s laws.  Yet, it qualifies the freedom of transfer of capital, including capital inflows, with 
the host State’s right to impose capital controls to protect its currency, financial position and 
balance of payments in accordance with the IMF Articles and in good faith.  This right is 
explicitly provided for.  It appears to cover both inward and outward capital from the host State.  
This would be different from the UK Model BIT and other UK BITs, which, as explained above, 
do not have a separate treatment of inward capital.  Notably, this BIT was made in the early 
1980s, at a time when many developed countries imposed or retained the right to impose capital 
controls.  
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The German Model BIT and US Model BITs offer a broader transfer clause in terms of scope, 
which is only limited with the qualification that such transfers are “in connection with an 
investment” or “related to an investment.”  As Waibel notes, “[g]iven the broad definition of 
investment in modern BITs, this limitation has limited practical significance.”127
The German Model BIT provides that “[e]ach Contracting Party shall guarantee to nationals or 
companies of the other Contracting Party the free transfer of payments in connection with an 
investment, in particular (a) of the principal and additional amounts to maintain or increase the 
investment . . . .”128
The German Model BIT, thus, requires the host state to allow the transfer of the capital required 
to make the initial investment.129  This provision not only mandates the capital transfer for the 
initial investment, it also grants the right to transfer additional capital for the purpose of 
maintaining or expanding the investment.  The host state may not restrict such transfers.  
Accordingly, the German Model BIT obliges the host state to allow the free transfer of both the 
initial capital and any amounts to be used to maintain or expand the investment. This obligation, 
that covers both the initial capital and any other amount used to maintain or expand the 
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investment, restricts the host State power to regulate inward capital flows in terms of timing, rate 
and quantity.  Article 7 of the German Model BIT emphasizes that such transfers are to “be made 
without delay” at the rate “applied by the International Monetary Fund on the date of payment 
for conversions of the currencies concerned into Special Drawing Rights.”130  The transfer shall 
be made “without delay” if it is completed within the time needed to complete the transfer 
formalities, which time may not exceed two month from the time of the transfer request 
submission.131 There is no quantitative limitation in the Model German BIT on the amount of 
capital that can be transferred into the host State.  The obligation to permit capital appears to 
limit the host State’s ability to impose quantitative restrictions over capital inflows. 
However, this does not mean that an investment can bring any amount of capital into the host 
State. This is limited to an amount “in connection to” to its admitted investment.  This would be 
restricted by the good faith doctrine under international law to the amount of capital 
proportionate to the needed capital for the admitted investment.  While a host State may not 
impose quantitative capital controls that limit the amount of capital that is required for the initial 
investment and its expansion under this provision, it may restrict the amount that is not necessary 
for activities related to the investment.  Of course, a host State cannot impose exchange 
restrictions or capital controls that vary the exchange rate from that provided for in the German 
Model BIT: the IMF rate. 
Along with the German Model BIT, the US Model BITs explicitly cover transfers related to 
investment both into and out of the host State.  US Model BITs follow this with an illustrative 
list.  US Model BITs and BITs include different provisions in relation to inward capital.  Some 
refer to “contributions to capital,” while others refer to “additional contributions to capital” as 
covered under the transfers provision. The 1992 US Model BIT has a broad transfer provision 
that liberalizes the transfer of capital relating to investment into the host State, but it does not 
explicitly include the initial capital.  It does, however, include capital needed to maintain or 
develop an investment.132
                                                  
130 , art. 7.
131 .
132 , art IV.  , 
, signed Aug 27, 1993, art. IV (1) (entered 
into force May 11, 1997)(“Each Party shall permit all transfers related to an investment to be made freely and 
German Model BIT
Id
US Model BIT 1992 See also Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador 
concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment
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On the other hand other US BITs provide explicitly that “contributions to capital” are covered 
under the transfer provision.133  Similarly, the US Model BIT 2004 states: “Each Party shall 
permit all transfers relating to a covered investment to be made freely and without delay into and 
out of its territory. Such transfers include: (a) contributions to capital . . . ”134
The use of the words “contributions to capital” in these two US Model BITs does not distinguish 
between an initial contribution to capital and additional contributions.  Vandevelde notes on the 
differences between these formulations that “[t]he word ‘additional’ was deleted because it was 
implied. The phrase ‘for the maintenance or development of an investment’ was deleted because 
it was unnecessary and potentially confusing, 
.”135
                                                                                                                                                                   
without delay into and out of its territory, Such transfers include: (a) returns; (b) compensation pursuant to Article 
III; (c) payments arising out of an investment dispute; (d) payments made under a contract, including amortization 
of principal and accrued interest payments made pursuant to a loan agreement; (a) proceeds from the sale or 
liquidation of all or any part of an investment; and (f) additional contributions to capital for the maintenance or 
development of an investment.”); ; art. V(1) (“Each Party shall permit all transfers related to an 
investment to be made freely and without delay into and out of its territory. Such transfers include: (a) returns; (b) 
compensation pursuant to Article IV; (c) payments arising out of an investment dispute; (d) payments made under a 
contract, including amortization of principal and accrued interest payments made pursuant to a loan agreement 
directly related to an investment; (e) proceeds from the sale or liquidation of all or any part of an investment; and (f) 
additional contributions to capital for the maintenance or development of an investment.”); 
, signed July 22, 1985, art. IV(1) (entered into force May 29, 1991) (“Each Party shall permit all 
transfers related to an investment to be made freely and without delay into and out of its territory. Such transfers 
include: (a) returns; (b) compensation pursuant to Article III; (c) payments arising out of an investment dispute; (d) 
payments made under a contract, including amortization of principal and accrued interest payments made pursuant 
to a loan agreement; (e) proceeds from the sale or liquidation of all or any part of an investment; and (f) additional 
contributions to capital for the maintenance or development of an investment.”).
133
, signed Sept. 29 (1999), art. 5 (1) (“Each 
Party shall permit all transfers relating to a covered investment to be made freely and without delay into and out of 
its territory. Such transfers include, but are not limited to: (a) contributions to capital . . . .”); 
134 , art. 7. 
, signed November 4, 2005, art. 7 
(entered into force November 1, 2006) (“Each Party shall permit all transfers relating to a covered investment to be 
made freely and without delay into and out of its territory. Such transfers include: (a) contributions to capital . . . .”).
135 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, , at 532 (OUP, 2009).
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Some US BITs, such as the US-Albania BIT, explicitly make reference to initial capital in the 
transfer provision.136  But the US Model BITs and most US BITs do not make such explicit 
reference.  However, this does not seem to exclude initial capital from the scope of the provision, 
given the broad scope of the transfer provision that includes all investment-related transfers.137  
US BITs, thus, oblige host States to admit inward transfers made upon the admission of 
investment under the obligation of the host state to admit “additional contributions for the 
maintenance or development of an investment” or “contributions to capital.”138  This means that 
an already established investment has the ability to get inward capital transfer, which the 
government is obliged to permit. This obligation restricts the ability of the host State to impose 
capital controls on inflows. It also enables the investor to raise claims against the host state 
before an international arbitral tribunal if the host State refuses to admit such additional 
contributions. 
Furthermore, like the German Model BIT, the US Model BITs refer to a certain exchange rate: 
market rate, which does not permit the host State to impose a different exchange rate for capital 
inflows.
It is important to note that not all US BITs have the same broad transfer provision.  Some US 
BITs provide for the freedom of transfers only for an exhaustive list of items.  For example, the 
US-Egypt BIT includes an exhaustive list.  The relevant provision states:
Either Party shall in respect to investments by nationals or companies of the other Party grant to those 
nationals or companies the free transfer of-
(a) returns;
(b) royalties and other payments deriving from licenses, franchises and other similar grants or rights;
(c) installments in repayment of loans;
(d) amounts spent for the management of the investment in the territory of the other Party or a third 
country;
(e) ;
                                                  
136 , art. V (“Each Party shall permit all transfers relating to a covered investment to be made freely 
and without delay into and out of its territory such transfers include: a) . and additional contributions to capital 
relating to the investment . . . .”) (emphasis added).
137 Vandevelde, n. 135, at 559 (noting that the words “initial and additional capital” in U.S.-Albania BIT 
that differ from the words “contribution to capital” in other U.S. BITs do not “affect[] the substance of the” 
obligation.”).
138 Jeffrey Lang, , 31 Cornell 
Int’l L.J. 455, at 457 (1998)
additional funds necessary for the maintenance of the investment
US-Albania BIT
initial
Cf. supra
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(f) the proceeds of partial or total sale or liquidation of the investment, including a liquidation effected as a 
result of any event mentioned in Article IV; and
(g) compensation payments pursuant to Article III.139
This BIT limits the free movement of inward transfers and derogates substantially from the US 
Model BITs transfer provision.  First, the BIT provides an exhaustive list of capital that is subject 
to the obligation of free transfer.  Of that only one category of capital inflows is subject to the 
obligation of free transfer: funds that are needed to maintain the investment.  Funds needed to 
expand the investment are not included in this list, and accordingly the host State is not under 
obligation to permit their transfer. In other words, pursuant to this provision, the host State 
retains the discretion to impose capital control on capital inflows, except for capital needed to 
maintain investment. 
Another US BIT includes an exhaustive list.  The US-Tunisia BIT does not have an open-ended 
transfer clause.  It provides for an exhaustive list of what is subject to the free transfer of funds.  
It states:
Each Party shall, with respect to investment by nationals or companies of the other Party, permit the free 
and prompt transfer, related to such investment, of: (a) returns; (b) compensation pursuant to Article III; (c) 
payments arising out of an investment dispute; (d) payments made under a contract, including amortization 
of principal and accrued interest payments made pursuant to a loan agreement; (e) proceeds from the sale or 
liquidation of all or any part of an investment; and (f) 
.140
With regard to inward capital, the US-Tunisia BIT provides for the obligation to permit 
additional contribution needed to maintain and develop the investment.  The scope of the inward 
transfer of funds is thus broader than the US-Egypt BIT because it obliges the host State to 
permit funds for the purpose of expanding the investment, unlike the US-Egypt BIT.  In addition, 
some US BITs include exceptions to the transfer provision.  
                                                  
139 , art. V (emphasis added).
140
, signed May 15, 1990, art. IV(1) (entered into force Feb. 7, 1993) 
(emphasis added).
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It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the framework for transfer of capital inflows 
restricts considerably the discretionary power of the host State.  
It is important to recall what makes foreign investment different from national investment under 
many BITs.  Foreign investors protected by BITs, unlike domestic investors, have the right to 
make inward capital transfers and to repatriate funds.  The host state often has no right to restrict 
such transfers, even if domestic circumstances so require.  National investors, by contrast, have 
no such rights to make inward or outward capital transfers.  
As for capital inflows, some BITs, like the UK Model BIT, leave discretion to regulate capital 
inflows to the host State in accordance with its laws.  This is the same position adopted in 
relation to the admission of investment.  The problem with this is that it could be interpreted in 
the same way that some tribunals have interpreted the admission of investment provision: that it 
is intended to prevent capital transfers that are tainted with illegality but not all capital transfers 
that do not conform with host state laws and regulation.  As discussed before, a different 
interpretation is to be preferred, one which retains the discretionary powers of the State over the 
capital inflows in accordance with its laws.  It is submitted that this later interpretation is more in 
accordance with the meaning of the BIT’s provision and the intention of the parties. 
On the other hand, unlike in the UK Model BIT, there is no explicit qualification to the capital 
transfer rights under the German and US Model BITs.  Neither includes reference to host State 
laws, nor to measures necessary to protect the host State economy or its balance of payments or 
to State party obligations under the IMF.  
This framework of admission of investment and capital under BITs is problematic.  It restricts 
the discretion of the host State in ways that may not have been expected.  The restriction arises 
from the combination of the broad meaning of investment under BITs, case law that interprets 
C. Conclusions as to Direct Treatment of Capital Inflows
i. Foreign Investors have Broad Rights to Make Capital Transfers
ii. The Problem of Unexpected Restrictions on Host State Discretion
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the discretion of State to regulate admission narrowly (effectively abolishing its right to require 
prior registration or approval), and broad transfer provisions.  
Investments, as defined in BITs and interpreted by arbitral tribunals, may not be authorized by 
the host State.  Many activities that constitute foreign “investments” may not need a 
governmental authorization to be made.  A purchase of stocks in a corporation, a deposit in a 
bank, or a turn key contract between a foreign contractor and a private party will be considered 
an investment, but may not require an authorization from the host State.  
It is therefore possible to have an investment under the BIT that exists legally in the host State, 
notwithstanding that it was not authorized by the host State.  In this case, such investment will be 
entitled to transfer capital into the host State under US and German Model BITs.  More so, as 
demonstrated above, an investment may not be in compliance with host State law requiring 
registration or other requirements, but may still be considered valid under the BIT.
Some examples from case law show facts where the host State was not positively engaged in the 
approval of the investment or capital undertaking, but an investment was found to have been 
admitted nonetheless.141  In , the tribunal found that if the transaction (a purchase of 
shares agreement) between private parties that constituted an investment under the BIT was 
valid, the host State must admit the investment.142   It stated:
[I]t is necessarily implicit in Article 2 of the Treaty that an investment must have been made in accordance 
with the provisions of the host State’s laws. In relevant part, Article 2 stipulates that “[e]ach Contracting 
Party . . . shall admit such investments in accordance with its provisions of law”. Accordingly, and as both 
parties acknowledge, the obligation upon the host State to admit an investment by a foreign investor (i.e. in 
the present context, to allow the purchase of shares in a local company) only arises if the purchase is made 
in compliance with its laws.143
In other words, if the investment transaction between private parties is legal , the host State 
is obliged to permit the investment under a BIT that only contains an “in accordance with the 
host State” admission clause. And because a transfer of capital to the host State is not required 
                                                  
141 See for e.g. , ICSlD case no. ARB/96/3 (Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to 
Jurisdiction ), 37 ILM 1378, para. 41 (July 11, 1997).
142 , UNCITRAL (Partial Award), para. 204 (Mar. 
17, 2006) [hereinafter ].
143 .
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for there to be an investment, in some cases the host State was liable to pay for funds that never 
entered its territory.144  
In addition, while not explicitly addressing the admission of investment and capital or transfers, 
in , the tribunal was faced with a claim that included a substantial amount of money that 
was loaned from the foreign investor to Argentinean companies in which it indirectly held an 
interest to pay its due liability under bonds and notes it issued to finance its operations.145  The 
issue was whether the investment included this amount, which was loaned after the alleged 
expropriatory measures were taken.  Argentina argued that it should not compensate the investor 
for the loan in question as it “responded to financial decisions made by the Claimant that [we]re 
not to be attributed to anyone else, and for which the Government [wa]s not responsible.”146
In applying the US-Argentina BIT, the tribunal found that subsequent capital contributions to an 
investment should not be treated in isolation since they were made because of the original 
investment.147  The tribunal first considered “the context in which th[e] loan was made,” noting 
that when the Argentinean companies attempted to arrange financing to pay the notes that were 
due around the time of the alleged expropriatory measure, they were unable to obtain the 
required financing from the financial markets.148  It concluded that “[s]uch loans were in fact part 
of the investment’s financing arrangements, and were interposed at a moment when 
only the investor was available to make them.”149  Accordingly, even though the claimant may 
have known of the expropriation or its impending nature at the time, the tribunal allowed it to 
claim compensation for the loan.  The loan “was a normal business move by the investor in a 
situation where additional financing was necessary to keep a company out of default.  To the 
extent that the loans were made in connection with a legitimate business purpose, as they in fact 
were, there is no reason to exclude them from the protected investment”.150
                                                  
144 , ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4 (Decision of the 
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It follows from this reasoning that an investment in the territory of the host state is entitled to 
incur financial liabilities and import capital as part of its continuing business and financial 
arrangements, which will be considered protected investments under BITs even though the host 
state did not approve them.
While it is reasonable that if the host State authorizes the investment that it also admits the 
capital required for such investment,151 not all kinds of investment require prior authorization, 
and even if they do, some case law has made such requirements ineffective.  The fact that an 
investment is authorized does not mean that the host State authorized capital inflows. Obligations 
such as national treatment in some BITs require a host State to admit investment as nationals, 
which means that its admission was not an acceptance of importing capital, but rather 
compliance with its BIT obligation.
Similarly, it could be argued that this obligation is reasonable in case of capital inflows needed 
for the maintenance of investment because maintenance may be necessary to the financial 
viability or competitiveness of investment.  But it does not follow that all kinds of capital should 
be liberalized.  While in the case of expanding an investment, it can be argued that this may be 
necessary for an existing investment to compete effectively,152 this is not the case in all 
expansions, which could be financed from capital within the host State. 
One of the main problems in this legal framework is its method of capital liberalization: 
immediate and total liberalization of capital relating to investment.  Compare this to what OECD 
countries have agreed to in the ,153 which 
deal with admission and establishment of investment.154  The 
(Code) is technically not an international treaty, but is a decision by the 
                                                  
151 See also discussion on fair and equitable treatment standard that includes good faith and complying with the 
basic expectation of the foreign investor. 
152 Lang, n 138, at 456 (noting that this guarantees “a predictable environment guided by market 
forces.”).
153 , reprinted in OECD, 
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154 OECD, 
, at 7 (OECD, 2007).
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OECD Council that takes all its decisions by a unanimous vote of all member countries.155 First, 
the Code, although binding on OECD member countries, depends on “a consultative process” 
and peer “persuasion” for monitoring and enforcement.156
Second, as mentioned before, the Code has not restricted the country members’ ability to 
regulate the right of establishment until 1984.157  Only after 1984 did the Code subject the 
discretion of the member countries in this regard to its rules. 158  
Third, the Code depends on a positive list method: it liberalizes capital inflows through listing 
the covered capital transactions in an attachment to the Code.  To be sure, the Code’s coverage is 
currently very broad and liberalizes both long term and short term capital flows between OECD 
member countries.159  But this was done gradually and over a long period of time through certain 
capital transactions and not a general liberalization of every kind of capital.  
Fourth, the Code permits its members to make reservations to liberalization,160 but these 
reservations cannot be made to the non-discrimination principle. Finally, the Code allows 
member states to derogate therefrom if they are experiencing economic problems.161
To compare this method of liberalization taken by developed countries with BIT liberalization 
that in many cases does not even include exceptions for financial difficulties illustrates the 
problem. Although some variations exist in BITs, and some include exceptions or limit the type 
of capital entitled to free transfer, an application of other obligations such MFN, could abolish 
these exceptions. 
BITs direct treatment of capital related to investment is absolute, broad and immediate.  While 
there are some variations between BITs and their scope, they generally allow the repatriation of 
original capital and other transfers related to investment.  The scope of the obligation is broad 
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and covers most funds arising from the investment including its liquidation.  It is also absolute 
and does not generally allow for exceptions.  Exceptions, if any, are generally limited, 
inconsistent, and subject to MFN and NT.  Time of transfer and exchange rate are specified.  
They accordingly lead to the abolition of all controls on the repatriation of capital and the duty to 
provide the necessary foreign exchange for transfer.  
Not allowing for an exception on the freedom of outflows transfers in exceptional economic 
difficulties is problematic. Another problem is that in some BITs, that right is very restricted in 
scope and only covers certain types of outflows with quantity and time limits for the exception. 
Moreover, the exception may be subject to the MFN principle, whether explicitly or implicitly.   
Accordingly, as a result, many developing countries will end up unable to utilize the exception 
they bargained for.  This is because, as shown, they may have concluded other BITs that do not 
provide for the exception at all, or provide for an exception for different reasons, which make the 
exceptions mutually exclusive, i.e., denying effect to each other. 
As for capital inflows regulation, there are two main approaches to the treatment of capital 
inflows.  The first one grants the host State discretion to admit capital in accordance with its 
laws; and the second provides for the free transfer of capital inflows related to investment 
without restrictions. Under the first approach, some BITs, such as those following the UK Model 
BIT, combine the host State discretion to admit investment and capital according to host State 
law.  It follows that the same interpretations given to the admission of investment under the host 
State discretion approach apply.
BITs under the second approach, such as those following the German and US Model BITs, 
provide for the free transfer of capital related to investment, which includes capital inflows. They 
provide for the rate of exchange and the time frame within which the transfer should be 
permitted.   
Most importantly, there is no qualification or distinction between the types of capital related to 
investment subject to the transfer obligation, which could be long term or short term capital or
even current transactions related funds because investment, as defined and interpreted by the 
majority of tribunals under BITs, includes any kind of asset or right that has economic value.  
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BITs, such as the ones following US Model BIT 2004, have restricted the investment definition, 
this is not the case in many BITs.  In addition, host States may not impose capital controls or 
exchange restrictions, and there is no general exception for financial crises or balance of 
payment difficulties.  
While there are different variations of the second approach directly treating capital inflows in 
different BITs—some provide for exceptions in case of financial crises or limit the types of 
capital subject to transfer— the application of other general standards under BITs restricts 
further these variations.
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BITs, by and large, treat the issue of transfer of funds into and out of the host State. BITs’ 
treatment to this subject includes direct treatment, which exists in the transfer of funds provisions 
and some times in the admission of capital provision.  They also include indirect treatment, 
which manifests in other general obligations and standards.
Many BITs contain general obligations and standards that might result in restricting the host 
State's regulatory autonomy to regulate capital flows. These include the obligation to grant most 
favoured nation treatment (MFN) and fair and equitable treatment (FET).  These obligations are 
drafted and interpreted broadly, which lead to ambiguity and incoherence in their application.
These results could have been mitigated if there is a dispute settlement mechanism that can unify 
the interpretation of these rules and create a coherent law that guides both the host state and the 
foreign investors.  Yet the chosen method of dispute settlement, investor-state arbitration, does 
not achieve these targets, but rather contribute to the incoherence and inconsistency of the law. 
This chapter analyzes these obligations that may affect the transfer of capital scope under BITs. 
It assesses how the breadth and absoluteness of these obligations can affect the treatment of 
capital movement under BITs, which constitutes the indirect treatment of capital under BITs.  It 
also assesses the investor-state arbitration role in applying these obligations.
MFN means that the host State must treat the foreign investment or investor no less than the best 
treatment given to other foreign investors or investment from other countries.1  This prohibits a 
host country from discriminating between different foreign investors on the basis of nationality.2  
                                                  
1 UNCTAD, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements, UN Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/10 (Vol. III), at 3 (1999); Rudolf Dolzer & Margrete Stevens, 
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MFN treatment is typically included in a clause between two states to treat each other’s investors 
no less than each country treats third country investors.3
The International Law Commission’s Final Draft Articles on Most Favored Nation Clauses 
defines MFN clause as “a treaty provision whereby a State undertakes an obligation towards 
another State to accord most-favoured-nation treatment in an agreed sphere of relations.”4  This 
definition affirms that an MFN clause “always applies to a determined sphere of relations agreed 
upon by the parties to the treaty concerned.”5
This agreed sphere of relations that limits the scope of the MFN clause is referred to as the 
rule, which means that the scope of the MFN is restricted to the subject matter 
of the original BIT.6 The original treaty is the treaty containing the MFN clause that beneficiary 
home State is party and it is referred to as the base treaty. The favourable treatment given in the 
third-party agreement must be concerning a subject matter that is covered in the base agreement.7  
This third-party treaty to which the investor seeking to apply the MFN clause is permitted to 
benefit from its favourable treatment determines “the extent of the favours” to which the investor 
may be entitled to.   
The MFN clause although included in bilateral agreements is considered a step towards 
multilateralism.9  “Indeed, that standard is at the heart of multilateralism. . . . [T]he MFN 
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standard seeks to prevent discrimination against investors from foreign countries on grounds of 
their nationality.”10
Yet the extent that the MFN clause can import obligations from other treaties has raised some 
controversy.11  Although, the definition of the MFN rule and its scope of application may be 
straight forward to define in abstract, it can be difficult and problematic to draw the scope of its 
application in practice.12  It is problematic to incorporate very different substantive obligations 
from other treaties. 13  This distorts the contractual obligations balance of the original treaty.14  
Nevertheless, this is the essence of the MFN treatment clause and this result is the purpose of its 
existence.15  
Generally, this importation will depend on the exact words of the specific clause in the original 
BIT and the treaty that grants the favourable treatment.16  The differences in drafting of the MFN 
clauses in different BITs result in different scopes of application for the MFN.17
If the MFN clause in the base agreement explicitly includes admission in its scope, then the 
foreign investor will be entitled to the national treatment right included in the other BIT. An 
example of such clause is the one in the Japan-Bangladesh BIT.18  On the other hand, if the MFN 
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clause explicitly excludes or limits the scope of this right, then the foreign investor will not be 
entitled to national treatment in the admission phase, or will be entitled to the extent of the 
limitation imposed in the base agreement. A BIT may limit the MFN clause scope with the 
condition that the extension is reciprocal. An example of such clause can be found in the Japan-
Sri Lanka BIT. 19
According to Pollan, “the MFN standard is generally, with the exception of the BITs drafted 
according to the US model, not applied during the pre-establishment period.  European and other 
BITs seem to introduce the standard limited to the period after admission.”20
Dolzer and Schreuer note that while this might be true regarding admission right, “[c]oncerning 
the right of establishment, it would seem that the principles of national treatment and of the 
most-favoured-nation rules, as contained in each treaty, will apply, regardless of the existence of 
a right to admission, as long as the investment has been properly made.”21 Sacerdoti suggests 
that it would be appropriate that the MFN treatment be extended to the right of admission.22
The Model German BIT provides for the national treatment and MFN for foreign investment, 
stating: “Neither Contracting Party shall subject owned or controlled 
by nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party to treatment less favourable than it 
accords to investments of its own nationals or companies or to investments of nationals or 
companies of any third State.”23  It also provides for the MFN to be granted to investors “as 
regards their activity in connection with .” 24  
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, signed Mar. 1, 1982, art. 2 (2)-(3)(“Nationals and companies of either Contracting Party 
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It appears from this provision that only admitted investment is entitled to national treatment and 
MFN.  The use of the words “investment in its territory” suggests that the national and MFN 
treatment only applies to already admitted or established investments. 
This limits the scope of the national treatment and MFN provision in the German Model BIT to 
only admitted or established investment. Thus the national treatment and MFN treatment do not 
extend to the pre-investment phase. Since any investment that is not admitted cannot be in the 
territory of the host State, the national treatment and MFN clause cannot be applied to the 
conditions of admitting foreign investment. This conforms to article 1 of the German Model BIT 
that subjects the power of the host State over the admission of investment to the host State law.  
However, once admitted, it might be argued that as to conditions of establishment, the national 
treatment may apply.  This follows from the generality in the national treatment clause.  But the 
MFN treatment appears to apply only to the “activities” of the foreign investor and not on the 
legal structure it uses for carrying out these activities. 
Second, for the transfer of funds, both national treatment and MFN would apply to the right to 
transfer funds into the country, as it relates to the carrying out the activities of investment in the 
territory of the host State, which is covered by national treatment and MFN.  In addition, national 
treatment and MFN will also apply to treatment relating to development and expansion of 
foreign investment and transfers required for such expansion.
Similar to the German Model BIT, the UK Model BIT provides most favoured treatment to 
investments.  It states: 
(1) Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject investments or returns of nationals or companies 
of the other Contracting Party to treatment less favourable than that which it accords to investments or 
returns of its own nationals or companies or to investments or returns of nationals or companies of any 
third State.
(2) Neither Contracting Party shall in its territory subject nationals or companies of the other Contracting 
Party, as regards their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of their investments, to 
treatment less favourable than that which it accords to its own nationals or companies or to nationals or 
companies of any third States.25
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However, the UK Model BIT also excludes pre-investment and admission from the scope of the 
MFN clause.  The use of the words “in its territory,” and requiring only MFN treatment for 
investors with regard “their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of their 
investments” without referring to admission or establishment, indicates that admission and 
establishment are not included in scope of the MFN clause.26  
That said, provisions regarding transfers required to make the admitted investment would be 
covered by MFN treatment as it relates to “management, maintenance, use, [and] enjoyment” of 
investment.  Accordingly, under the UK Model BIT, favourable treatment granted to other 
investments regarding capital inflows would apply to investors under it.
In this way, MFN and NT may change the substance of a transfer obligation under a BIT. A 
combination of different favourable treatments in different BITs concluded by the host State 
could lead to unrestricted transfer of capital inflows.  For example, a State that concluded BITs 
following the UK Model BIT and German Model BIT on capital transfers would be required to 
extend the treatment of capital inflows under the favourable German Model BIT to investors 
subject to the UK Model BIT under MFN of the UK Model BIT.  
In addition, exceptions to freedom of capital inflows transfers provided in different BITs by one 
host State may lead to them being mutually exclusive by virtue of MFN clause, leaving the host 
State without any discretionary power to regulate capital inflows even in financial emergencies.
The Model BITs contain most favoured nation (MFN) and national treatment (NT) clauses.27  
The Model German BIT provides for the NT and MFN for foreign investment. 28 It also provides 
for the MFN to be granted to investors “as regards their activity in connection with 
investments”.29  
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The US Model BIT 1992 also extends the MFN treatment generally to investment.30  The US 
Model BIT 2004 MFN clause extends its coverage to both investors and investments.31  
However, it is suggested that the difference in drafting the clause by referring to investor or 
investment or both is just a difference in style, which is not intended to make a difference in the 
scope of the MFN treatment, which is broad and includes both pre-investment and post-
investment under US BITs.32
It follows from the above that the MFN clause in the Model BITs of the UK, US and Germany 
would apply to transfer provision.  It would accordingly be possible to incorporate any better 
treatment accorded in other BITs and to avoid restrictions and qualifications to such right.  
Exceptions to the free transfer of capital into the host State may be avoided by virtue of the MFN 
clause that incorporates the transfer treatment in another BIT of the host State that does not have 
the same exception or qualification.
Many States have BITs that allow exceptions to the free transfer of capital outflows. However, 
they may have BITs without such exception or with different exceptions.   In the case that a 
developing country includes an exception from the free transfer of capital outflows for economic 
difficulties; inconsistencies arise, however, between different BITs concluded by the same 
country on the circumstances that permit the use of such exception, and on the substance and 
scope of the exception.  In some cases, a country will be party to BITs that provide for such an 
exception and BITs that do not. The following two subsections will illustrate the effect of the 
MFN applicability on exceptions to repatriation of capital outflows under BITs concluded by two 
developing countries: Bangladesh and Egypt. 
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The UK- Bangladesh BIT provides that either country may use the regulatory powers under their 
laws over investment outflows transfers in “exceptional financial or economic circumstances”. 33
This means that either country facing extraordinary financial or economic hardships may restrict 
capital outflows related to investment. It is only qualified that these prerogatives be employed 
“equitably and in good faith”. 34
Likewise, the Germany-Bangladesh BIT allows a Contracting Party to restrict the transfer of 
capital outflows of yields of liquidation. 35 This exception only covers restrictions on capital 
transfer related to liquidation proceeds and does not cover returns of capital provided for in 
Article (4) of the BIT. “Returns” is defined to include any amount resulting from investment 
whether “as profit or interest.” 36 The restriction is also limited for a maximum of five years, 
where 20% of the amounts must be permitted every year. 37  However, the exception is only in 
case of “exceptional balance of payment difficulties”. 38  
The US-Bangladesh BIT is more restrictive to the regulatory power of the host state in cases of 
exceptional economic circumstances.  It provides for the right of Bangladesh to provisionally 
postpone “transfers of sales or liquidation proceeds”, in case it finds that “its foreign exchange 
reserves at a very low level.”39  This does not allow Bangladesh to postpone transfers of profits 
or dividends or any other transfers not arising from “sales or liquidation proceeds”.  In addition, 
this is qualified by three conditions. First, the most favored nation treatment shall apply to this 
exception. 40 This means that any treatment of the transfers may not be less than that of foreign 
investors from other countries.  By virtue of an international agreement or otherwise, other 
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countries foreign investors may have a more favourable treatment. In this case, if those other 
foreign investor’s transfers are not postponed or are given a faster path than the general 
postponement imposed, US investors will be entitled to the same favourable treatment. This 
condition can make the exception ineffective in the case that Bangladesh enters into any 
international agreement with another country that does not provide for this exception. Second, 
the postponement may not exceed the time required to reinstate the reserves to a minimal 
satisfactory point.41  In any case, a maximum of five years is set during which a yearly minimum 
of 20% of proceeds amount must be allowed transfer. 42  Third, the US investor must be allowed 
to invest the delayed transfer amounts in a way that keeps its value. 43  
The use of different terminology in allowing the restriction on capital movements with different 
scope of application in different BITs concluded by the same developing country combined with 
MFN treatment may make the use of this exception problematic. First, the MFN treatment results 
in restricting the applicability of the exception to the least restrictive in all BITs. It may also end 
up in making the exceptions totally ineffective. 
The BITs concluded between Bangladesh and the UK, the US, and Germany illustrate these 
concerns. What triggers the exception in the Germany-Bangladesh BIT is the existence of 
“exceptional balance of payment difficulties”. 44 The UK-Bangladesh BIT provides for a general 
and rather ambiguous prerequisite for either party to invoke the exception, namely “exceptional 
financial or economic circumstances”.  The extent of the measures that can be taken by the host 
state is also not restricted, except in the sense of being “equitable and in good faith”. 
The US-Bangladesh BIT, on the other hand, allows Bangladesh to only postpone transfers in 
cases when Bangladesh’s “foreign exchange reserves [are] at a very low level.” 45  
The MFN treatment clause in the UK-Bangladesh BIT prohibit any treatment of UK investment 
that falls short of any treatment granted to investment from third countries.46 Accordingly, it 
seems that the more discretionary and broad criterion stated in the UK-Bangladesh BIT will not 
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be applicable in any circumstance, except to the extent that the more restrictive criteria stated in 
the Germany-Bangladesh BIT and US-Bangladesh BIT are applicable.
This may also lead to turning the whole exception futile. An illustration will be if Bangladesh 
has “exceptional balance of payment difficulties” but the foreign exchange reserve level is 
satisfactory. Under the Germany-Bangladesh BIT, Bangladesh can restrict liquidation proceeds 
capital outflows from German investment, but cannot postpone investment proceeds of 
liquidation of US investments under the US-Bangladesh BIT. However, the MFN treatment 
provided for in the Germany-Bangladesh BIT will not allow Bangladesh to take such measures, 
since it will be giving a more favourable treatment to US investors.47
The reverse may also be possible. In cases when Bangladesh's “foreign exchange reserves [are] 
at a very low level”, there are no “exceptional balance of payment difficulties”. Similarly, 
Bangladesh may not be able to postpone capital outflows that belong to US investors since it is 
prohibited from imposing the same on German investments. The US-Bangladesh BIT explicitly 
provides that the enforcement of this exception must be “in a manner not less favorable than that 
accorded to comparable transfers to investors of third countries”. 48
The Egypt-UK BIT, after stating the principle of freedom of investment returns, allows the host 
state to restrict these transfers in “exceptional financial or economic circumstances”.49  The 
Egypt-UK BIT provides that
(1) Each Contracting Party shall in respect of investment guarantee to national or companies of the other 
Contracting Party the free transfer of the returns from their investments, subject to the right of each 
Contracting Party in exceptional financial or economic circumstances to exercise equitably and in good 
faith powers conferred by its laws
(2) In the case of transfer of capital this shall be effected in accordance with the relevant laws of the two 
Contracting Parties.50
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This provision allows the host country to restrict capital transfers related to investment in cases 
of financial or economic crisis. It can also be interpreted to allow the country to impose 
restrictions before a crisis erupts.  The use of the word “circumstances” permits such 
interpretation. However, as an exception, this must be interpreted narrowly.  Only in 
extraordinary circumstances can the host country invoke this provision. 
On the other hand, the US-Egypt BIT provides that 
“the Parties recognize that it is possible that the Arab Republic of Egypt may find its foreign exchange 
reserves at a very low level. In these circumstances, the Arab Republic of Egypt may temporarily delay 
transfers required under Article V, Paragraph 1(f), but only: (i) in a manner not less favourable that 
accorded to comparable transfers to investors of third countries; (ii) to the extent and for the time period 
necessary to restore its reserves to a minimally acceptable lever, but in no case for period of time longer 
than that permitted by the provisions of law 43 in force on the date of signature of this Treaty; and (iii) after 
providing the investor an opportunity to invest the sales or liquidation proceeds in a manner which will 
preserve their value free of exchange risk until transfer occurs.”51
The scope of the exceptional financial clause in the US-Egypt BIT is narrower than the 
aforementioned one in the Egypt-UK BIT. It can only be invoked by Egypt in the case of an 
acute foreign exchange reserve.  Additionally, the US-Egypt BIT only allows it when the 
problem occurs, i.e., when the foreign exchange reserves is already “at a very low level”.  It does 
not allow for the possibility of delaying the transfer to prevent the problem.52 Even then, the only 
measure that Egypt can undertake is to postpone “the proceeds of partial or total sale or 
liquidation of the investment”.53 Other transfers related to investment may not be inhibited. In 
addition, MFN treatment applies explicitly to this exception.  The US-Egypt BIT also imposes a 
time limit of five years on the period that Egypt can postpone these transfers.54
In a case where the Egyptian government is facing an economic crisis that does not result in 
having a very low foreign exchange reserve, it may not be able to apply the necessary measures 
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on foreign investors (like British investors) as a result of the application of the MFN, since these 
measures will not be applicable under the US-Egypt BIT.  By the same token, if a crisis is fairly 
imminent and will reduce the foreign exchange reserve to a very low level, Egypt may not be 
able to take measures under the US-Egypt BIT.  This treatment may extend to other investors by 
virtue of the MFN clause.
It is worth noting that the MFN is restricted to “comparable” transfers in the US- Egypt BIT.  
This restricts the scope of the MFN to transfers that are similar.  This criterion can include 
“comparable” transfers in terms of quantity and quality. This means that the host country may 
vary its restriction to the other party investors’ transfer from third parties investors’ transfers 
depending on the quantity or the kind of capital that is restricted.  This is a qualification to the 
application of the MFN principle in this case. 
Other BITs entered into by Egypt include different rules. The Egypt-Japan BIT allows either 
country to utilize exchange controls as permitted by the IMF Articles. 55 The Egypt-Japan BIT 
provides that the rate of exchange shall “include the rate of exchange prevailing under the 
applicable laws and regulations of each Contracting Party.”56  
Some BITs concluded by Egypt do not provide for any exception for transfer of outflow capital. 
The Canada-Egypt BIT and Denmark-Egypt BIT, for example, do not explicitly provide for any 
exception on the free transfer of capital and returns from investment for exceptional economic 
difficulties.57 However, the MFN is excluded explicitly from some BITs concluded by Egypt 
with regard to tax issues. This prevents foreign investors from challenging the tax based capital 
controls on their transfers on the basis that other countries' foreign investors are receiving 
different treatment.  The Egypt-UK BIT exempts tax laws and agreements related to taxes from 
the application of the MFN treatment and national treatment provided for in the BIT. 58
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However, the US-Egypt BIT has a different rule. It provides that: 
With respect to its tax policies, each Party should strive to accord fairness and equity in the treatment of 
investment of nationals or companies of the other Party. 
Nevertheless, all matters relating to the taxation of nationals or companies of a Party, or their investments 
in the territories of the other Party or a subdivision thereof shall be excluded from this Treaty, except with 
regard to measures covered by Article III and the specific provisions of Article V.59
This explicitly excludes taxation from the scope of the BIT, except with respect to transfers 
(Article V) and if the taxation is considered indirect expropriation (Article III).
The ability of a British investor to invoke the MFN in order to be entitled to include the taxation 
of transfers treatment in the US-Egypt BIT is dubious in light of the explicit exclusion thereof 
from the Egypt-UK BIT.
The above shows how even an exception made by a BIT for the purpose of assisting a 
developing country in financial or economic hardship can be curtailed by the same BITs broad 
obligations to the extent of making it futile. It is questionable whether these developing countries 
intended that their right to temporarily restrict capital outflows in crisis situations that they 
negotiated with developed countries be taken away by other BITs.
FET finds its origin in the US treaties on friendship, commerce and navigation (FCNs), and as in 
many other BITs obligations, in the private model of Hermann Abs and Lord Shawcross and the 
OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property.60  
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FET can be interpreted as equivalent to the international minimum standard or as an autonomous 
standard.  Under the first interpretation, a restriction on capital inflows in general should not 
violate the international minimum standard because under international law has the right to 
regulate and restrict capital inflows.  If this regulation is both arbitrary and discriminatory, it 
might be found in violation of the minimum standard according to some awards that found that 
the international minimum standard is violated by arbitrary and discriminatory treatment.61   
If the autonomous standard, which is the prevailing interpretation under BITs, is adopted the 
substantive obligations would be different.  There are different obligations included under the 
FET and different interpretations given to them—mostly broad interpretations—which may
affect the regulatory powers of the host State.  FET is interpreted broadly to encompass both 
substantive and procedural protections, including an obligation of vigilance and protection; an 
obligation to accord justice and due process; an obligation to maintain a stable and transparent 
regime of investment regulation; an obligation to respect investor’s expectations; an obligation to 
act in good faith, an obligation to a refrain from discriminatory and arbitrary treatment; and 
proportionality and reasonableness.62
The autonomous FET was interpreted by tribunals to include the obligation of good faith, 
obligations of transparency, stability and respect of investor’s legitimate expectations.63  While 
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some tribunals referred to certain language in the relevant BIT or to past tribunals to find that 
transparency was part of FET, some did not state any reason why transparency was part of FET.  
Tribunals have initially interpreted the content of this obligation in a broad language that 
imposed positive obligations on government to act to ensure the investor’s clear understanding of 
its legal regime and any proposed changes to it.  One oft-cited case is , which laid down 
subjective and objective criteria for FET. interpreted the FET as requiring the host 
country to conform to the foreign investor’s “basic expectations” that were the basis for its 
decision to invest.64  This depends on what the foreign investor based its decision on at the time 
of taking the decision to invest; which is a subjective standard. It then followed this with 
objective criteria of what the foreign investor expectations are, stating:
The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally 
transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and 
regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative 
practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations. Any and all State 
actions conforming to such criteria should relate not only to the guidelines, directives or requirements 
issued, or the resolutions approved thereunder, but also to the goals underlying such regulations.65
The tribunal stated that it based this autonomous interpretation of the fair and equitable standard 
on the ordinary meaning of the BIT words, “international law and the good faith principle.”66 No 
other authority for this interpretation was cited by the tribunal.
’s interpretation of the FET standard was, rightly, described by Chile as “the Tecmed 
programme for good governance,” and the annulment committee has found its approach 
“questionable.”67  For one, creating an obligation based on the investor expectations rather than 
BIT’s obligation appears arcane to international law rules, and it does not arise from the ordinary 
meaning of the BIT FET obligation.68  The tribunal described its interpretation as an 
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“autonomous interpretation”.69  It reasoned that otherwise the fair and equitable treatment 
provided in the Mexico-Spain BIT will be stripped of any independent meaning or protection to 
foreign investment. 70  No explanation how is this so. Why, for example, the international 
minimum standard would not have provided protection to foreign investment against arbitrary 
and discriminatory actions of the State.  
While what referred to as a content of the fair and equitable treatment can be viewed as 
best practice or model for government treatment of investment, it cannot reflect the current 
customary international law, or what the parties to BITs accepted when they agreed to this 
provision.  Clear evidence to that is the reaction of the NAFTA countries in their interpretation 
of the FET clause to refer only to minimum standard of treatment under customary international 
law.71  
’s criteria do not grant any space for the typical government process which is not always 
efficient.  Different policies may be employed by different parties within different governments, 
or even within the same government where different objectives might be pursued.  It is hardly 
conceivable that an investor would expect a developing state to have such efficient government 
that can explain the policies and goals behind each policy and to never be inconsistent or 
contradictory to satisfy .72  Other tribunals have, nonetheless, followed .73
In the light of the broad application of this standard, one question is whether it has application on 
the admission and transfer provisions in BITs.  All the Model BITs provide for the obligation to 
accord fair and equitable treatment (FET).74  For the U.K. and US BITs, such treatment is 
                                                                                                                                                                   
of the host State towards foreign investors derive from the terms of the applicable investment treaty and not from 
any set of expectations investors may have or claim to have.”).
69 , para. 155.
70 ., paras. 155-156.
71 , (July 31, 2001) available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta/chap11interp.pdf.
72 Gus Van Harten, , 89 (OUP, 2007); Susan D. Franck, 
, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 675, at 678 (2005) 
(“No regulatory framework is absolutely clear and free from inconsistencies.”); Bohuslav Klein, 
, 5 JWIT 19, at 21 (2004) (“[T]he State administration in all 
countries is a little bit inefficient.”).
73 , , para. 280.
74 , art. 2(1); , art. 2(1); , art. II(2)(a).
Tecmed
Tecmed
Tecmed Tecmed
Tecmed
Id
Free Trade Commission Clarifications Related to NAFTA Chapter 11
Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law International 
Decision: Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador
How to Avoid 
Conflicting Awards: The Lauder and CME Cases
See, e.g. CMS Final Award
See German Model BIT UK Model BIT US Model BIT 1992
B. Application 
197
accorded at the post-admission phase.  On the other hand, the FET in the German Model BIT 
might apply on the admission process as well. In the admission phase, this obligation would 
entail an obligation of good faith, transparency and accord due process in the admission phase.  
Additionally, the MFN clause in the US BITs could incorporate such treatment, as it applies in 
the admission and establishment phase.  Some tribunals have applied FET that existed by virtue 
of MFN clauses in other BITs. 75
Most importantly, FET applies to the obligation to permit inward transfers. Obligation such as 
respecting investor’s expectations may affect the substance of the State’s right to regulate capital 
inflows. If the host State laws and regulation at the time of admission allowed free transfer of 
capital inflows for this kind of investment, a foreign investor might reasonably expect that its 
admitted investment is entitled to be allowed to import inward funds to conduct or maintain its 
operations.  Host State actions that fail to meet these expectations might be found in violation of 
FET.  
An analogous situation exists in case, where after the admission of the investment the host 
State actions were found to violate FET as they did not conform to the investor’s expectations.76  
In that case, the foreign investor was seeking to build a residential community over a piece of 
land which it purchased from a private seller.  However, the land was in the agricultural zone and 
cannot be used for that person.  The seller convinced the investor that rezoning is simple, and 
that the project can be built on the land.  The investor did not conduct its own due diligence on 
the matter.  The investor received the approval to invest from Chilean Foreign Investment 
Commission (FIC), and a foreign investment contract with FIC.   The investor attempts to 
acquire the zoning permit was rejected because there was a policy against changing the zoning in 
this area.  The claimant argued that the host State violated FET by failing to meet its reasonable 
expectations that it can build in the location which is specified in the foreign investment contract.  
The respondent argued that FIC’s approval and contract was only to guarantee transfer of capital 
and national treatment, as the foreign investment contract explicitly required the investor to 
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acquire zoning permit and other authorizations.  It further argued that if the investor had made its 
due diligence it would have found such policy. 
The tribunal stated that the FET entailed “an even-handed” and “just” treatment.77  It agreed with 
that the legitimate expectations of the foreign investors must be respected.78 It further 
found that the FET requires the host State to be proactive. It stated: 
[I]n terms of the BIT, fair and equitable treatment should be understood to be treatment in an even-handed 
and just manner, conducive to fostering the promotion of foreign investment. Its terms are framed as 
–“to promote”, “to create”, “to stimulate”- rather than prescriptions for a passive behavior 
of the State or avoidance of prejudicial conduct to the investors.79
The tribunal applied this standard finding that the different organs of the host State have acted 
incoherently and applied their policies inconsistently.  The tribunal found that FIC’s approval 
gave the investor the expectations that the project could be undertaken in the specified location.  
The tribunal found that the host State “has an obligation to act coherently and apply its policies 
consistently, independently of how diligent an investor is.”80  The approval of the FIC was 
inconsistent with the urban policy of the government, which constituted a violation of FET.81
Likewise, a host State that approves an investment and fails to permit inward capital required for 
its business may be held in violation of FET, even if no transfer provision existed in the relevant 
BIT or if the transfer provision did not include inward transfer. In addition, if the host State 
changes its laws and regulation after the admission of investment and restricts the ability of the 
investment to bring capital inflows, the obligations of stability and due process might be invoked 
by the investor.  
Some case law found that amending investors’ rights that existed in the regulatory framework at 
the time of its admission were in violation of FET obligation of to ensure stability and 
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predictability.82  Also, some awards explicitly rejected the need to a specific guarantee or 
undertaking by the host State to justify the foreign investor’s expectations.83
For example, in , under US-Argentina BIT, the ICSID tribunal found that fair and 
equitable treatment includes stability of the legal regime.84  It based its finding on the preamble 
of the BIT that states that “fair and equitable treatment of investment is desirable in order to 
maintain a stable framework for investment and maximum effective use of economic resources,” 
and other statements in the preamble on promoting mutual investment and cooperation.85  
It also referenced for the proposal that FET “involves consideration of the investor’s 
expectations when making its investment in reliance on the protections to be granted by the host 
State.”86  It thus found that transparency is required from the State to meet the investor’s 
expectations, while rejecting that bad faith is required to find the State in breach of FET.87
The tribunal clarified what the protected “fair expectations” were.  They must be in reliance on 
“conditions offered by the host State at the time of the investment,” which “must exist and be 
enforceable by law.”88  Based on this, the tribunal found Argentina’s amendments of its 
investment legal regime and its guarantees to foreign investors, including computing tariffs in 
US dollar, the exchange rate from pesos to dollars, and periodical adjustment of tariffs, have 
violated FET as it did not preserve the stability and predictability requirements.89  It also found 
that the treatment of investments in the gas sector of the economy violated the FET because these 
amendments were not applied to other sectors, most notably, the export sector.90  
thus stands for finding that an incentive in a law to certain sector should be preserved 
because it constitutes a specific guarantee to investors in that sector and FET’s stability and 
respect of investors’ legitimate expectations require not amending these incentives.  The tribunal 
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does not address whether the guarantee should be permanent or if it could be changed after 
certain reasonable period.  
What’s more, when other different sectors were treated more favourably, the tribunal found that 
this violates the FET without considering if there is any reason for such different treatment 
between different sectors. 
Accordingly, if a the host State laws provided for the free transfer of capital inflows in general or 
for the specific sector where the foreign investor is investing and after the admission of the 
investment, and later the host State amended its laws and imposed capital controls on capital 
inflows in general or on the specific sector of the investor, would suggest that these 
changes in regulation might violate FET. It follows that indirect capital controls such as taxing 
capital inflows or exchange restriction may violate the FET because it changes legal framework 
upon which the investor has invested.  
In addition, if reasoning is adopted, capital controls that distinguish between different 
types of capital inflows such as long term and short term capital or based on the underlying 
investment type may violate FET because it discriminates between different recipients of capital 
inflows. 
What’s more, under fair and equitable treatment is interpreted to require a host state to 
inform an investor beforehand of its intention to change these rules.  This could inhibit any use 
of capital controls, since any such prior notice could lead to massive capital outflows, preventing 
the exact purpose of capital controls.91  Likewise, notifying investment that temporary taxes on 
transfers will be imposed will prohibit the host state from imposing taxes for the same 
reason.
Some disputes arising from the measure taken by Argentina to deal with its financial crisis 
illustrate this point.  These measures were considered a violation of fair and equitable treatment. 
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In , the tribunal found that the change in the legal regime that the investor entered under 
to its detriment, even if done in good faith, constitutes a breach of fair and equitable treatment.  It 
stated:
The measures in question in this case have beyond any doubt substantially changed the legal and business 
framework under which the investment was decided and implemented. Where there was business certainty 
and stability, there is now the opposite.
. . .
Even assuming that the Respondent was guided by the best of intentions, what the Tribunal has no reason 
to doubt, there has here been an objective breach of the fair and equitable treatment due under the Treaty. 
The Tribunal thus holds that the standard established by Article II(2)(a) of the Treaty has not been 
observed, to the detriment of the Claimant’s rights.92
Similarly, in , the Tribunal found that the devaluation accompanied by not allowing the 
adjustment of the tariffs charged by the foreign investor resulted in increasing the costs and loss 
of the investor’s income, which is not “fair and reasonable.”93  The tribunal found that although 
the devaluation is a general economic measure, it has a particular impact on the foreign investor 
that is within its jurisdiction.94  The tribunal did not, however, consider the devaluation an 
expropriation, but ordered compensation on the basis of the breach of FET treatment and non 
observance of agreed upon obligations.95  
In this case, the claimant asserted that it was not accorded fair and equitable treatment because 
Argentina changed its regulatory system in relation to its investment. Argentina argued that the 
FET standard was vague, and that it only granted international minimum standard protection.96
The dispute relates to the 1989 privatization program in Argentina that included public utilities, 
and established TGN as the gas transportation operator for the north of the country.  CMS, a US 
company, acquired a minority stake in TGN from Argentina.  Argentina laws provided that gas 
transportation tariffs were to be calculated in US dollars, converted into Argentine pesos at the 
time of the billing, and begged pesos to US dollars at an exchange rate of 1 to 1.  These tariffs 
must be adjusted biannually in accordance with the US Producer Price Index (PPI). In 2000, 
Argentina suspended the tariff adjustment and the exchange rate of 1 to 1.  The devaluation of 
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pesos reduced the value of the tariffs by over two-thirds when calculated in dollars, which 
negatively affected TGN.  
The tribunal considered the “stability and predictability” as an integral part of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard.97 This is based on the purpose of the US-Argentina BIT as 
provided for in its preamble. 98 The tribunal noted that this does not mean that FET required that 
the laws regulating investment “be frozen as [they] can always evolve,” but this does not mean 
that the laws “can be dispensed with altogether when specific commitments to the contrary have 
been made.”99  Since Argentina has completely changed the legal framework that the claimant’s 
made its investment under, and especially the elements that were “crucial for the investment 
decision,” it found Argentina in violation of FET.100   
The tribunal in thus based its finding partly on the BITs’ preambles, which state that FET is 
desirous to achieve stability.  Still, it did not explain why such statement was not included as an 
obligation in the operative part of the BIT.  Indeed, if the States desired to have a clear obligation 
of stability, they would have stated so explicitly in the operative part of the BIT, or in a 
definition of FET. also placed certain emphasis on the subjective elements that the investor 
took into account when it invested.  But these elements could be viewed as objective elements 
because any investor would have taken into account the exchange rate and tariffs system that 
existed at the time into consideration.
Conversely, some recent awards have recognized the flaws in an interpretation that emphasizes 
the expectation of stability without limiting it to some reasonable and legitimate conditions. For 
example, in , the tribunal followed previous tribunals’ interpretation of the FET, 
finding that this obligation entails a treatment that is not discriminatory, arbitrary, and protects 
the investor’s legitimate expectations. 101  On the question of discriminatory treatment, the 
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challenged treatment must be compared to a treatment accorded to a comparable investor.102  The 
tribunal found that while the State’s actions might be considered a contractual violation, such 
violations were not proven to be discriminatory as the claimant had not proven that a comparable 
investor was treated better.103  It observed that any reasonable investor could not have expected 
the legal environment to be stable at the time, since substantial political and economic changes 
were happening at the time.104  
The tribunal also dealt with the legitimate expectations.  The criterion for the expectations to be 
legitimate is “if the investor received an explicit promise or guaranty from the host-State, or if 
implicitly the host-State made assurances or representation that the investor took into account in 
making the investments.”105  In the absence of such representation of the host State, one must 
examine the circumstances surrounding the making of the investment, including the host State 
actions at the time.106  Finding that there was no explicit or implicit guarantee or representation, 
the tribunal confirmed that the State may amend its laws, and do without a stabilization 
agreement, exercise it regulatory and legislative power at its discretion.  107  The tribunal 
summarized the extent of the right to stability, stating:
In principle, an investor has a right to a certain stability and predictability of the legal environment of the 
investment The investor will have a right of protection of its legitimate expectations provided it exercised 
due diligence and that its legitimate expectations were reasonable in light of the circumstances. 
Consequently, an investor must anticipate that the circumstances could change, and thus structure its 
investment in order to adapt it to the potential changes of legal environment.108
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Since the country was in transition and many legal changes were expected, the investor could not 
have legitimately expected the legal framework to stay unchanged.109  If it wished so, it should 
have included a stabilization clause.110  Meanwhile, any frustration to its contractual right is a 
contractual matter that is not protected by international law.111
thus limits the positive obligation of the State to actively inform the investor of any 
uncertainties to only the facts are not available to the public which the investor cannot 
independently obtain.  It also takes into account the host State’s circumstances that are or should 
be known to any diligent investor.  This is contrasted with the active duty imposed by , 
the duty of “vigilance” imposed by , and other decisions that followed them.
Similarly, in , the tribunal criticized the broadly stated principle of stability under FET, 
which might amount to freezing the legal regime.112  Under FET, an expectation must be 
legitimate and reasonable.  The tribunal found that an investor’s legitimate and reasonable 
expectation cannot be that the legal system will not develop and change.113  It held that such 
expectations may be reasonable and legitimate only if host State explicitly expressed specific 
undertakings to the investor.114  The FET, the tribunal noted, “cannot serve the same purpose as 
stabilization clauses specifically granted to foreign investors.”115  
The tribunal also confirmed that the investor’s “subjective expectations” may not be the only 
basis for deciding what the legitimate and expectations are, but that these “must be examined as 
the expectations at the time the investment is made, as they may be deduced from all the 
circumstances of the case, due regard being paid to the host State’s power to regulate its 
economic life in the public interest.”116
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Under the independent interpretation, many tribunals developed different principles in order to 
give content to FET.  Many tribunals used the preamble of the BIT to find specific obligations 
under FET while others built on interpretations of previous tribunals to reach their own 
accumulated interpretation of the FET or just to state the accumulated content based on all 
previous tribunals findings without examining the exact language of the relevant BIT.117  
Based on this, the tribunals found that FET included several different obligations or components 
like good faith, denial of justice, due process, lack of arbitrariness and discrimination, freedom 
from coercion, transparency, stability of the legal regime, and respecting investors’ expectations.  
These specific components, the tribunals found, were to be part of the obligation, but not the 
complete numeration of the components of the obligation.  Specific obligations, such as 
respecting investors’ expectations, are as vague and subjective as the FET obligation.  Some 
tribunals gave them more content and broader reach, while other tribunals imposed reasonable 
limits to this interpretation.    
On one end of the spectrum, interpretation of FET stands out in its overreaching and 
lack of any ground.  It does not arise from the ordinary meaning of FET nor in many BITs from 
the context of the BIT.  It is, however, cited by many tribunals as authority of what FET means, 
and by others as authority of what customary international law minimum standard stands now.
Also, many tribunals refrained from stating a specific and exhaustive content of FET as they 
retained discretion to decide on a case by case basis. Other awards like and , 
while maintaining that FET is independent from the minimum standard, limited it to a more 
reasonable standard that does not depend on the subjective expectations of investors, and that 
take into consideration the host State circumstances.  These limitations include requiring that the 
expectation be reasonable and maintaining that the stability obligation is not absolute and must 
relate to a specific undertaking by the host State.
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The danger of these interpretations is that they entail the risk of halting regulation in the public 
interest, and encourage challenges to bona fide regulation.  Thus, in addition to being groundless, 
they threaten the normal regulatory process of government.  Indeed, the question remains, 
exactly what government can fully satisfy the interpretation in its regulation?118  
It is not surprising that FET has proven to be an important standard routinely invoked by 
plaintiffs in recent disputes under BITs.119  This is due to its flexibility, ambiguity, and 
convenience in terms of application to any State conduct or omission that, although may not be 
unlawful, is objectionable.  It serves as a fall back claim for claimants where the host State 
conduct does not rise to expropriation or to a violation of other specific obligations under the 
BIT.120  It was also used successfully in Argentina’s financial crises cases.
Customary international law does not recognize a private person's standing in international law 
to bring a claim against a sovereign state. A treaty or a national law is required to bestow such 
standing on a private person.121 Under customary international law, a foreign investor’s remedies 
against a host country are limited to suing the host country in its own courts, requesting 
diplomatic interference from the home country, and requesting the home country to adopt the 
foreign investor’s claim before international tribunals.122
Yet almost all BITs allow foreign investors to seek direct redress of any alleged violation to its 
rights under BITs through arbitration. Under this regime, a foreign investor is not dependent on 
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its home country to adopt its claim.123  Most BITs and the Model BITs thus allow state parties 
and private investors to initiate arbitration against the host country for violations of the rights of 
the foreign investor under such BITs.  The foreign investor is free to seek redress in its own 
name.  This investor-state arbitration is often very broad and covers most conceivable disputes 
that may arise out of investment between a foreign investor and a host State.124
This investor-state arbitration adds to the BITs regulatory dilemma.  On the one hand, it 
guarantees to investors the right to have their cases adjudicated before a forum that is not an 
organ of the host country and without the need to rely on its home state to adopt its claim.125  It 
thus provides a direct enforcement mechanism to their rights under BITs and encourages foreign 
investment to invest in developing States, confident that there is an independent mechanism to 
adjudicate their rights.  
Because arbitration adds to the guarantees provided to private foreign investment, it may help in 
increasing such investment by guaranteeing to the foreign investor its ability to seek adjudicating 
disputes against a foreign host State in a neutral forum.126  It increases the confidence of foreign 
investors to invest in the host state, allows foreign investors to avoid the assumed bias in the host 
                                                  
123 Jeswald W. Salacuse, 
, 31 Fordham Int’l L.J. 144, at 144 (2007). , 
, signed November 14, 
1991; art. VII (3) (entered into Force October 20, 1994) [hereinafter ]; 
, art. X (signed November 5, 1991) [hereinafter ]; 
, signed May 15 1986, art. 7 
(entered into force May 15 1986) [hereinafter ]; 
; signed January 8, 1996, art 7 (entered into force April 
21,1997).
124 Shane Spelliscy, 
, 12 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 95, at 96 (2001); Elihu Lauterpacht, 
, 4 Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 259, at 271 
(1997).
125 Joel C. Beauvais, 10 
N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 245, at 261 (2002)
126 UNCTAD, , UN doc. TD/B/COM.2/62, at 4 (2005); David R. 
Sedlak, , 23 Penn St. Int’l L. 
Rev. 147, at 153,155 (2004); Rainer Geiger,
, 11 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 94, at 105 (2002);  Horn, n. 121, at 6 .
Is there a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute 
Resolution See, e.g. Treaty between United States of America and the 
Argentine Republic concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment
US-Argentine BIT Agreement between the 
Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investment Canada-Argentine BIT Agreement between the 
Government of the  United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal  Protection of Investment
UK-China BIT Agreement between the Government of the  United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Chile concerning the 
Promotion and Reciprocal  Protection of Investment
Burning the Idols of Non-Arbitrability: Arbitrating Administrative Law Disputes with Foreign 
Investors The Inaugural Earl A. Snyder Lecture in 
International Law: International Law and Private Foreign Investment
Regulatory Expropriations Under NAFTA: Emerging Principles & Lingering Doubts,
.
See Investor--State disputes and policy implications
ICSID’s Resurgence in International Investment Arbitration: Can the Momentum Hold?
Regulatory Expropriations in International Law: Lessons from the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment supra 
208
state courts, provides more flexibility, and allows parties to choose arbitrators with an expertise 
in the subject matter.127  
Arbitration is also favoured because of its decisions' finality, speed, and confidentiality, and also 
because it is generally less expensive than courts litigation.128 It is also a means to avoid the 
differences in legal traditions and remedies in different countries.129 Furthermore, investor-state 
arbitration grants foreign investors the ability to directly challenge host states' actions without the 
need for the political interference of the home country.130 It is thus observed that “[w]ithout the 
option to arbitrate, the specter of unfair expropriation might chill cross-border economic 
cooperation and capital flow.” 131
On the other hand, it affects and burdens substantially sovereigns, in general, and developing 
States, more specifically, in taking necessary regulation for public interest purposes.132  Investor-
state arbitration allows the foreign investor to directly challenge the host State regulation. 133 In 
this respect, it can be used to challenge the regulatory autonomy of the host state to impose 
capital controls.  
Most BITs and the Model BITs permit investors from the State parties to initiate arbitration 
against the other State to settle disputes relating to its investment in that State. The consent of the 
host State to arbitration is included in the BIT.  
The scope of the arbitration clauses in BITs is very broad.  In both the UK Model BIT and the 
German Model BIT, the dispute has to be in relation to an “investment” by a national of the other 
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party.134  As previously discussed, the prevailing interpretation of investment under BITs is very 
broad and covers almost any right that has economic value.
The US Model BIT arbitration clause, on the other hand, is more detailed, although similarly 
broad—it provides for investor-State arbitration for disputes “arising out of or relating to (a) an 
investment agreement between” the host State and the foreign investor; (b) “an investment 
authorization”; or (c) an alleged violation of any right under the BIT.135
For the right to transfer capital inflows or outflows to exist under BITs, there must be an 
investment in the host State: the investment must be made or admitted.  The treatment of the 
right to make investment varies between different BITs.  The question is whether there is a right 
to arbitrate a decision not to admit investment under BITs: whether the investor-State arbitration 
covers admission of investment?
Both the German and UK BITs are concerned with the protection of the investment after its 
admission.  The dispute settlement provision in both BITs is only applicable to “investments,” 
which, by definition, are already admitted. 
As for the US BITs, they prohibit discrimination against foreign investors from State parties 
thereto with respect to the right of establishment.136 The question is whether a private investor 
can use the dispute settlement mechanism under US BITs to enforce the right of establishment or 
get damages for the violation thereof.  If this right exists, a private investor may challenge many 
direct and indirect capital controls, like screening procedures.
US BITs define the scope of the investment dispute between a state party and an investor from 
the other party. An example of a relevant provision provides that
For purposes of this Article, an investment dispute is a dispute between a Party and a national or company 
of the other Party arising out of or relating to (a) an investment agreement between that Party and such 
national or company; (b) an investment authorization granted by that Party's foreign investment authority to 
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such national or company; or (c) an alleged breach of any right conferred or created by this Treaty with 
respect to an investment.137  
It lays down three cases where the investor can invoke the arbitration against the host country.  
The first two cases require the existence of an agreement between the state and the investor, or 
authorization from the state. They do not cover the case of an investor who applies for 
authorization to establish a business but gets rejected. The third case covers the violation of the 
BIT by a state party regarding “an investment.”  The investment is defined as “every kind of 
investment in the territory of on one Party owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals 
or companies of the other Party, such as equity, debt, and service and investment contracts….”138
This means that there should be an already established investment in the host state’s territory as a 
prerequisite for allowing investor state dispute.139 An investor cannot challenge through the 
arbitration provided for in the US BIT a host state denial of establishing or acquiring a business, 
even if such rejection violates the US BIT.  
In , a dispute under US-Sri Lanka BIT, the claimant submitted a bid to build a power 
plant on a Build-Own-Transfer basis to improve the supply of power in Sri Lanka.  After 
negotiations with several bidders, the government chose the claimant to enter into a letter of 
intent, which included an exclusivity period for negotiations to conclude the final agreement.  
After further negotiations, the claimant and the government entered into a letter of agreement 
that stated the agreed issues and provided that further negotiations are needed to agree on all 
issues. The parties concluded another agreement to extend the exclusivity period.  All 
agreements explicitly stated that they did not create any obligation upon the parties.  The parties 
failed to conclude a final agreement. The claimant initiated this arbitration, asserting that its 
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expenditures should be considered investment under the BIT.140  The fact that claimant had 
incurred expenditures after the conclusion of the letter of intent was certain. 141  The tribunal 
found that Sri Lanka never admitted these expenditures as investment.  All the agreements 
between Sri Lanka and the claimant explicitly stated that they did not create any obligation.  The 
claimant’s expenditure before the admission of investment that never realized cannot be 
considered an investment. 
The tribunal noted that the BIT, ICSID Convention and States practice under the facts in this 
case do not support the contention “that pre-investment and development expenditures . . . could 
automatically be admitted as ‘investment’ in the absence of the consent of the host State to the 
implementation of the project.”142  
Most importantly, the tribunal found “that while the US-Sri Lanka BIT contains provisions 
regarding the definition of investment and conditions for its admission, they recognize the 
Parties’ prerogative in this respect.”143  It refused “to accept as a valid denomination of 
‘investment’ the unilateral or internal characterization of certain expenditures by the Claimant in 
preparation for a project of investment.”144  
The decision was thus based on the fact that there was no investment admitted by the host State.  
This suggests that even though the US BIT provides for national and most favoured nation 
treatment on the pre-entry phase, the enforcement of such provision through investor-State 
arbitration is dubious. The state party to the BIT may discriminate against national investors of 
the other party in authorizing the establishment of investment without an effective international 
dispute settlement mechanism available to the private investor to enforce such right.
Accordingly, through screening or performance requirements, capital controls  may escape 
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism.  This is, however, limited to an investor who does 
not have any investment in the territory of the state party to the BIT. In case of an investor who 
is discriminated against with regard to extending its investment in the host country, this dispute 
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would be covered under the dispute settlement mechanism because an already admitted 
investment is entitled to the right to expand.  
Additionally, in the case of expansion, it is submitted that a foreign investment that is already 
established under the UK and German Model BITs would be able to challenge a denial of the 
right to expand, since this would be a dispute related to an investment as required under these 
Model BITs. 
Furthermore, after admission, an investment would be entitled to import the necessary capital to 
conduct its business under German and US Model BITs.  In addition, such right might be found 
under the UK Model BIT by virtue of MFN, or fair and equitable treatment clauses.  In such 
cases, the foreign investor would be entitled to seek arbitration for denial or restriction of its 
rights to transfer inward capital necessary for its investment. 
Thus, except in a case of an expansion of an already established investment, the state investor 
dispute settlement mechanism is not available to private investors for the phase prior to 
admittance.145  However, once admitted, a foreign investor will be entitled to seek arbitration to 
import capital necessary for its investment.  
This conclusion may not seem reasonable, since a wrongful rejection to admit a foreign investor 
appears to be more substantial violation of the BIT than discrimination after admission. 
However, a foreign investor who is already in the host country and has already committed capital 
therein is probably in a worse position than a foreign investor who is not in the host country. A 
foreign investor who is already in the host country may need additional capital to face certain 
financial or other circumstances without which the investment may be lost by not being able to 
compete or continue. On the other hand, a foreign investor who is not admitted loses only 
preparatory expenses, but not the main investment capital.
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Under most BITs, contrary to customary international law, a foreign investor does not need to 
exhaust all host state remedies before seeking arbitration under BITs.  Further, these disputes 
normally challenge a measure -- e.g. a legislation or regulation -- made pursuant to the regulatory 
power of the host state. Any decision against the host state might require the state to change or 
cancel its measure.146  This is because, in addition to the damages that the claimant investor will 
be entitled to, other similarly situated foreign investors will have a claim under the same BIT, or 
a similarly worded BIT or treaty. 147
Although arbitration is the method used for resolving these disputes, these are not mere 
contractual claims, but rather claims arising from an alleged breach by the host country of an 
international law obligation.148  In a dispute under a BIT, the applicable rules and laws are the 
relevant BIT provisions and its choice-of-law provision, if any.149  The BIT’s choice of law 
provision could be the host State law or international law or both.150  If there is no choice of law, 
the tribunal chooses the applicable law.  There, the rules of arbitration and are 
relevant.  In ICSID arbitration, for example, the ICSID Convention provides that if there is no 
choice of law, the tribunal must apply the host State law and applicable rules of international 
law.151  
In any case, because the BIT is an international treaty, one of the applicable laws applied by 
investment arbitral tribunals would always be public international law, at least in interpreting 
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BIT’s provision.152  This means that changes in local laws will not substantially affect the rules 
applicable to these disputes, and will leave the host state without the ability to amend the rules 
applicable to these disputes.153
Most importantly, investor-State arbitration also differs from commercial arbitration because it 
involves general policy decisions that involve the public. Such arbitrations are usually publicized 
and attract a great deal of public and media attention. Many groups, including parliamentarians, 
get to announce their views, and this might affect the host countries and investors' approaches 
during the arbitration.154
Another feature of the BIT’s investor-State arbitration is that only the investor can file for 
arbitration and not the host State: the claimant will always be the investor and the respondent is 
always the State, even when the BIT’s provision allows the host State to file for arbitration.  For 
example, under the UK Model BIT, each contracting state gives its unilateral consent to submit 
to ICSID’s jurisdiction regarding any dispute in relation to an investment in its territory.155  This 
allows a foreign investor to request arbitration under ICSID if the dispute is not solved within 
three months.156  Although the provision allows both the host country and the investor to submit 
the dispute to ICSID, the investor has to consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction because only the host 
state is obligated to submit to ICSID under this provision.157 Thus, only the foreign investor 
decides whether to submit the dispute to ICSID.
Additionally, many BITs and Model BITs dispute settlement provisions give the foreign investor 
the option to choose the arbitration forum and rules for arbitration from several options, 
including the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the United Nations Commission on International 
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Trade Law (UNCITRAL).  The Model UK BIT allows the investor and the host state to choose 
between ICSID, the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, and an 
arbitrator or ad hoc arbitral tribunal.  If they cannot agree on one of these methods, the 
arbitration must take place in accordance with UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.158
The US Model BIT allows the foreign investor to choose between ICSID arbitration and 
UNCITRAL arbitration.159  Similarly, the German Model BIT contains two models of arbitration 
between the State and investors.  One is under ICSID Convention and the other is under 
UNCITRAL.160  All of these choices are of ad hoc tribunals, meaning that there is no permanent 
tribunal that decides cases and there is no hierarchy between these tribunals. 
The broad provisions and scope of BITs arbitration provisions mean that laws and regulation of 
host States would be subject to this arbitration.  There are many reasons that arbitration under 
BITs could negatively affect the regulatory powers of the State, especially the developing States.  
These reasons are not theoretical; as will be shown, practice has revealed their validity.  
First, the scope of the tribunal’s coverage is very broad—it applies to any 
dispute relating to investment under the German and UK Model BITs, and to alleged violation of 
the BIT in relation to investment under the US Model BIT.  Accordingly, general regulatory 
measures that affect investment fall under the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction. 
Second, given the broad definition of investment, the broad and ambiguous meanings of the 
standards and obligations under BIT, and the applicable laws to these obligations—especially 
international law—that leave a wide discretion to tribunals to determine the substantive content 
of the rules, tribunals have formulated different rules that encroach on the regulatory discretion 
of host States.161  
Third, there is no precedent system in international arbitration and no appellate body to ensure 
the coherence, stability and certainty—an essential basis to exercise regulatory powers and for 
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investors to know the extent of their rights and risks—of the legal rules.162  This is because in 
arbitration, arbitral tribunals are not obliged to follow precedents. 163
Accordingly, some tribunals have issued contradictory decisions under BITs and other 
investment agreements.  Contradictions come in cases that can be divided into the following 
categories: (i) cases with same facts filed by different but related legal personalities for the same 
claims before different tribunals under different treaties with similar provisions; (ii) cases where 
different tribunals interpret the same provisions in the same treaty differently; and (iii) cases with 
different circumstances but similar investor’s rights alleged to be violated. 164  
For example, in several awards against Argentina arising from its financial crisis, arbitral 
tribunals have reached contradictory interpretations and results as to whether there was a 
necessity that excused Argentina’s violation of its BITs obligations. resulting from the same 
financial crisis under the same BITs and similar BITs provisions.165
The state of necessity was invoked by Argentina in several cases arising from its financial crisis.  
Several arbitral tribunals have ruled differently on the conditions for this defense and on its 
availability in investor-state disputes.  
In , a dispute that resulted from measures taken by Argentina during its financial crisis, 
Argentina argued that it should be exempt from liability for these measures by reason of “state of 
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necessity”. 166 In dealing with this defence, the tribunal based its analysis of the state of necessity 
on Article 25 as reflecting customary international law on the issue.167  It described the crisis as 
resulting from “economic conditions that made it impossible to maintain the fixed exchange rate 
and which gradually led to the greatest default on foreign debt in history and the collapse of the 
Argentine financial markets.” 168  
The tribunal conceded that such change in circumstances affects “the governing legal and 
contractual arrangements.” 169  It further maintained that it was controversial whether the 
financial crisis is caused by foreign investment resulting from opening the country thereto, or by 
the partial reform by Argentina which did not stop the government interference. 170
The tribunal further added that, although the crisis is “severe,[….] in international affairs and 
international law, situations of this kind are not given in black and white but in many shades of 
grey.”171 Because the crisis had what the tribunal called “relative effect,” it cannot be invoked to 
preclude wrongfulness on the part of the host country even though the crisis was severe, and the 
circumstances warranted the host country measures to avoid “total economic collapse.”172
Regarding whether the measures are the only means available for Argentina, the tribunal found 
this issue controversial, because some economists have suggested different methods to deal with 
the crisis other than what Argentina has taken. 173  The tribunal relied on the commentary of the 
International Law Commission to the effect that if there are other ways to deal with the 
necessity, albeit “more costly or less convenient”, the necessity ground shall be dismissed.174
                                                  
166 , para 304. Argentine raised this argument by using other legal bases like . The 
Tribunal, apparently, understood these terms as interchangeable terms for state of necessity, which do not refer to 
different basis. However, constitutes a different basis under Article 23 of The International Law 
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. James Crawford, 
, at 170 (Cambridge University Press, 2002). The 
commentary on Article 23 states that “ does not include circumstances in which performance of an 
obligation has become more difficult, for example due to some political or economic crisis.” at 171.
167 , para 315.
168 , para. 153.
169 , para. 154.
170 , para. 153.
171 , para. 320.
172 , paras. 321-322.
173 ., para. 323.
174 ., para. 324.
CMS Final Award force majeure
Id. force majeure
See The International Law Commission’s Articles 
on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries
force majeure
Id. 
CMS Final Award
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id
218
Accordingly, it found that these measures were not the only method available as required by 
Article 25. 175
The tribunal also distinguished between “severe” crisis and “a situation of total collapse” -- only 
in the latter case can the host state invoke the necessity or emergency clause in the BIT.176
What’s more, the tribunal found that Argentina had created the crisis by the policies of its 
different governments that went back to the 1980s crisis.177  It did not conceal its disapproval of 
the government’s policies and the measures taken by the government “that reached its zenith in 
2002 and thereafter.” 178
The tribunal’s reasoning in makes it hard, if not impossible, to invoke the state of necessity. 
By its introduction of the concept of “relative effect”, it is creating a general rule that the 
necessity cannot be invoked because in the international arena, these issues are “relative”. This 
reasoning evades evaluating the circumstances of the crisis and contradicts the tribunal’s 
description of the crisis as “severe”, and could have cause a total collapse of the economic 
system. 
In addition, it is hardly conceivable that economists will ever agree on one solution for a 
financial crisis. By the tribunal’s reasoning regarding the condition that the measures should be 
the only means available, it closed the door for any host country to invoke necessity in a 
financial crisis. With regard to the means available, it seems the tribunal does not accord any 
degree of deference to the host country in such situations. 
The distinction between “severe” and “total collapse” situation is without basis, vague enough to 
be objectively considered, and the tribunal itself used both terms to describe the crisis in 
Argentina. 
It should be noted that the reasoning of the tribunal regarding the state of necessity was 
criticized as an error of law by the ad hoc annulment committee, which found that the tribunal 
had committed an error of law by equating the BIT Article XI on the effect of state of emergency 
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with customary law on the defense of necessity and by dealing with the latter only, and that its 
interpretation of Article XI was erroneous.179  
In , a dispute under the Argentina-UK BIT, the tribunal refused outright to apply the necessity 
defense.  It reasoned that this is a defense that is available under customary international law 
between States, but is not available in case of State-investor dispute under a BIT.180 It further 
added that since the Argentina-U.K. BIT does not provide for necessity defense, such defense is 
implicitly precluded.  It stated:
[T]he Commentary to the ILC Draft Articles indicates that a defense based on necessity is precluded 
“where the international obligation in question explicitly or implicitly excludes reliance on necessity.”  It 
can be argued that the Argentina-U.K. BIT implies such exclusion. Thus, Argentina would not be entitled 
to invoke necessity to unilaterally revoke vested rights (e.g., a dollar denominated tariff and economic 
equilibrium) designed precisely to operate in situations where a run on the currency would lead to a 
situation of necessity. There is no question that Argentina is entitled to adopt such measures as it deems 
appropriate to emerge from the state of emergency. However, it remains obligated to pay compensation. 
This is one view as to how bilateral investment treaties operate to induce foreign investment. Assuming that 
necessity were to justify some fair and non-discriminatory measure by Argentina, an obligation to 
compensate would still obtain by virtue of the BIT. 181
Yet in , the tribunal found that necessity under public international law applied and that 
that Argentina’s financial crises justified its violation of its BITs obligations.182
Another example is related to two cases that had the same facts where a Dutch company (CME) 
and its American owner, Mr. Ronald Lauder, initiated two arbitration proceedings under two 
different BITs.  The facts relate to an investment in television channel operation in the Czech 
Republic, where Mr. Lauder decided to invest in a corporation that applied for a television 
operating licence.  
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In , the tribunal dismissed claims that the initiation of investigation against CNTS was 
arbitrary and discriminatory. It found that the investigation was not arbitrary because there were 
valid reasons to suspect that CNTS was not complying with the law as amended to require only 
the person who was awarded the licence to broadcast.183  Furthermore, the initiation of 
investigation was not discriminatory because similar investigations were launched against a 
domestic corporation.184
The tribunal also dismissed the investor’s allegation that the Media Council interference in the 
contractual relations between CNTS and CET 21 was arbitrary and discriminatory.  The tribunal 
found that the contractual relation was vague and cast suspicion on whether the licence was 
illegally transferred to CET 21. 185 Therefore, the Media Council had “an objective ground” to 
ask for a clear contractual relation compliant with the law.186  The tribunal then turned to 
allegations of violation of FET.  It found that the State’s actions were reasonable and consistent 
with the proper application of its laws. 187  
The above reasoning of is at odds with ’s reasoning. 188 The CME tribunal found 
that the changes made in 1996 to grant CNTS only the know-how of the license instead of the 
use of the license amounted to a “coercion” that changed the legal foundation for the investor’s 
investment, and destroyed the legal protection of the investment. 189  The agreement of CNTS to 
these changes does not change the nature of its illegality, since CNTS was forced to accept them 
because it did not want to risk losing its investment if the licence was cancelled.190  
In reaching its conclusion, the tribunal found the criterion suggested by Professor Vagts for a 
code of unfair bargaining practices in the negotiations between investors and governments 
governing, which states: “‘Cancellation of the franchise, permit, or authorization to do business 
in which the investor relies, except in accordance with its terms; and Regulatory Action without 
bona fide governmental purpose (or without bona fide timing) designed to make the investor's 
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business unprofitable.’” 191 The tribunal concluded that requiring the 1996 changes was in breach 
of this criterion, and in breach of the BIT, and that the Media Council should have refrained from 
altering the structure it previously agreed upon. 192  
The tribunal, in finding that the Czech Republic breached its FET obligation, rejected the defense 
that other broadcasters were required to have similar arrangements dividing the licence holder 
from the provider of the service as irrelevant.193  The criterion of FET is not national treatment, 
but rather the breach of international law.  By destroying the legal foundation under which the 
foreign investor relied on and made its investment under, the government breached the FET 
obligation.194
While both tribunals have referred to international law in their analyses, a methodological 
difference led to different results.  In , the tribunal analysis assumed the government 
actions were valid, and asked if there was a proof of discrimination or arbitrariness on the 
government side.  Finding no discrimination and legitimate concerns to take the measures, it did 
not find that violation was established.  In on the other hand, the tribunal started its 
analysis by suspecting any measures, including general laws that affect the legal structure of the 
investment.  
This shows that even though the facts were the same, the submissions were identical to both 
tribunals, and the legal provisions were similar and the applicable law was the same; tribunals 
end up issuing completely contradictory awards in light of the ambiguous standards and the 
absence of supervisory or appellate authorities. In addition, many tribunals have ignored State 
practice when interpreting international law and State submissions on the interpretation of 
substantive rules.  For example, the NAFTA tribunal in rejected previous 
tribunal’s interpretation of the same provision, the interpretation submitted by all NAFTA State 
parties and the claimant, and interpreted the provision differently while acknowledging that the 
plain meaning of the provision did not conform to its interpretation.195
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To conclude, this shows a jurisprudence that is not coherent, and arbitral awards which are 
usually unforeseeable.196  Part of the incoherence can be explained by the ambiguity of the terms 
and broad language used in these agreements, and the ambiguity in customary international law 
regarding investment. 197  In cases where customary international law was found to be applicable, 
different tribunals used different criteria and standards.198  This adds to the existing ambiguity in 
this branch of international law and in already ambiguous general international obligations under 
BITs. 199 Some of these cases, which were decided without public involvement, implicated public 
policy issues and have different political and economic effects.200 This threatens the stability of 
the legal system and does not allow for the establishment of coherent and foreseeable norms that 
regulate the actions of countries and foreign investors. 201   
Furthermore, the current ad hoc arbitral tribunals regime is not the appropriate forum for 
challenging general regulatory measures of the host State.202  Without the power to correct and 
unify the interpretation of BITs obligation, balance private and public interest investor-State 
arbitration may not be the best regime to deal with general regulatory issues—arbitration may be 
appropriate in private commercial relations where parties may choose for the convenience of 
flexible procedures and confidentiality, however, it may not be the appropriate forum for 
adjudicating public interest cases involving regulatory powers of states and public policy 
decision. 203  Arbitrators are chosen on a case-by-case basis by parties to the dispute. They do not 
have the independence and accountability attributes of judges, which constitute the basis of their 
legitimacy. 204
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This is partly a result of there being no body responsible for resolving the inconsistencies of the 
decisions under the BITs.205 The absence of binding authorities or an appellate mechanism has 
led to inconsistent body of case law and interpretations.  Although many arbitral awards cite to 
and adopt reasoning of other awards, this is not mandatory, and thus many awards did not follow 
previous decisions.206
In addition, the arbitral tribunals established under BITs have a broad discretion to award 
different kinds of remedies.  The tribunal in affirmed its right to issue declaratory 
decisions, injunctive relief, and other non-pecuniary remedies.207 It based this power on previous 
decisions and academic opinions. The inherent power of an international tribunal to order the end 
of an illegal action or omission that violates international obligations is recognized in these 
authorities.208   In this regard, some FTAs such as NAFTA has restricted the remedies that a 
tribunal can grant to monetary compensation and restitution of property.209 NAFTA expressly 
prohibits injunctions of host States' measures. 210  
Some interpretations of standards like, MFN and FET give them broad applications that apply 
the most favourable treatments provided in different BITs to allow the foreign investor to avoid 
limitations or exceptions in the transfer provisions, restrict the regulatory powers of States to 
vary their treatment to different sectors or to make amendments to their regulatory frameworks.  
Accordingly, under MFN, if the host State has a BIT or other treaty that has free transfer of 
capital inflows or a more favourable treatment in any way from the foreign investor home State 
BIT, the most favourable treatment would apply.  
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The broad obligation of MFN combined with different levels of substantive rights in different 
BITs concluded by a developing country, narrows the regulatory autonomy of this country in 
controlling capital outflows. 
Furthermore, other broad and absolute obligations such FET result in denying the host State the 
ability to amend, even temporarily, its legal regime in response to a crisis.  Other obligations 
such as the prohibition of indirect expropriation could be relevant. However, given the FET 
broad interpretation, it is recognized that it would be the more relevant and applicable to capital 
transfers regulation.
Finally, investor-state arbitration, however, suffers from systemic shortcomings that exacerbate 
the substantive problems.  There is no mechanism to ensure coherence or consistent application 
of the law, which leads to uncertainty and inconsistent interpretations.  Tribunals come to 
different conclusions for the same facts and different interpretations for the same provisions. It 
was shown how tribunals decide in inconsistent ways, even when applying the same rules.  
To conclude, direct and indirect regulation of investment and capital movement under the Model 
BITs may provide rights to transfer capital that considerably restricts the host State monetary 
sovereignty to regulate capital flows, especially during financial crises.  This is augmented by a 
dispute settlement mechanism that is not able to produce consistent and coherent law.
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The issue of international capital movement is an important subject in international economics 
given the amount of international capital movement and its effect on the global economy. It is 
also important in international investment law.  After all, there is no foreign investment without 
transfer of capital.
While much academic work has focused on the transfer of capital in international economics, as 
well as general discussion of the benefits and disadvantages of liberalization of international 
capital movements, writings in international investment law have generally discussed the 
interpretation of transfer provisions in treaties.  Occasionally, they have also addressed other 
treaty obligations and their possible effect on capital controls and restrictions.  The latter works 
have emphasized the importance of BITs’ guarantee of the free transfer of capital without 
analyzing their defects.  They have also focused on the repatriation of capital, rather than the 
admission of capital and the underlying investment.1  In this context, BITs have been advocated 
as a means to induce investment, which may lead to growth and development.  To encourage 
foreign investment, BITs provide that foreign investors are entitled to transfer capital relating to 
their investment.  
While the evidence suggests that foreign direct investment leads to economic growth, it is also 
true that some kinds of investment and capital movement may cause or contribute to economic 
crises.2 This study has analyzed BITs’ regulation of capital movements in the context of its effect 
on the liberalization of capital account and such liberalization’s relationship to financial crises.  
Its principal conclusion is that BITs regulation of capital movement is defective and imbalanced.  
It is in need of reform so that there can be balance between foreign investors’ need to transfer 
funds and the states’ right to regulate the transfer of funds.  This study emphasizes the 
importance of the regulation of international capital movement, and the effect of the 
liberalization of capital transfers on financial crises.  This is where there is an inherent imbalance 
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in BITs that might negate the goals of economic growth and development of the host State.  This 
study concludes that the existing regulation of capital movement under the BIT framework is 
deficient, both substantively and procedurally.  
Substantively, in endeavouring to protect and liberalize foreign investments and capital, BITs, by 
and large, include absolute, broad, and immediate obligations that liberalize the movement of 
capital.  These obligations do not distinguish between different kinds of investment and capital.  
They effectively curtail the regulatory power of the host state without providing criteria to strike 
a balance between investors’ rights and states’ regulatory rights to protect their economies 
against volatile capital, and to prevent and mitigate economic crises.  The substantive defects are 
augmented by a dispute settlement mechanism that has resulted in ambiguous and incoherent 
interpretation of what were already dysfunctional provisions.
The BITs and case law examined in this study reveal that the substantive defects result in a state 
of incoherence and ambiguity amplified by the existence of ad hoc investor-state arbitration that 
has its own structural deficiencies.  These defects are interconnected.  They reinforce each other 
in curtailing the host State’s ability to regulate capital movement.  Yet this study recognizes that 
foreign investors may be victims of these defects as much as States. There is no guarantee that 
the ambiguity of the content of BITs’ obligations, or the incoherence, inconsistency, and 
unpredictability of their interpretation and application will protect the legitimate interests and 
rights of either investors or States.
This concluding chapter starts with a discussion of the necessity of regulating capital movement.  
It then proceeds to identify the substantive and procedural defects in BITs and their 
interrelationships. Finally, it proposes some suggested reforms to BITs.  
Without regulation, liberalization of all kinds of capital movement is likely to cause financial 
difficulties and crises.  Indeed, some kinds of capital flows are inherently volatile.  They follow 
differences in interest rates or speculate on currencies targeting short term gain, without adding 
any value to the economy.  Once the interest or exchange rates change, or interest rates in 
I. The Necessity of Regulation
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another country provide a better profit margin, this capital leaves the host state.  Investors in such 
capital typically move in herds, and their movement can cause financial difficulties and crises.  
The destabilizing effect of these flows should not be underestimated.  A sudden influx of short 
term capital inflows in a country may change its fundamentals, such as raising its currency 
exchange rates.  When this capital moves out of the country for any reason not relating to its 
fundamentals, which were not accounted for in the first place, they cause financial difficulties 
and crises.
In addition, while some kinds of capital flows may not be inherently volatile, they may require 
the existence of an advanced economy and regulation to achieve growth and development in the 
economy.  If no such environment exists, they may also cause economic difficulties.  This makes 
it even more important for developing states to regulate the admission of capital and to have 
some regulatory discretion, in case of financial crises, to regulate capital outflows. 
The movement of capital is not only caused by internal factors related to the host State economy 
or fundamentals.  It also results from external factors that are completely unrelated to the host 
State economy (such as self fulfilling attacks and contagion problems).  This is particularly true 
in developing States where investors may not trust in the host State’s ability to avoid or 
withstand the consequence of crises or financial difficulties that take place internally or in 
similarly situated countries.  Even developed countries may be subject to self-fulfilling attacks or 
contagion problems, as illustrated in the recent financial crisis.  
To avoid the destabilizing effect of certain kinds of capital, States must be able to regulate 
capital movements according to their circumstances.  They may have to use different kinds of 
capital controls and exchange controls on both capital inflows and outflows.  Certainly, the need 
to use capital controls, and their intensity, will depend on the sophistication of the host State’s 
market and its ability to deal with different kinds of capital.  
In normal circumstances, capital controls on the inflow of capital appear to be necessary to avoid 
destabilizing capital, such as capital transfers that follow differences in interest rates for short-
term gain.  The host State may impose direct or indirect capital controls, such as requiring 
approval or registration of capital inflows, whereby the admitted capital stays in the host State 
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for a certain period, or whereby certain taxes are imposed on the admission of capital or 
unremunerated reserve requirement on foreign obligations to avoid speculative capital.  
Also, controls on capital inflows and outflows may be needed in exceptional circumstances to 
prevent or mitigate financial crises or balance of payment difficulties.  Almost all major 
multilateral and regional instruments that deal with foreign investment and capital include certain 
exceptions to allow States to restrict capital movements in these cases.
The obligations regarding the transfer of capital and other obligations are effective immediately.  
The immediate liberalization covers all kinds of capital in all sectors except for sectors included 
in a list: the negative list.  Immediate liberalization combined with the negative list stands in 
contrast with the liberalization of capital under other multilateral agreements and instruments 
that promote gradual liberalization through a positive list.  The available evidence indicates that 
immediate liberalization of all sectors, and for all kinds of capital, does not favour developing 
countries and restricts their ability to prevent and mitigate the consequences of financial crises.  
The immediacy combined with absolute and broad obligations does not allow for the 
development of a sophisticated market that can absorb the various different kinds of capital. 
Accordingly, it is not suitable for developing states.  Further, regulation of capital movement 
may be necessary -- not in relation to the sector or industry, but rather in relation to the kind of 
capital, transaction or investor that should be restricted or accredited.   
This study therefore concludes that the immediate liberalization of capital movement without 
sequencing, distinguishing between different kinds of capital, or allowing for exceptions for 
economic crises and balance of payment difficulties does not consider the different 
circumstances of different states, the history of economic crises, nor the experience of most 
states with capital account liberalization.
“Breadth” relates to the concepts of investment and related capital; the scope of the transfer 
provisions; the obligation to grant fair and equitable treatment (FET); the obligation to accord 
II. Immediacy of Liberalization
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foreign investment most favoured nation treatment (MFN) and national treatment (NT); and the 
prohibition of indirect expropriation.  Each of obligations is broadly drafted, defined and 
interpreted.  This breadth is a source of ambiguity and incoherence, and unduly restricts the 
regulatory powers of the host state over capital movements.  
First, while the transfer provisions are not uniform and interpretation may vary, they are all 
broad in terms of their scope and subject.  This stems from the broad definition of investment, 
which determines the scope of BITs and is broadly defined to include not only foreign direct 
investment, indirect investment and other kinds of investment, but also any kind of asset that has 
economic value.  This, in turn, is reflected in transfer provisions that provide for the free transfer 
of funds related to investment and its returns. This broadens the scope of BITs, its obligations 
and the funds entitled to free transfer far beyond what is necessary to protect and promote 
investment, The capital subject to the transfer obligation includes almost any transfer of funds 
for transaction or asset that has a financial value.  
Second, transfer provisions do not distinguish between long term capital, short term capital, and 
non-productive destabilizing capital that seeks short term gains, since the investment definition 
covers all these kinds of capital; transfer provisions do not always distinguish between them, and 
many cover both inflows and outflows of capital.
Third, other obligations and standards of treatment that apply to the transfer of funds are broad 
and some lack a clear content and meaning.  They have been interpreted by many tribunals in 
favour of the foreign investor and given broad content under which several broad and 
unreasonable obligations were imposed.  These obligations are interpreted without being limited 
to the ordinary meaning of the words of the treaty or to state practice.  
A clear example of this is the FET obligation, with all its breadth and ambiguity.  It has been 
interpreted to include obligations that do not stem from its ordinary meaning, nor are they 
supported by States’ practice.  Such obligations overlap with other obligations under BITs 
including the obligations of transparency, stability; acting consistently, without discrimination or 
arbitrariness; the obligation on the host State to ensure that its regulation and policies are clear, 
and to act pre-emptively to prevent any misunderstanding that a foreign investor may have; and 
the obligation to notify investors beforehand of any changes it seeks to introduce to its laws and 
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policies.  These obligations can paralyze the regulatory powers of States over capital movements.  
They also include obligations that are included in other standards of treatment, like national 
treatment and most favoured nation treatment.
FET has also been interpreted to mean no more than the minimum standard of treatment.  Yet 
while some tribunals interpreted the minimum standards narrowly, many tribunals have 
broadened the scope and content of the minimum standard.
It is not only FET that has been interpreted expansively and inconsistently by arbitral tribunals.  
The NT and MFN clauses have also been broadly interpreted.  In particular, when it came to 
identifying the appropriate comparator (whether it must be an identical competitor of the foreign 
investor, or merely an entity in a similar class which is not identical), tribunals have reached 
inconsistent decisions.  The broader interpretation, when applied to treatment of capital 
movement, may restrict the ability of the host state to treat different kinds of capital differently.  
Similarly, the prohibition of indirect expropriation, which also applies to the transfer of capital, 
is broadly defined and ambiguous.  It does not clearly distinguish between compensable and non-
compensable measures.  This results in an expansive definition of indirect expropriation that 
covers legitimate regulation.
The broad meaning given to investment combined with the rather ambiguous standards which 
are interpreted broadly hinders the regulatory powers of State parties.  These obligations, as 
interpreted by many tribunals, are not always reasonable and do not conform to the rules of 
interpretation under international law nor to expectations of state parties that their legitimate 
regulatory powers would be respected.  While some tribunals, and some State practice, have tried 
to limit these obligations to reasonable standards, inconsistencies and different interpretations are 
bound to continue because of the breadth and ambiguity of the standards, and the freedom of 
each tribunal to interpret the obligations without regard to other tribunals’ interpretations.
Of course, some state practices, such as in the US, have recognized this defect and tried to limit 
and clarify the content of the broad concepts and obligations in its most recent model BIT. Yet 
the bilateral nature of BITs does not permit these defects to be treated globally and only applies 
to future BITs concluded by these countries.
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One of the main problematic issues in BITs is that the liberalization of capital flows is absolute 
and immediate.  The term absolute is used here to refer to two concepts: (i) the absolute nature of 
the obligation; and (ii) the non-contingent nature of the obligation.  The former means that the 
obligation to permit capital transfers does not generally provide for restrictions or exceptions. 
The latter means that the obligation to permit the unrestricted flow of capital is not contingent on 
a third party’s treatment, whether that third party is a national or other foreigner.  
First, many BITs require the transfer of capital related to investment, as illustrated in the Model 
BITs and BITs discussed in this study. This requirement is absolute – the BITs do not permit the 
host state to impose any restrictions or capital controls on the transfer of funds relating to an 
investment regardless of the national treatment of similar transfers.  BITs also specify the 
exchange rate and time of transfer.  Accordingly, a host state cannot impose administrative 
capital controls.  Moreover, it may not be able to impose taxes on transfers. 
This applies to both the repatriation of capital and to the admission of capital.  Yet the UK Model 
BIT takes a different position with regard to capital inflows: it provides that an admission of 
capital shall be in accordance with the host state's laws and regulations. 
Secondly, the Model BITs do not explicitly permit exceptions for economic crises or balance of 
payment difficulties.  This approach is adopted in many BITs.  In other words, host states may 
not be permitted to take certain measures, including capital controls, to prevent or mitigate 
financial crises.   
Third, even when a BIT provides that the host state shall have discretionary powers in regulating 
admission or repatriation of capital – or for exceptions to the absoluteness of freedom to transfer 
funds -- application of other obligations and standards may lead to negating this discretion.  Most 
importantly, the application of the most favoured nation treatment and national treatment as 
broadly drafted in BITs and interpreted by some tribunals could lead to restricting the ability of 
the host state to regulate capital flows or to restrict it in economic difficulties,   If the host state 
has a BIT or another treaty that has free transfer of capital inflows or a more favourable 
IV. Absoluteness of Liberalization
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treatment in any form from the foreign investor home state BIT, the most favourable treatment 
would apply.  
This problem is most acute for developing countries that conclude different BITs with different 
transfer provisions and exceptions.  The application of the MFN principle, for instance, may lead 
to negating the exceptions to the liberalization obligations provided for under one BIT in favour 
of the absolute terms of liberalization that bind the state under another BIT. This in effect renders 
obligation to permit the transfer of funds absolute.  While it could be argued that it is the host 
state duty, in that case, to keep its obligations under different BITs consistent to protect its 
legitimate interests, many developing countries sign these agreements in the context of receiving 
certain economic aid without having the capacity to comprehend their consequences or the 
ability to negotiate their terms.
Similarly, if a host state is enforcing exchange controls or capital controls on certain sectors or 
industries, national treatment may lead to absoluteness in treatment because, under one 
interpretation, foreign investment may be entitled to national treatment granted to another 
industry or sector, even if its national competitors in the identical sector do not benefit from the 
same.  This may apply when a state is providing different exchange rates for different industries 
or sectors.  
Likewise, the interpretation of fair and equitable treatment that restricts the change in the 
regulatory regime of the host state and ensures that the expectations of the foreign investor must 
be protected even if there was no specific guarantee from the government could lead to 
absoluteness of the obligation and restrict the ability of the host state to enforce capital controls, 
even temporarily.  
Fourth, one way to restrict the inflow of certain kinds of capital is to restrict the underlying 
transactions.  This means that the host state may restrict inward capital movement by restricting 
the admission of the underlying investment.  One of the main methods of such regulation is when 
the host state requires prior registration or screening of investment. While most BITs grant the 
host state the discretion to admit investment according to its laws and regulations, tribunals have 
not always given effect to this provision and did not find registration requirement under the host 
state laws applicable under that provision, except when registration is specifically required under 
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the BIT.  Such interpretations further restrict the host state’s discretion to regulate admission of 
capital by restricting its ability to regulate the permission of the underlying transaction.  
Furthermore, many BITs, such as the US BITs, provide for national treatment and MFN in the 
admission of investment, which puts the foreign investors on equal footing with nationals and 
other foreigners in the admission of investment.  While non-discrimination in the admission of 
investment might be favoured to avoid inefficiency and distortions, it further restricts the state 
ability to regulate capital since nationals do not have the same right to free transfer of capital 
under BITs in contrast to foreign investors.  Accordingly, the host state might be more willing to 
permit certain kinds of investment by nationals, while prohibiting foreign investors from the 
same or imposing certain conditions on them.  This would be in violation of the US BITs 
admission provision. Granted, US BITs permit the state parties to derogate from this provision in 
certain sectors included in a list.  However, this method might not be sufficient to protect the 
host state from volatile capital, and many developing countries may not have the capacity to 
determine the sectors they need to include in this list.  Even if there is capacity to determine the 
sectors or transactions that should be included in this list, economic circumstances may change 
to necessitate adding to this list, which are not subject to unilateral change.  
Fifth, even when the host state is dealing with economic crisis, the necessity defence under 
customary international law, as codified by the Vienna Convention, may not be enough to permit 
the state to restrict capital movements to mitigate the crisis, since some tribunals have interpreted 
this exception very narrowly, and still others have found that it does not apply to the relationship 
between a foreign investor and the host state.  Thus, where there is no exception provided for in 
BITs, the necessity provisions might not be available for the host state to restrict capital 
movements during financial crises.  
It is thus submitted that the combination of BITs direct and indirect regulation of capital transfers 
and admission of investment in many cases would lead to liberalization of capital inflows, 
without leaving discretion to the host state to regulate capital inflows directly or through 
regulating the admission of the underlying investment.  This results in complete liberalization of 
capital inflows without restriction as to the kind of capital or exception to deal with economic 
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crises, which is a result of incidental applications and interpretations of different standards and 
obligations and may not have been intended by the parties to BITs.
BITs include a dispute settlement provision that allows foreign investors to seek arbitration to 
resolve disputes with the host state, which covers disputes related to transfer of both capital 
inflows and outflows.  This investor-state arbitration is ad hoc in nature: there is no permanent 
tribunal and for every dispute a new arbitral tribunal is established. The broad terms of BITs, 
their sweeping effects, and the sometimes incoherent interpretations of these provisions, could be 
partly mitigated if the mechanism for their enforcement created coherent and consistent law.  
Investor-state arbitration, however, has demonstrated its lack of capacity in this respect.  
This system of arbitration consists of ad hoc tribunals, which are not bound by precedent, there is 
no hierarchy in their structure, and their decisions are not generally subject to substantive review. 
Accordingly, each tribunal decides the case without need to comply with prior precedents or 
being subject to a revision or appeal by a higher tribunal.  
This results in inconsistencies in the interpretation of BITs obligations and contradictions in the 
results of similar disputes without the chance of correcting and unifying these interpretations.  
The result has been an inconsistent and incoherent body of law, which protects neither the state’s 
regulatory powers nor the legitimate expectation of investors.  These inconsistencies and 
contradictions add to the ambiguity and incoherence in the rules applicable to transfer of capital.  
In addition, they make it more difficult for the host state to ascertain the content of the rules it 
should follow in regulating capital or in case of financial crises.  
For example, after the Argentinean financial crisis, many disputes arose from the measures taken 
by Argentina, which included restricting the movement of capital.  When Argentina invoked 
necessity to defend its measures, several tribunals reached contradictory decisions.  Some found 
that the financial crisis did not satisfy the requirements of necessity under international law; 
others found that the requirements were satisfied, and a tribunal found that the necessity cannot 
be invoked in investor-state arbitration. The Argentinean example shows the difficulty of 
permitting an ad hoc arbitration system to resolve general regulatory and policy issues.  
V. Inconsistent and Incoherent Enforcement
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Furthermore, this system may not be able to maintain the balance between states and investors' 
rights in light of its ad hoc nature and the fact that it can only be invoked by foreign investors.  It 
is submitted that the current investor-state arbitration regime is deficient, and adds to the 
substantive deficiencies in BITs treatment of capital movement.  
The regulation of international capital movements should not be left to a case by case approach. 
It is hardly conceivable for a state to regulate in general under this kind of fragmented dispute 
resolution system, let alone a subject such as the regulation of capital movement.     
Appropriate reforms are structural, substantive, and procedural.  The first basis for reform is the 
recognition that the regulation of international capital movement is a issue that is appropriate for 
a global agreement rather than a bilateral one.  Second, the substantive rules governing the 
transfer of capital under BITs need to be amended to allow for the State’s control over capital 
inflows and for the State’s discretion in dealing with financial crises.  Third, broad rules need to 
be clarified to enable all stake-holders to understand their rights and obligations.  Fourth, the 
existing investor-state arbitration system itself requires reforms that will promote coherence of 
interpretation, and consistent application, of the relevant international law.
A multilateral agreement is preferred over the current fragmented web of BITs.  This would 
allow for both an international standard for the regulation of capital movement and for a 
balanced approach to regulation.   This is because it would be applicable to all States, rather than 
under the current regime where developing countries are the principal focus of BIT obligations. 
It would also allow for a unified policy for dealing with the issue of capital movement, which is 
a global issue that requires a global agreement.
It is vital that the host State be able to regulate the admission of investment and capital to prevent 
destabilizing capital from causing financial crises.  As the most recent financial crisis has proven, 
States that regulate the admission of capital are able to prevent the global financial crises from 
VI. Reform
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threatening their economies.3  Conversely, by allowing the free movement of capital inflows 
without distinguishing between different kinds of capital or the sophistication of the host state 
market, the host state will be subject to the risk of financial crises caused by destabilizing 
capital.4  It is thus proposed that the admission of investment and capital inflows should be 
subject to the host state's discretion.  
For repatriation of capital, the investor should be permitted to repatriate capital relating to its 
investment.  However, general exceptions to prevent and mitigate economic crises are required 
for sustainable liberalization of capital movement. Clear and specific exceptions to the freedom 
to repatriate capital for financial difficulties are needed.  These should be temporary and 
balanced to protect the investors’ legitimate expectations by including certain safeguards to 
protect investors’ rights, such as the ability to make transfers required for loan repayments 
during the temporary period.  They should also allow for the transfer of a certain percentage of 
the capital arising from investment to pay other stakeholders.  This proposal conforms with the 
practice of many states in their BITs and of developed states in making certain binding 
commitments, such as the OECD Codes of Liberalization of capital movements (which permits 
its members to make reservations to liberalization,5 and allows member states to derogate from 
its obligations if they are experiencing economic problems).6
Third, the content of the broad and absolute obligations and standard of treatment under BIT 
should be more specifically and clearly drafted.  NT and MFN should only apply to similar 
competitors such that the host State may vary its regulation according to different activities of 
investors.  FET should be limited to cases where there is specific guarantee of the State for free 
transfer and should not be used to prevent the host state from amending its regulatory policies 
according to its needs.  Also, rules on indirect expropriation should be clarified to enable the 
distinction between the normal regulation of capital and expropriation.  It should not only be 
dependent on whether an economic harm has been caused by the regulation.
                                                  
3 Jonathan D. Ostry, Atish R. Gosh, et el, , IMF Staff Position Note No. 
SPN/10/04, at 13 (2010) (“[T]he empirical evidence suggests that the use of capital controls was associated with 
avoiding some of the worst growth outcome associated with financial fragility.”).  
4 .; Chapter II.
5 , OECD, OECD CODE OF LIBER ALISATION  OF 
CAPITAL MO VEMEN TS, art. 2 (b) (OECD, 2003).
6 , art. 7. 
Capital Inflows: The Role of Controls
See Id see also
OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements reprinted in
Id.
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Fourth, measures to promote coherent and consistent application of the law by investor-state 
tribunals should be introduced.  This may include a move to a system in which arbitrators are 
appointed from a standing body by institutions (rather than by the parties to the arbitration 
themselves), as well as the establishment of a permanent appellate body charged with developing 
consistent and coherent law. Both States and investors could be entitled to appeal arbitral 
tribunals’ decisions to such a body.  
It is recognized that there are obstacles to reforms of this comprehensive nature, not least of 
which is a possible lack of political will to unify the rules applicable to foreign investment.  
Many developed countries would not be willing to have the same rules apply to them, which 
might result when developed countries are parties to the same agreement.  Yet it will be difficult 
for the current BIT regime to endure in the face of the concerted and well-founded criticism of 
its shortcomings.  For instance, the European Commission has successfully challenged the 
current transfer provisions in BITs concluded by European countries because they do not allow 
for derogation in exceptional circumstances.  Similarly, many states have voiced their concerns.  
Some have started to terminate BITs to avoid the imbalanced restriction on their regulatory 
rights.  It would be better for States and investors to take the initiative to propose a new 
multilateral regime that balances the rights and obligations of all parties.
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